Bloggings by boz

I've seen several recent articles on Chavez's approval numbers, claiming they are declining. I've been regularly posting numbers as I see them on Twitter. Here I'll give a brief analysis of what I think Venezuela's poll numbers currently show:

• IVAD, Datanalysis and Hinterlaces have released polls on a regular basis since the last election. Keller chimes in quarterly with his numbers.
• IVAD and Datanalysis have shown Chavez's approval hovering around 55-60% with occasional spikes up or down. Hinterlaces has polled him much lower, hovering closer to 40. There's a benefit to all three polls as they are fairly consistent in each of their methodologies, so you can track the trends, no matter which methodology you prefer.
• The most recent specific numbers on Chavez's approval?: Ivad 62%, Datanalisis 52%, Keller 45%, Hinterlaces 41%.
  
• Yes, Chavez's approval numbers appear to have trended down over the past few months, but there is nothing yet to suggest this is beyond the usual ups and downs of polling in Venezuela over the past 4 years. It's a notable decline, but is not a major and/or permanent collapse in support as certain analysts have claimed.
• People are more unhappy with current government policies and the current state of the country than they are with the president. This is not unusual. Polling going back at least four years shows a relatively large divide between Chavez's approval and support for specific policies. Most Venezuelans disagree with a good number of the governments economic and security policies and don't like Chavez's more autocratic tendencies, but support for Chavez remains. This should be an opportunity for the Venezuelan opposition, but the opposition has rarely shown itself able to take advantage of this divide.
• Chavez's reelection numbers are low right now (around 40%, even in the best of polls for him). Even people who support Chavez are tiring of him and willing to consider alternatives. A decade is a long time to be in power and many people do want to see a new face. Still, an alternative must prove himself or herself. Chavez's numbers are not so low that anyone can step into the space. We're also not that close to an election, so this number is a bit less relevant than during an actual campaign.
• Why do Chavez's numbers move up and down? All polling shows it has more to do with real world policies than political philosophies. Every poll consistently shows crime, jobs, inflation, electricity, healthcare and other bread and butter issues matter more than Chavez's positions on free speech, democracy and foreign policy. His poll numbers are moving down right now because of those bread and butter issues and would move back up if he fixed some of them. I think both the opposition and the president forget or ignore this sometimes.
  
• Chavez has a base between 25% and 35% of the population. The base has shrunk slightly from its high, but not as much as some articles claim. The base matters, because they can be rallied to vote in high percentages and turnout is a huge factor in elections, giving Chavez a boost over where his general approval numbers are.
  
• There is no unified opposition. I don't mean this in terms of opposition leadership, but in terms of broader public opinion. A significant number of people may dislike Chavez's policies or even Chavez personally, but there is no public consensus as to what the alternative should look like.
• Chavez may not have coattails, but can the opposition organize? Today, Chavez could probably rally support, mobilize his base and win another presidential election. However, an organized opposition could probably win legislative elections against Chavista candidates, who are not as well known or liked as the president. I don't think Chavez has the coattails to guarantee a legislative election win, even if his numbers move back up. Then again, the opposition could also implode or make serious errors sensing a weaker president and fighting over positions before the election. I think the opposition's worst enemy remains their own political capabilities.