Six lessons, one month after the coup
The military coup in Honduras occurred one month ago yesterday. The situation still hasn't been resolved, with both sides fighting and negotiating for power. So what have we learned over the past month?
The Micheletti government is dumb. If we didn't know it on day one, we knew it within the first week. The Micheletti government couldn't get its story straight about what occurred the day of the coup. They clearly botched the congressional vote, used a forged resignation letter, shut down media, imposed curfews and failed to get a single other government to recognize them. Violations of the constitution in the name of protecting the constitution and violations of civil liberties in the name of protecting democracy. Now it appears cracks are forming within the coup coalition. They've managed to stay in power for a month, but that's about all they've accomplished.
President Zelaya likes the high stakes showdowns. Even before the coup, Zelaya proved he liked the big showdowns. Since the coup, he's flown into Honduran airspace threatening to land and briefly crossed the land border from Nicaragua. Both times he has put on a show for the media and placed his own life in some danger. However, he's avoided the big final confrontation with the coup government that he has promised at times. It will be interesting to see if/when he makes a third attempt and whether it's symbolic or if he actually aims to finish the job. It also raises questions about what he will do if/when he returns, because he doesn't seem like the sort of president who will sit around as a lame duck for six months and quietly serve out the rest of his term. He's going to push the envelope every time.
The Obama administration is going to work multilaterally. For a region that is historically accustomed to US interference, the Obama administration's multilateral approach has caught nearly everyone by surprise. From day one, they signed on with the OAS condemnation of the coup and worked through the OAS to find a solution. They've given their full support to the Oscar Arias negotiations. They've slowly but surely inched the bilateral pressure up on the Micheletti government including pausing aid and revoking visas. However, they've refused to impose a US solution on the problem. This coup has created the odd scenario of people who used to criticize US interference now demanding the US act and impose its solution. Meanwhile, the Obama administration continues to maintain a steady pace and support the multilateral efforts, even if they seem frustratingly slow or less effective than the usual path the US has taken in Latin America.
The OAS is slow and needs reform. Most people knew the OAS needed reform before the coup took place. However, the coup has highlighted a number of concerns. The OAS couldn't act prior to the coup to prevent it. The Democracy Charter really only works for the executive branch. Once the coup occurred, the OAS tools to resolve it were limited to dialogue, meetings and strongly worded resolutions, which have not proven to be enough. It's also possible that the coup shows the OAS can only work on one big issue at a time and many other needed issues have been pushed off to the side over the past month.
Hugo Chavez speaks loudly and carries a small stick. One month ago President Chavez placed his military on alert and demanded the Micheletti government overthrown. How'd that work out? Chavez has used loud rhetoric, cut off oil deliveries, threatened military action and supported Zelaya's frequent flyer miles. He's denounced the coup and tried to find conspiracies behind it. But in all, he's been completely ineffective in accomplishing what he promised on day one, restoring Zelaya. Looking at Zelaya's travel schedule, it's clear he views Chavez as a propaganda tool (it's nice to have the Telesur camera crew follow him around) and a source of some travel funds, but he doesn't think Chavez can effectively help him in any other way.
Democracy still faces challenges in Latin America. Threats to democracy and civil liberties have existed throughout the region, but this military coup should be a wakeup call of how serious the challenge is. The clashes between branches of governments are not unique to Honduras. The role of the security forces should not be as the final decider of an institutional fight (nor should that role fall to a mob of protesters, a foreign power or other non-constitutional methods). Although the coup in Honduras received big attention because the military overthrew the president, we shouldn't overlook those times the president effectively eliminates or neutralizes another branch of government or basic human right through extra-constitutional means. How these institutional clashes are resolved is a big question for Latin American democracy and finding the balance between protecting democracy and sovereignty remains tough. Right now, the main goal is to restore democracy in Honduras, but the region shouldn't let the broader questions slip off the table.
The Micheletti government is dumb. If we didn't know it on day one, we knew it within the first week. The Micheletti government couldn't get its story straight about what occurred the day of the coup. They clearly botched the congressional vote, used a forged resignation letter, shut down media, imposed curfews and failed to get a single other government to recognize them. Violations of the constitution in the name of protecting the constitution and violations of civil liberties in the name of protecting democracy. Now it appears cracks are forming within the coup coalition. They've managed to stay in power for a month, but that's about all they've accomplished.
President Zelaya likes the high stakes showdowns. Even before the coup, Zelaya proved he liked the big showdowns. Since the coup, he's flown into Honduran airspace threatening to land and briefly crossed the land border from Nicaragua. Both times he has put on a show for the media and placed his own life in some danger. However, he's avoided the big final confrontation with the coup government that he has promised at times. It will be interesting to see if/when he makes a third attempt and whether it's symbolic or if he actually aims to finish the job. It also raises questions about what he will do if/when he returns, because he doesn't seem like the sort of president who will sit around as a lame duck for six months and quietly serve out the rest of his term. He's going to push the envelope every time.
The Obama administration is going to work multilaterally. For a region that is historically accustomed to US interference, the Obama administration's multilateral approach has caught nearly everyone by surprise. From day one, they signed on with the OAS condemnation of the coup and worked through the OAS to find a solution. They've given their full support to the Oscar Arias negotiations. They've slowly but surely inched the bilateral pressure up on the Micheletti government including pausing aid and revoking visas. However, they've refused to impose a US solution on the problem. This coup has created the odd scenario of people who used to criticize US interference now demanding the US act and impose its solution. Meanwhile, the Obama administration continues to maintain a steady pace and support the multilateral efforts, even if they seem frustratingly slow or less effective than the usual path the US has taken in Latin America.
The OAS is slow and needs reform. Most people knew the OAS needed reform before the coup took place. However, the coup has highlighted a number of concerns. The OAS couldn't act prior to the coup to prevent it. The Democracy Charter really only works for the executive branch. Once the coup occurred, the OAS tools to resolve it were limited to dialogue, meetings and strongly worded resolutions, which have not proven to be enough. It's also possible that the coup shows the OAS can only work on one big issue at a time and many other needed issues have been pushed off to the side over the past month.
Hugo Chavez speaks loudly and carries a small stick. One month ago President Chavez placed his military on alert and demanded the Micheletti government overthrown. How'd that work out? Chavez has used loud rhetoric, cut off oil deliveries, threatened military action and supported Zelaya's frequent flyer miles. He's denounced the coup and tried to find conspiracies behind it. But in all, he's been completely ineffective in accomplishing what he promised on day one, restoring Zelaya. Looking at Zelaya's travel schedule, it's clear he views Chavez as a propaganda tool (it's nice to have the Telesur camera crew follow him around) and a source of some travel funds, but he doesn't think Chavez can effectively help him in any other way.
Democracy still faces challenges in Latin America. Threats to democracy and civil liberties have existed throughout the region, but this military coup should be a wakeup call of how serious the challenge is. The clashes between branches of governments are not unique to Honduras. The role of the security forces should not be as the final decider of an institutional fight (nor should that role fall to a mob of protesters, a foreign power or other non-constitutional methods). Although the coup in Honduras received big attention because the military overthrew the president, we shouldn't overlook those times the president effectively eliminates or neutralizes another branch of government or basic human right through extra-constitutional means. How these institutional clashes are resolved is a big question for Latin American democracy and finding the balance between protecting democracy and sovereignty remains tough. Right now, the main goal is to restore democracy in Honduras, but the region shouldn't let the broader questions slip off the table.
Labels: conflict, democracy, honduras, latinamerica, OAS, US-foreign-policy, Venezuela |
