New FARC video confirms contributions to Correa

AP:

An hour-long video police found in a computer of an alleged rebel appears to dispel any doubts that Colombia's largest rebel army gave money to the 2006 election campaign of President Rafael Correa of Ecuador.

The video shows the second-ranking commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia reading the deathbed manifesto of founding leader Manuel "Sureshot" Marulanda. The manifesto clearly acknowledges FARC contributions to Correa's campaign, but it's still possible that Correa wasn't aware of them.

AP's video experts say the video is authentic and the person speaking is clearly Mono Jojoy. The letter from Marulanda he is reading from has been publicized previously, but having video of one of the FARC's top commanders reading the letter should help convince some of those with doubts (although I'm sure there are those who will never be convinced). The letter also confirms the authenticity of the laptop data seized during the attack on the Raul Reyes camp in Ecuador in March 2008.

I'm very willing to believe Ecuadorian President Correa didn't know about these contributions. However, someone in his organization took that money from the FARC and promised them assistance in exchange for it. Correa needs to acknowledge that his administration has a problem and do more to weed out the corruption linking his political organization to the FARC.

Crisis in Honduras 9

NYT:

The chief negotiator for the political standoff in Honduras said Thursday that the two camps in the crisis had agreed to a number of compromises, including the formation of a so-called unity government and amnesty for crimes committed by both sides.

Good news that negotiations seem to be progressing quite well over the course of this week. Which makes this AP story seem strange:

A top aide said exiled Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was heading home Thursday to set up an alternative seat of government inside the country, and will use it as his headquarters in a "final battle" against the coup leaders.

Zelaya's foreign minister, Patricia Rodas, said he is "on his way" back, but refused to say how or when he planned to enter Honduras.

Why head back into the country for a "final battle" when negotiations are going well? It could be:

1. Negotiations really aren't going as well as Arias claims.
2. Zelaya doesn't trust Arias to deliver.
3. Zelaya isn't really returning but is using the threat to pressure Micheletti.
   
4. Zelaya feels he has the momentum (in part thanks to protests and blockades) and returning immediately is strategically useful.
   
5. Negotiations might be working, but Zelaya prefers to win his post back rather than negotiate a unity government.
6. Zelaya just likes the drama.

I'm not sure which is correct, but four and five are the most interesting options above. It could be negotiations would work, but Zelaya feels he has his opponents on their heels and wants to move in for the knockout. The question becomes whether he is judging his opponents correctly.

Insulza on the Honduras crisis

This morning I attended an event with OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza speaking about the coup in Honduras and the role of the OAS. The event was sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue and held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My rough headcount says there were over 200 people in attendance.

There were enough interesting details that I'm writing a summary of Insulza's points below. I tried to capture the most interesting information accurately, but I'm writing this up fairly quickly following the event. The audio should be online soon so people can check through and listen for themselves.

Intro: Insulza began with a condemnation of the coup without qualifications. He compared it to the "rape of democracy." He then moved on to discuss various issues, working off four questions brought up by Peter Hakim (paraphrased here):

1. What did the OAS do prior to the coup?
2. Did the OAS act appropriately after the coup?
3. What are the prospects for the Arias-led negotiations?
4. Where does the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter stand now?

OAS actions prior to the coup: Insulza said the OAS was aware of rising tensions prior to the coup and had sent people to Honduras several times to discuss the conflict with all the actors. In the week prior to the election, Insulza received permission from the OAS to send an emergency mission to Honduras but "Zelaya wasn't in a hurry." Specifically, Zelaya said he was going to the SICA meeting followed by the inauguration of the new Panamanian president, and told Insulza that Thursday or Friday (July 2 or 3) would be ok. Insulza moved it up to that Monday (June 29), but of course, the coup happened on Sunday.

Insulza said that the OAS had refused to send an official election observation mission to the non-binding referendum (which is contrary to some reports in the media). The people in country were not part of an election mission.

Insulza also said that he had met with the head of the Supreme Court in the week prior to the coup and knew that there was a pending case against President Zelaya brought by the Attorney General. He also stressed that the Honduran Congress met on Friday evening through 5AM the following morning trying to figure out what to do with the president. At that time they couldn't agree. He said that had they agreed the arrest order was legitimate and voted on it, the debate over whether this was a coup would have potentially been far more difficult. The fact they agreed on Sunday, after the military action, but couldn't agree on Friday when civilian institutions were still in control, helped create the unanimous consensus that their actions weren't justified and that a coup had taken place.

Later in the question and answer session, Insulza said that even though the OAS had acted, he wished the OAS has acted sooner (as in weeks sooner) and done more to bring the two sides together.

The day of the coup: Insulza says he received a call from President Arias the morning of the coup letting him know that Zelaya had been dropped off in his country. In a side note, he said that officials have told him that the president of the Supreme Court seemed confused the morning of the coup and had no idea what was occurring, even if a few days later they were acting as if everything had been done on their orders.

The role of the OAS post-coup: Insulza said the OAS has played a decisive role, getting a unanimous declaration condemning the coup the day that it occurred. It was the OAS action that has ensured no country has recognized the Micheletti government. He said that if the OAS hadn't acted, there would be a much more entrenched dictatorship in Honduras right now. His opinion is quick and decisive OAS action was necessary and improved the situation.

During the Q+A period, Insulza said that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was sending a delegation to Honduras soon (they can do that, even though Honduras has been suspended from the OAS) and that it would report on any rights violations that had occurred.

Zelaya's return attempt: Insulza said the OAS discouraged Zelaya from attempting to fly to Tegucigalpa on Sunday, July 5, and that he did so personally as well. He said that he (the secretary general) was actually barred from flying to Honduras that day by the OAS permanent council because of concerns over safety. The plan was for the other presidents along with Insulza to fly to El Salvador instead, where they could be close to the country, but they had no plans to land in Honduras. They could not stop Zelaya from attempting.

The role of Arias: Insulza said that he called Oscar Arias and asked him to serve as a mediator. Arias said he would agree if the OAS backed him and if both Zelaya and Micheletti would agree. When asked about Arias' formal legal standing on this issue, Insulza said he is designated as the mediator by both the OAS and by SICA. He said having high profile individuals serve as representatives or mediators is a normal OAS process (they name formal representatives for all their electoral missions among other issues), but Arias' qualifications as well as the nature of this event have increased the attention. There was no mention of the US in that process (or really, mention of the US in any of Insulza's remarks).

Insulza was obviously pushing back on criticism that Arias had been brought in after the OAS had failed. He said he wasn't worried about taking credit, but about getting the job done. Still, he seemed to care that credit fall to the correct place in his mind.

The negotiations: Insulza said that things have gone back and forth, but that he is cautiously optimistic for the negotiations this upcoming Saturday. He said he knew other people were becoming impatient, but that they should at least wait to see how this weekend's round of negotiations turn out. He indicated the OAS position is for Zelaya to return as president and that all other conditions that the parties agree to are secondary. He said that questions to resolve are the guarantees for the other institutions of government (the Congress and Supreme Court), questions about amnesty and what to do with the military leaders who acted in the coup.

What if?: Insulza dodged the question of what if negotiations don't work. Hakim pushed the question and Insulza said that the OAS would not justify military action to reinstall Zelaya, but wouldn't say how far the OAS was willing to go. He asked people to "not get restless" about what Plan B would be when Plan A of negotiations led by Arias has not even had time to play out.

Insulza also avoided the question of what if Micheletti holds out at democratic elections take place. Would Honduras be allowed back into the OAS under those circumstances? He said that would be a very unfortunate scenario and would likely divide the OAS. He stressed that the OAS clearly prefers a unanimous decision to one in which it's divided, even if it can get a 2/3 vote.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter: Insulza said that if you had asked him two months ago, he would have told you about his concerns of the democratic charter, but he believes after the OAS response to the Honduras coup, the charter is stronger than ever and at the center of debate. He said the charter was a success, but also had some limitations.

He noted two specific problems that should be discussed and reformed:

1. The charter does not grant easy access to the OAS by other branches of government. He specifically pointed to President Gutierrez dissolving of the Ecuador Supreme Court as an event that highlighted this limitation. The Supreme Court had no way to go to the OAS to ask for the invocation of the charter against the president.
   
   Also on this point, answering a question, Insulza said he saw no difference between a military coup and a "coup of the masses" in which a movement forces a president out of office. He said both fall under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. However, in the case of former Bolivian Presidents Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa, neither requested the OAS to invoke the charter.


2. The charter is not specific enough about what violations to constitutional order really constitute a break with democracy. In this example, he pointed to a set of reforms that President Carter recommended a few years ago that should be a starting point for debate.

Overall, it was a good event and Insulza was pretty frank in his opinions on what occurred. Let me know your comments via e-mail, your blogs or Twitter.

Goodbye Manta, hello Palanquero

Ecuador's government has said Friday is the final day of US counter-drug surveillance operations out of the Eloy Alfaro airfield in Manta, Ecuador.

The US has been in Manta for ten years. Our presence takes up less than 5% of the space on the Ecuadorian base (which is also the city's civilian airfield; if you visit Manta, you're landing on the same runway US Awacs do). We built 22 buildings on the Ecuadorian base including dorms, commissaries and hangers that will now be transferred to Ecuador's military per the original agreement. We also modernized the runway, trained Ecuador's crew on maintaining the airfield at a high standard and improved the emergency response capability.

The presence in Manta has not been without controversy. The original agreement was signed by a disgraced president in the middle of the night with no Ecuadorian congressional approval. That president was soon forced from office over other issues, but it put a taint on the agreement from the start. While the US presence had a good amount of support inside the city of Manta, it was less liked nationwide due to what some people saw as an imposition on Ecuadorian sovereignty. Various controversies over the years, both true and false, eroded support over time.

So now, how does the US monitor and interdict drugs transiting the Pacific? Well, it looks like we're going to Colombia.

An agreement between the US and Colombia has been hinted at for months, but significant details have emerged over the past two weeks. There is coverage today in AP, El Tiempo and Cambio among other places. Also worth reading is the Cambio article from two weeks ago that really provided the first significant details.

Some of the main points taken from the media (none of which are final or verified):

• The agreement involves three air bases (Palanquero near Bogota, Apiay in Meta and Alberto Pouwels on the Caribbean coast). The agreement also says there will be increased US naval visits at Malaga Bay and Cartagena.
  
• The US military presence in Colombia will not exceed the current cap on personnel (800 military, 600 contractors).
• From a legal standpoint, most of the new agreement relies on previous agreements about US military personnel in Colombia.
• There will be no US bases in Colombia and no new bases will be built. The planes will use existing Colombian bases and the Colombian military will retain full control of the bases.
• That said, a bill in the US Congress authorizes $46 million for building a better runway and two airplane hangers at Palanquero.
• Operations will go beyond finding drug traffickers in the Pacific and Caribbean. While El Tiempo notes they could be used for "counter-terrorism" (surveillance of the FARC), I imagine that also means the US might do search and rescue or disaster relief/humanitarian missions (which were not allowed under the Manta agreement).
• The US military may not conduct offensive military operations from the base including operations against the FARC.
• US planes may not cross Colombia's borders into neighboring countries (Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador) without explicit approval of those countries. That should be obvious, but it's worth stating.

Some questions remain.

1. Perhaps most important, how does the US handle human rights concerns? Palanquero was once off limits due to various human rights concerns. Could it happen again? How would that affect the US mission?
   
2. How do Colombia's neighbors react? I'm sure a certain neighbor to the east will show his usual bluster and lack of restraint, but I think the reactions of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Panama to this agreement are going to be important over the long term.
3. How do we handle a change of administrations in Colombia? The Uribe administration wants this agreement. In fact, it may be fair to say they're pushing for more than the US wants. However, the president elected in 2010 could be a bit less eager and nobody can be sure how politics in Colombia (or any other country) will shift 5-10 years into the future.
4. Are these Colombian bases the "replacement" for Manta, or just one step of a broader strategy? Are there potential future agreements for "gas-and-go," overnight landing rights or emergency landing rights with Chile, Peru, Brazil, Panama or even Ecuador (Manta is still a nice runway, even if we don't have a US facility there, and Correa is a reasonable guy)? Those sorts of agreements could extend the range of US counter-drug surveillance without placing US troops on the ground. The Colombia negotiations were kept quiet; are there quiet negotiations going on elsewhere?

Update: More from Adam.

Counterattack by La Familia 2

Washington Post:

Mexican authorities said Tuesday that a super-violent drug cartel called La Familia was responsible for torturing and killing 12 federal agents whose bodies were found dumped alongside a mountain road in the western state of Michoacan late Monday....

...The abduction, torture and execution of such a large group of federal agents marks a steep escalation in President Felipe Calderón's war with the drug cartels. Though drug mafias often clash with local police officials they fail to intimidate or corrupt, a direct counterattack against federal forces is almost unheard-of. The 12 agents represent the highest one-day death toll for federal forces in the three-year-old drug war.

If this didn't have your attention on Monday, it should now. La Familia's attacks are a style of insurgency I don't think the Mexican government was prepared to fight. They need to rethink their strategy on fighting this organization.

A coup with an expiration date

There are almost too many interesting angles to explore with the events in Honduras, but one of the most pertinent at the moment is the idea that we can be 95% certain there will be a democratically elected leader in six months. Whether or not Zelaya returns, it's almost certain that elections will be held in November (if not sooner) and a new president inaugurated in January. That's not something you can say about many coups.

In fact, in the Cold War era in Latin America, restoring democracy within six months of a coup would have been seen as a major triumph. It's a sign we have higher expectations for the region today that every country in the region including the US is still pushing to have Zelaya reinstated rather than just letting the timetable play out.

Last night, Zelaya gave a new ultimatum. Restore him to power within a week, or else. As we've all realized over the past few weeks, Zelaya likes the high-noon showdown in his cowboy hat.

There is a broad, though not unanimous, consensus that the restoration of Zelaya should be done peacefully through negotiations. Forcing democracy on a country isn't particularly easy (see Iraq) and comes with risk of violence and conflict.

But negotiations are slow. They're time consuming. They're boring. That pace works and may even be essential in normal negotiations to bring peace to a long standing conflict or restore democracy after an undemocractic regime has taken power. However, in this case, that amount of time may not be available because the negotiations could be overtaken by events, in this case, elections.

Or to put it another way: Arias sees this as a peace process and is willing to take the time to make it work; Zelaya sees this as a hostage negotiation and believes acting soon is the only option. Which analogy wins the international debate may impact the outcome.

Counterattack by La Familia

Mexican authorities arrested Arnold Rueda Medina, one of the top figures in the La Familia cartel in Michoacan. The arrest was a serious hit to the organization and a win for Mexico's intelligence and security forces. What happened next, however, was a sign of just how powerful some of these transnational criminal organizations have become.

Within two hours, paramilitary units controlled by La Familia attacked the police station where Rueda was being held. Failing to free him, the group began a ten hour, eight city coordinated attack against security forces in the area. Media reports say the attackers used military grade weapons and grenades. Three police officers were killed as they responded to the scene of an accident, only to have a convoy drive by and shoot them down. Two soldiers were assassinated while returning to their barracks. 18 other police officers were wounded in the series of attacks, some of which attacked targets out in the open patroling while others assaulted buildings where security forces were located.

Two of the attackers were arrested and one killed, but it's uncertain at this point how many attackers were involved in all of the incidents combined. It looks like the attacks were focused on security forces with no civilians targeted.

I definitely agree with those who say Mexico needs police and judicial reform to fight the drug traffickers. However, the style of warfare used by La Familia this weekend goes beyond what most police units are capable of fighting. The bad guys are well trained, funded, armed and coordinated. They're willing to go on the offensive, target security forces on patrol, engage in ambushes, go after off-duty officers and assault police stations and military barracks. Most countries' militaries, much less their police units, would be challenged by that level of attack. And remember, most of this cartel is based in only one state in Mexico; there is a broader nationwide security challenge too.

La Familia spent several hours engaging in insurgency-style warfare against the Mexican security forces as a display of force and a warning to the government. I get the sense they held back from doing even more damage by avoiding civilian targets. Any government in the world would have to go back and ask themselves how to prepare for the next high level arrest after these attacks.

Also worth reading, today's LA Times discusses the complexity of the battle the Mexican government faces two and a half years into the Calderon administration.

POLL NUMBERS!!! Divided in Honduras

UPDATE: See updates at the bottom of this post.

Everyone has wondered what the Honduran population thinks about the events over the past two weeks. I think the CID-Gallup poll gives us a first hint, but leaves more questions.

Asked whether they believed the removal of President Zelaya was justified, 41% agreed, 28% disagreed, 31% said don't know/won't answer. UPDATE: Asked if they agree with the actions that removed him, 41% agreed and 46% disagreed. See below.

47% of Hondurans believe Zelaya was convoking the constitutional referendum to change the reelection rules and remain in power. 36% believe he was just trying to change the constitution overall.

63% disagreed with Zelaya's call for a constitutional assembly (the question that was supposed to be asked in the plebicite the Sunday he was overthrown). 23% agree and 15% said they don't know.

In terms of party identification, 38% identified with the Liberal Party, 33% with the National Party and 27% with no party. Both Zelaya and Micheletti are members of the Liberal Party.

A couple warnings: First, these numbers come from interviews done from 30 June-4 July, so they are already a few days old and public opinion could have shifted within that time. Second, polling immediately after a coup comes with a huge set of difficulties. These numbers are probably relatively accurate, but there are some questions that need to be raised.

Some thoughts:

1) The 41-28 split suggests that there is a slight plurality in favor of Zelaya's ouster, but that there certainly isn't a solid majority either for or against it. These numbers suggests a fairly divided public. Even with plurality support, it doesn't look great for Micheletti. (I wrote previously that post-hoc public approval would not justify a coup, no matter what these numbers showed.)

2) Who are you 31% of people with no opinion on the issue? Do you really not know? Do you have a nuanced opinion that can't simply be answered with yes or no? Are you scared to answer because of the military? Are you embarrassed to answer that you're in favor of a "coup"? Do you just not care because you think all politicians are corrupt? It's probably some combination of all five of those choices (with many leaning towards the final "they're all corrupt" reason), but I think digging down into how a third of the population doesn't have an opinion is worthwhile. UPDATE: Now we know that this 31% was answering a slightly different question; see below.

3) While there wasn't a specific approve/disapprove number of Zelaya published, it's pretty clear from these numbers that he wasn't very popular and lacks majority support (in fact, 4 in 10 dislike him enough they think it was ok to oust him early). If he does come back, he's going to face significant challenges.

UPDATE: As discussed over at Greg's blog, there is some controversy over these numbers as there are now a second set of numbers being reported in the media. The Honduran media, most Latin American media, Reuters, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal report the numbers I have above. However, VOA, AP and the NYT report that the numbers are actually 41% in favor, 46% against.

The other number appear to come from an interview Carlos Denton, president of CID-Gallup, on VOA. You can hear the very short audio clip on the website, but there is limited context to it.

Which one is correct? Are they potentially both correct, but answering different questions (sometimes pollsters ask questions 2 or 3 different ways)?

CID-Gallup hasn't placed the data on their website yet and reporters haven't updated their stories or gotten back to me. I'm traveling this weekend, so I won't be around to update much, but I'll look into this more next week.

UPDATE: I have the data from CID-Gallup (thanks to them), and although I'm having a hard time formatting the document correctly to view the graphics, I think I've sorted out what occurred with these numbers. There are two questions related to the removal of President Zelaya. I'm going to keep them in Spanish so everyone can see them:
¿Considera usted que las acciones que tomó Mel Zelaya con respecto a la cuarta urna justificaban su destitución del puesto de Presidente de la República?
Yes 41%, No 28%, Don't know/No answer: 31%.

¿Cuánto está usted de acuerdo con la acción que se tomó el pasado domingo que removió el Presidente Zelaya del país?
Support 41%, Oppose 46%, Don't know/No Answer 13%.

Essentially, the first question asks whether Mel Zelaya deserved to be removed due to his power grab and the second asks if the person agrees with the action that removed him. This is a good example how the wording of questions matters in a poll.

From a media perspective, La Prensa didn't specifically lie but absolutely committed a sin of omission. They had that 41-46 number against the coup, that number is very relevant (potentially more relevant than the other one), and they should have published both numbers. Not doing so created an image about the poll that wasn't true and spread through many other media. They should correct their articles as should everyone who published using their information.

My quick analysis now having the full data: If this poll is accurate, there are (or were last week) 40% of Hondurans strongly in favor of the removal of Zelaya, 30% of Hondurans who strongly support Zelaya and 30% who have a nuanced view, disliking Zelaya but also disagreeing with or not comfortable with the coup and the Micheletti government. Specifically on the coup, 41-46 is essentially a divided country leaning against the coup.

As I've written previously, no post-hoc public opinion number would justify the coup, but none of these numbers are good for Micheletti. Having a 40% base of support would be a great start to running a winning election campaign. However, in trying to consolidate a coup, only starting with 40% makes life very difficult and doesn't suggest the majority public support the government claims.

FARC increasing use of child soldiers

The cover story in this week's Cambio looks at the increased forced recruitment of children by the FARC. As a large number of adult FARC combatants have deserted the group or been killed or captured by the military, the FARC have been using thousands of children in combat, to plant landmines and to guard coca fields.

The article, citing statistics from the UN and the Catholic Church, says the FARC are using younger children in recent years. Child soldiers in some FARC units average under 12 years old (This article says the average age is 11.8 years old; another NGO last year said the average age of FARC child soldiers is 11.5). At times, the FARC are kidnapping children as young as 8 or 9 from their homes and forcing them into combat.

The International Criminal Court considers the mass recruitment of child soldiers a war crime and certain members of the FARC leadership may be charged.

I've covered this issue previously on my blog and this Cambio article helps highlight it again. I highly recommend it for those who read Spanish.

Crisis in Honduras 8

Secretary Clinton met with Honduran President Zelaya to discuss the next steps to restore democracy in Honduras. The US played a major role in getting both Zelaya and Micheletti to agree to meet with Costa Rican President Arias tomorrow (Thursday). While neither side has signaled any movement towards compromise, the fact they're willing to sit down and meet is a good sign. Arias has made clear that he views Zelaya as the legitimate president of Honduras, but is willing to help these negotiations.

Some people have hinted that the selection of Arias is a shot by the US or others at OAS Secretary General Insulza. I don't think that was done intentionally. Arias was simply the person both Zelaya and Micheletti trust to mediate fairly.

***
President Obama mentioned Honduras during a speech in Russia this week:

America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of government on any other country, nor would we presume to choose which party or individual should run a country. And we haven't always done what we should have on that front. Even as we meet here today, America supports now the restoration of the democratically-elected President of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies. We do so not because we agree with him. We do so because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not.

I think the Obama administration response to the events in Honduras has been excellent (which I'll expand on in a future post) and this paragraph explains part of it. Being consistent on democracy issues, even when we have political disagreements, is key to repairing the US reputation in the hemisphere. While criticisms still come in from both the left and the right, I think President Obama is more concerned with improving the hemispheric relationship over the long term than responding to the short term whims of his critics. The administration's actions over the past two weeks will show results on that long-term agenda over the coming years.

New protests in Peru

A major three day strike is expected to begin today in Peru. Indigenous movements and unions are planning to protest the government and demand the resignation of President Garcia's cabinet.

In response, the Peruvian government has authorized the military to support the police in maintaining public order and secure key infrastructure including electricity, airports and roads. The Garcia government is also offering money to groups that work rather than protest.

The groups protesting lack a single leader or a cohesive agenda. The indigenous continue to protest over the Garcia government's development policies and they want the resignation of those responsible for the violence in Bagua. Teachers unions want better wages. Transportation unions have some dispute over traffic fines. Overall, social movements are angry that the Garcia government is restricting their right to protest peacefully.

On the other side, there are rumors of organizations within the police and military complaining that the government has not yet arrested those responsible for the deaths of 24 members of the security forces during the Bagua violence.

Combined with the tough economy, none of this looks good for Garcia. The image is that he doesn't have control over the country outside of Lima and his attempts to regain control look increasingly repressive. Garcia appears very unsure of how to handle the issues he is facing. No, there is no easy solution, but the failure of presidential leadership isn't helping.

Book on MS-13

Sam Logan's This is for Mara Salvatrucha will be released today.

There are weeks in which Central America's problems feel like a throwback to previous decades. Sam's book goes the opposite direction, dealing with the modern problem of youth gangs, illicit trafficking and transnational crime that extends from South America to inside the United States. The issue of transnational crime overlaps with every other key issue in the region including immigration, governance and economic integration.

Over the next few weeks he'll be blogging here about the issues as he's on his media tour.

Two OAS resolutions

On June 3, 2009, the OAS unanimously passed a resolution that created a path for Cuba to rejoin the organization, but said that Cuba must take certain steps. That resolution included the following:

That the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.

So what does the line "practices, purposes and principles of the OAS" actually mean?

On July 5, 2009, the OAS, perhaps unknowingly, answered that question almost perfectly. Here's the July 5th resolution, with a few minor edits in italics:

1. To suspend the Cuban state from the exercise of its right to participate in the Organization of American States, in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The suspension shall take effect immediately.

2. To reaffirm that the Republic of Cuba must continue to fulfill its obligations as a member of the Organization, in particular with regard to human rights; and to urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to continue to take all necessary measures to protect and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.

3. To instruct the Secretary General, together with duly designated representatives of various countries, to reinforce all diplomatic initiatives and to promote other initiatives for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Cuba.... No such initiative will imply recognition of the regime that emerged from this interruption of the constitutional order.

4. To encourage the member states and international organizations to review their relations with the Republic of Cuba during the period of the diplomatic initiatives for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Cuba....

To make the point about the precedent of the resolution, I obviously substituted Cuba for Honduras and removed portions about a specific elected government. Today, both Cuba and Honduras are undemocratic regimes and I expect both to be treated equally.

While most analysts are looking at the consequences of the July 5th resolution on Honduras, the real importance is that it sets the ground rules at the OAS for Cuba and any country in the hemisphere that turns undemocratic.

The June 3rd resolution eliminated a Cold War era anachronism and gave every Western Hemisphere country a path to enter the inter-American system; the July 5th resolution set the 21st century precedent for the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS in dealing with an undemocratic nation. I agree with both resolutions and they should be treated as a pair. Every country in the Western Hemisphere should work to make sure both resolutions are applied consistently.

Crisis in Honduras 7

Honduras' exiled President Zelaya likes the dramatic showdowns and he had one yesterday. Zelaya's plane circled the airport in Tegucigalpa as the Honduran military denied his plane the right to land. The military placed vehicles on the runway to prevent his landing. After giving interviews live with the Telesur crew that was on the plane, Zelaya flew on to Managua and later San Salvador to give an interview with other allies in the region.

Prior to the showdown, several key hemisphere leaders including OAS Secretary General Insulza asked Zelaya to delay his return to give more time for negotiations and avoid violence. Zelaya, however, wanted to force the issue and keep the pressure and attention on the Micheletti regime.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of protesters (estimates vary) marched to the airport and tried to enter. The military and police used teargas against the protesters and apparently also used live rounds as at least one or two were killed and dozens were injured (once again, estimates vary). The interim government extended curfew hours and continues to censor media and take other undemocratic actions on a daily basis.

All of yesterday's drama happened after the OAS officially suspended Honduras, only the second suspension in the organization's history (the other famously being Cuba).

Zelaya has said he will try to return again either today or tomorrow. Zelaya clearly believes he has the Micheletti government on the ropes and can regain control if he continues to pressure the issue daily. I think Zelaya also fears that he'll lose momentum if he stops to negotiate. The worst case scenario for Zelaya, if his goal is to regain power, is that people stop focusing on his fight against the coup and start focusing on the November (or sooner) election that will choose the next democratically elected leader.

UPDATE: As Greg writes, if Zelaya's tactic is to continue the pressure, then Micheletti's tactic is to delay, delay, delay. The challenge for the international community (the OAS in particular) is to find the balance between immediate action that would potentially create a violent confrontation and negotiations (delayed action) that would potentially give the Micheletti government time to consolidate its power. Neither of those two extremes is an optimal solution, but finding the optimal point between negotiations and action is quite challenging.

Happy 4th

Happy Independence Day to everyone in the US. Even though it's a busy news season for Latin America, I'm taking the weekend off.

I'll be back on Monday with analysis of the Mexican elections, the crisis in Honduras and whatever other crazy things the weekend holds.