Bloggings by boz

Venezuelan Attorney General Luisa Ortega said that the right to freedom of expression must be regulated and limited. The legislation she introduced would punish "media crimes," and she fairly clearly defined those crimes as including significant criticism of the Venezuelan government.

You can read a PDF of the legislation here or watch yesterday's speech by Ortega here. Comment from Quico, coverage from AP. Also, coverage of similar issues last week in the LA Times.

The Chavez government has been chipping away at freedom of speech and freedom of the media for years and this legislation would be a major step in the wrong direction. It would greatly expand the government's power to censor media and the right to free speech by individuals.

Yesterday evening, Ecuador's government dropped a bombshell on the issue of whether the FARC financed Correa's campaign.

Previously, the Ecuadorian government had accused Colombia of falsifying laptops from Raul Reyes and then manipulating the video of Mono Jojoy confirming the laptop information. President Correa asked the FARC to clarify events and the FARC responded quickly saying the Colombian government was lying. As recently as yesterday morning, President Correa was denying the FARC financing.

Then, last night, Ecuador released the Reyes diaries. The diaries essentially confirm the information from the Reyes laptops and Jojoy video and provide additional evidence that the FARC provided funding to Correa's campaign through former Minister of Security Larrea, former sub-minister Chauvin and two other officials. In exchange, those officials allowed Reyes to set up his camps in Ecuador. Reyes said that the FARC "confided in Correa that [the funding] was suicide," indicating the funding wasn't particularly useful and brought more trouble than it was worth. Interestingly, the diaries also indicate that Reyes did not fully trust Larrea, Chauvin and the others, believing they were double agents and connected to Mexican cartels. Ecuador's intelligence agencies say they recently obtained the 20 handwritten pages and have released all the information to the OAS.

The information released indicates President Correa could still legitimately deny knowing anything about this funding and charge his former officials with corruption (which I've suggested previously). Larrea and Chauvin were named in the Reyes laptops almost 18 months ago and every piece of evidence that has come out since has pointed to them. Chauvin has been arrested for ties to other drug traffickers. Correa's unwillingness to prosecute these two for connections to the FARC is simply out of stubbornness, preferring to keep tensions high with Colombia than admit that corruption from the FARC touched his administration. Hopefully the Ecuador government's release of the Reyes diaries is the first step changing that attitude.

Update: There are a few allegations that the Reyes diary is false, but they're being made by unnamed Colombian sources. We'll see if anyone is willing to go on record calling this false.

The military coup in Honduras occurred one month ago yesterday. The situation still hasn't been resolved, with both sides fighting and negotiating for power. So what have we learned over the past month?

The Micheletti government is dumb. If we didn't know it on day one, we knew it within the first week. The Micheletti government couldn't get its story straight about what occurred the day of the coup. They clearly botched the congressional vote, used a forged resignation letter, shut down media, imposed curfews and failed to get a single other government to recognize them. Violations of the constitution in the name of protecting the constitution and violations of civil liberties in the name of protecting democracy. Now it appears cracks are forming within the coup coalition. They've managed to stay in power for a month, but that's about all they've accomplished.

President Zelaya likes the high stakes showdowns. Even before the coup, Zelaya proved he liked the big showdowns. Since the coup, he's flown into Honduran airspace threatening to land and briefly crossed the land border from Nicaragua. Both times he has put on a show for the media and placed his own life in some danger. However, he's avoided the big final confrontation with the coup government that he has promised at times. It will be interesting to see if/when he makes a third attempt and whether it's symbolic or if he actually aims to finish the job. It also raises questions about what he will do if/when he returns, because he doesn't seem like the sort of president who will sit around as a lame duck for six months and quietly serve out the rest of his term. He's going to push the envelope every time.

The Obama administration is going to work multilaterally. For a region that is historically accustomed to US interference, the Obama administration's multilateral approach has caught nearly everyone by surprise. From day one, they signed on with the OAS condemnation of the coup and worked through the OAS to find a solution. They've given their full support to the Oscar Arias negotiations. They've slowly but surely inched the bilateral pressure up on the Micheletti government including pausing aid and revoking visas. However, they've refused to impose a US solution on the problem. This coup has created the odd scenario of people who used to criticize US interference now demanding the US act and impose its solution. Meanwhile, the Obama administration continues to maintain a steady pace and support the multilateral efforts, even if they seem frustratingly slow or less effective than the usual path the US has taken in Latin America.

The OAS is slow and needs reform. Most people knew the OAS needed reform before the coup took place. However, the coup has highlighted a number of concerns. The OAS couldn't act prior to the coup to prevent it. The Democracy Charter really only works for the executive branch. Once the coup occurred, the OAS tools to resolve it were limited to dialogue, meetings and strongly worded resolutions, which have not proven to be enough. It's also possible that the coup shows the OAS can only work on one big issue at a time and many other needed issues have been pushed off to the side over the past month.

Hugo Chavez speaks loudly and carries a small stick. One month ago President Chavez placed his military on alert and demanded the Micheletti government overthrown. How'd that work out? Chavez has used loud rhetoric, cut off oil deliveries, threatened military action and supported Zelaya's frequent flyer miles. He's denounced the coup and tried to find conspiracies behind it. But in all, he's been completely ineffective in accomplishing what he promised on day one, restoring Zelaya. Looking at Zelaya's travel schedule, it's clear he views Chavez as a propaganda tool (it's nice to have the Telesur camera crew follow him around) and a source of some travel funds, but he doesn't think Chavez can effectively help him in any other way.

Democracy still faces challenges in Latin America. Threats to democracy and civil liberties have existed throughout the region, but this military coup should be a wakeup call of how serious the challenge is. The clashes between branches of governments are not unique to Honduras. The role of the security forces should not be as the final decider of an institutional fight (nor should that role fall to a mob of protesters, a foreign power or other non-constitutional methods). Although the coup in Honduras received big attention because the military overthrew the president, we shouldn't overlook those times the president effectively eliminates or neutralizes another branch of government or basic human right through extra-constitutional means. How these institutional clashes are resolved is a big question for Latin American democracy and finding the balance between protecting democracy and sovereignty remains tough. Right now, the main goal is to restore democracy in Honduras, but the region shouldn't let the broader questions slip off the table.

Related to Mexican President Calderon's fight against drug trafficking organizations, today's Washington Post headline "New Strategy Urged in Mexico" has one problem: it suggests there was an old strategy.

Calderon began fighting the drug trafficking organizations from the moment he arrived in office. He asked for and received help from the United States. He's deployed more Mexican military forces than any previous administration. He's shown resolve in the face of violence and seen both progress and setbacks.

Here's the essential problem. Nobody doubts Calderon has the resolve to fight a war against the cartels. But nobody is sure Calderon has a plan to win that war.

Calderon has been so caught up in the day-to-day fight that he's never answered the questions "What does victory look like?" or "What is the 5-10 year plan?" or "What is Mexico trying to accomplish?" Calderon began his fight against cartels without a plan for victory. He just started fighting because he saw a threat and violence. Throughout the past two years, instead of pro-actively implementing a plan, Calderon has tended to react to violence, sending thousands more troops to Juarez, Michoacan and elsewhere following surges in violence from the cartels.

In spite of the media's constant use of the word "strategy," troop deployments and the Merida Initiative aren't strategies, they're military operations and an aid package. Asking the US to counter consumption, fight illicit arms trafficking and block money laundering are probably components of a strategy, but not a strategy in themselves. Police, intelligence and judicial reform are obviously more components. Economic development and countering corruption need to be included. And yes, there is also a role for military operations to achieve a clear objective like defeat a specific cartel unit or secure an area while reforms are taking place.

However, it's up to Calderon and others in Mexico to piece it all together, provide a vision, set the priorities and lay out some sort of timetable for what will likely be a long struggle, one that will likely continue beyond Calderon's presidency and will have to adapt to changing events. Calderon doesn't need a new strategy, he just needs a strategy. Then we can debate the strategy overall and the components within.

Adding to the recent tensions in the Andes, reports surfaced this weekend that the FARC had obtained AT-4 anti-tank weapons. The weapons are made in Sweden and most likely made their way through Venezuela, which purchased the rockets prior to President Chavez's term*.

Discussions about weapons trafficking through Venezuela have existed for a number of years. The laptops seized at the Raul Reyes camp in 2008 indicated that the FARC were attempting to obtain missiles through their contacts in the Venezuelan military. El Tiempo reported recently that President Uribe had discussed the issue of weapons trafficking to the FARC with Chavez.

The issue has flared up as Jane's reported that AT-4 weapons were seized in FARC camps and Semana Magazine linked the weapons trafficking to two military officers close to President Chavez. Today, Uribe and Vice President Santos both discussed the weapons trafficking, saying the Swedish rockets came from Venezuela. The Venezuelan government denies the allegations, claiming they're made up. The Swedish government and the company that manufactures the rockets are investigating how their rockets ended up in FARC hands and there are indications they will ban their sale to Venezuela in the future if these weapons are from the inventory sold to Venezuela. There also remain concerns that the FARC are trying to acquire surface-to-air missiles, which would be much more of a threat to the Colombian government and civilian aviation.

If the rockets seized from the FARC camps are the ones sold to the Venezuelan government, there remain some serious questions about how high up the corruption and knowledge of trafficking goes. Are these low level corrupt officials, the generals that are named by Semana, or even higher?

*Corrected from earlier version

Brazil and Paraguay signed a deal yesterday to triple the amount of money Brazil pays for hydroelectric power coming from the Itaipu dam as well as develop infrastructure to help Paraguay use excess power generation (NYT, Bloomberg, BBC).

Some analysts are framing this deal as realism and power politics to shore up Brazil's regional influence and send a message to Bolivia about energy agreements. Lula, however, framed it within Brazil's broader development goals, saying it's impossible for Brazil to succeed if it has failing neighbors. Therefore, it's in Brazil's interest to help Paraguay improve.

Either way, this was a huge political win for President Lugo, who is completing a campaign promise by getting Paraguay a better deal from the region's most powerful country.

You put your left foot in, you take your left foot out....

Honduran President Zelaya did the hokey pokey on the Nicaragua-Honduras border yesterday. Surrounded by supporters and media, he briefly stepped across the border made a few cell phone calls, touched a sign that said "Welcome to Honduras" and then crossed back to Nicaragua. He was inside the country, barely, for about 15 minutes. It made for dramatic television (I was watching). The move was called "reckless" by Secretary Clinton and others who felt he was putting on a show rather than working towards resolving the situation. Afterwards, Zelaya stepped back into Nicaragua and made some more phone calls. It's unclear what his next move will be, but he is scheduled to be back in Washington next week to meet with US officials.

Both Greg Weeks and Al Giordano question whether Zelaya's actions yesterday actually weaken him because he did not follow through on his return yet again. The interim government, however, was also weakened in that they did not or could not follow through on their threat to arrest Zelaya.

Elsewhere in the country, Zelaya supporters gathered near the border to try to greet the exiled president as he returned, but they were largely blocked by security forces. Clashes took place and there are reports of some casualties. There was a major pro-Micheletti march in San Pedro Sula. Strikes against the de facto government continued elsewhere in the country and there were reports that some police officers were striking over not being paid since the coup.

***

Today's WSJ takes a longer term view of Zelaya through a conservative lens, recounting how the cowboy from an elite land-owning family became an ally of Chavez during his term in office. There seems to be a question of whether it was ideology or political/economic pragmatism.

Dueling op-eds in today's Washington Post, as OAS Secretary General Insulza defends his role as well as the organization's role in the Honduras crisis. Next to that article, Edward Schumacher-Matos calls for Insulza to be fired for his inability to manage the crisis in Honduras before it became a coup as well as work to defend the broader definitions of democracy in the hemisphere that go beyond reinstating Zelaya.

Insulza is correct in his op-ed that the role of the Secretary General is fairly limited by the institution and the desires of the member states. Those who are asking Insulza to go beyond his institutional role to do more to criticize presidents who are going beyond their institutional roles don't realize the problem in their arguments. The Democratic Charter probably needs to be revised, but it's not Insulza's job to do so unilaterally.

When I wrote the post about the new US-Colombia base deal last week, one of the questions was "How do Colombia's neighbors react?" Well, now we know. The deal has increased tensions between Colombia and several other South American countries.

Venezuelan President Chavez has promised to review ties with Colombia including potential trade ties. Chavez also said he will double the number of tanks in Venezuela as protection. Bolivian President Morales has discussed increasing ALBA's military capabilities as a counter-weight to the US military in the hemisphere. Ecuador and Nicaragua also criticized the deal. Several commentators linked the deal to the Honduras coup, saying (rather absurdly) both were signs that ALBA was under attack by the US military.

At one point, Colombian Foreign Minister Bermudez pointed out Chavez's hypocrisy, saying that Colombia never complained about Venezuela's plans for a Russian military base or military cooperation with China. Bermudez said Venezuela should not involve itself in Colombia's sovereign military cooperation decisions the same way Colombia does not complain about Venezuela's. That statement seemed to simply enrage Chavez more.

On top of the base discussions, Colombia-Ecuador tensions have also increased over the past month due to Ecuador's arrest warrant against former Colombian Defense Minister Santos and the video from FARC leader Mono Jojoy that proves the FARC provided money to someone within Correa's campaign.

Two more questions:

1. Will this go beyond harsh words and diplomatic disputes to something more serious? Probably not, but it's still worth watching.
2. Where is the South American Defense Council and UNASUR on these issues? Both the issue of US operations from Colombian bases and the issue of increased ALBA military cooperation seem to be ripe for debate in the new South American military forum. That organization, along with UNASUR, should be the focal point for these discussions rather than the media and diplomatic back and forth. Yet, Chilean President Bachelet said that UNASUR is not looking at the issues. Why?
   

Checking Twitter from my phone last night, I read details of Costa Rican President Arias' new plan being posted followed by a quote from Arias giving the parties eight days to discuss. The very next post, less than a minute later, was news the Micheletti government had rejected the plan. Well, at least you can't accuse them of delaying this time.

Arias new 12 point plan was similar to his previous 7 point plan. It contained a few more carrots for the interim government to limit Zelaya's powers upon his return, but insisted on Zelaya's return as president. The Micheletti government says Zelaya cannot return as president due to various institutional rulings and general stubbornness. (aside: The LA Times claims Zelaya also rejected the new 12 point plan over the limits on his powers; RAJ disagrees).

With Micheletti's rejection of the plan, Zelaya's people said negotiations had "failed" and they're going to escalate the issue beyond Arias. They requested Arias to get SICA, the OAS and the UN to meet against to increase pressure on the interim government. I've seen various conflicting reporting about precisely what Zelaya plans to do next, but it seems likely that he's going to force the issue by crossing the Honduras-Nicaragua border at some point soon.

In other news, there was a protest in favor of the Micheletti government yesterday in the capital, a reminder that Zelaya may face some tough governing tasks if he returns. Strikes and protests from the pro-Zelaya side are expected today. Zelaya supporters are asking for targeted sanctions against the coup government. There's also a fun little spat between the Micheletti and Chavez over whether Venezuelan diplomats can remain in the country that could turn into something bigger if either side pushes harder.

AP:

Mexican drug traffickers are branching out as never before — spreading their tentacles into 47 nations, including the U.S., Guatemala and even Colombia, long the heart of the drug trade in Latin America....

...In dozens of interviews with officials and experts in seven countries, The Associated Press found that the Mexican mobs increasingly buy directly from the cocaine-producing Andes and have begun using countries as distant as Argentina to obtain the raw material for methamphetamine. Mexican gangsters have been arrested as far away as Malaysia as they seek new markets for cocaine and "meth" supply sources.

People who have read this blog long enough know about most of these issues, but AP does a good job pulling it all together. The transnational criminal organizations operating out of Mexico are trying to control the entire illicit trafficking chain from start to finish. In the process, crime has increased in nearly every country in the hemisphere and every government is facing some significant security challenges as TCOs violate their sovereignty. This is one the big regional challenges that defies ideological labels and the region needs to work together to solve it.

Secretary Clinton called Honduras de facto President Micheletti over the weekend to strongly encourage him to work with the Arias negotiations. She also warned him of the significant consequences his government will face if he does not work to peacefully restore democracy to Honduras. Clinton's call was one more step of the Obama's administration's building pressure on the Micheletti government and push for peaceful resolution to bring democracy back to Honduras. I continue to think the Obama administration is doing an excellent job overall on the Honduras crisis.

I'm going to use that point to start commenting (unorganized ranting perhaps) on the Obama administration's management of the Honduras crisis as an element of broader US-Latin America and foreign policy. The points below aren't particularly organized or comprehensive, just me getting a first draft of my thoughts on paper (in an electronic sense).

Secretary Clinton's call and ongoing discussions through other channels go to Obama's promise to communicate with governments, even the ones with whom we have significant disagreements. The willingness to talk frankly with a coup government we do not officially recognize goes beyond Honduras to our policy on Cuba and even Iran and North Korea.

Although the Honduras crisis is only a few weeks old, it's worth looking at how Obama has handled it because it comes with far less of the historical baggage than those other situations which the new president has inherited from his predecessors. I think Obama and Clinton are aware of that fact and are dealing with Honduras as both an individual crisis that needs to be solved but also a potential precedent for how the administration will act and work with multilateral institutions when dealing with future "rogue" nations like the Micheletti government.

As written previously, I think there are necessary parallels between the issues of Honduras and Cuba. The two countries are the only unelected, undemocratic governments in the hemisphere. Even though we don't have diplomatic relations with the governments, we're forced to have limited military relations with both due to our bases at Soto Cano and Guantanamo (great article from McClatchy this about US-Cuban joint military training). They are the only two governments out of the OAS.

It's stunning in the case of Honduras to watch some people in the US and around the hemisphere reflexively call for immediate cutting of aid, removal of ambassadors, economic sanctions, trade embargoes, travel restrictions, cuts on remittances, etc. Those are all weapons in the US diplomatic arsenal that should be considered (I'm not saying they should never be used), but those are also all the same policies that have failed for 50 years in Cuba. Implementing any of those policies on Honduras is something that should be carefully considered and even more carefully executed so we don't end up doing more harm than good as we have with our Cuba policy. The US is still trying to fix early mistakes on its Cuba policy. Let's think before we take an action three weeks into the Honduras crisis that could create decades of bad consequences.

This really comes down to 1) communication, 2) working through multilateral organizations, 3) standing by our principles and 4) thinking before we act. I want the US to still be communicating with the Micheletti government the same way I want the US to communicate with the Cuban government and we should use those communications to discuss human rights and democracy issues. I think working through the OAS and other organizations rather than imposing a unilateral US policy strengthens the hemisphere. On our principles, we've correctly condemned the coup and insisted on Zelaya's peaceful return because he is the elected president of Honduras.

That fourth point of thinking before we act, however, can't be overstated. I discussed before how this crisis has a time element to it. Yet, acting too quickly has its own set of dangers. Every action we take sets a precedent for how we may act with future coups or disruptions in democracy. Every action has the potential to have months, years or even decades of consequences for US-Honduran relations and relations with the rest of the hemisphere if this crisis is not resolved in the near term. Many countries in the hemisphere exhausted their full range of diplomatic and economic levers in the first week of this crisis, leaving only a few countries with continued leverage over the de facto government. Many countries also pulled their ambassador and fully cut off communications with the de facto government, limiting their ability to deal with both sides. The Obama administration's ability to maintain slow, steady pressure on the Micheletti government and communicate with them has been a key reason continued progress has been made during weeks 2 and 3 after the coup. If only we could find a way to turn back the clock and take a similar approach with Cuba.

The Obama administration's biggest success in this crisis may be its patience, its ability to set a steady pace, and its thinking through the consequences before acting, none of which are attributes the United States has historically been known for. A president elected in part due to his ability to manage the fast-paced communications technology and the 24/7 news cycle is succeeding at diplomacy by slowing the hype and taking the long view. We may not have solved the Honduras problem in the first three weeks, but we're setting up a strong and intelligent US policy for the next decade and beyond.

LA Times (and Times of London):

Although Sandinista loyalists like Martinez's father, Mario, still abound, far more common are the disillusioned, like Martinez himself -- those who believe today's version of Sandinista rule is a mockery of the original leftist revolution. "A farce," in the words of renowned Nicaraguan poet and novelist Gioconda Belli.

Most of the top Sandinista comandantes who led the revolution, along with other prominent militants, have long parted company with Ortega. They accuse him of reversing many of the revolution's gains and of using the presidency primarily to expand his own financial and political power base.

Critics charge that Ortega and his forces have systematically persecuted opposition politicians, dissidents and independent journalists, while striking deals with erstwhile enemies, including right-wing businessmen, in the interest of political expediency.

Similar stories have appeared previously. The fact that most of Ortega's former Sandinista allies believe he has betrayed the revolution isn't a new fact, but it's worth reflecting upon at the 30th anniversary.

Many long time readers as well as those who know me in person have heard me talk about the breakdown of the "left" and "right" political ideology labels. The way those ideologies were defined in the Cold War no longer apply well to the hemisphere and too many analysts throw around "left" and "right" without really defining what they mean. There is still some aspect to the labels that deals with how large of a role the state has in the economy, but the broader uses of the terms seem to be more self-defined by each individual leader than based on policy points along an ideological spectrum.*

The Sandinista case in Nicaragua may be one of the most telling on the left-right label debate. In the international media, Ortega is often defined as a "leftist" because he labels himself that way and allies himself with others who label themselves leftists. However, he's opposed by a large portion of the Sandinista revolutionary leadership, he's struck alliances with the most "right-wing" politicians and a conservative wing of the Catholic church. Ortega's "leftism" cannot be defined by his stance towards the US either. While Ortega often launches rhetorical criticism at the US, he remains a member of CAFTA, wants to maintain MCC funds (which have been cut off over the election fraud dispute), continues to cooperate with US military and counter-drug initiatives and even sends students to WHINSEC, hardly loved by supposed "leftists" on the continent.

The issues with Ortega do go beyond ideology. His former allies in the Sandinistas, among others, are also concerned about his anti-democratic moves including consolidation of power in the presidency, corruption, harming of women's rights, fraudulent elections, the banning of political parties and attacks on the media.

If you were to take Ortega's policies and practices rather than his rhetoric and alliances, he's not that far on the spectrum from the right-wing Somoza regime the Sandinistas overthrew 30 years ago. That's why a good portion of the Sandinistas oppose him today.

That's also why I avoid the automatic reference to Ortega as a "leftist" on this blog, although it's almost a given in any international media outlet. Rather than using the conventional wisdom, it's worth rethinking how the political spectrum or spectrums have changed in Latin America. Looking at Ortega's Nicaragua today might be a good place to start. Thirty years after a real left vs. right revolution in Latin America, there's something very different from that Cold War era battle going on in Nicaragua.

*Tim Rogers at the Miami Herald had a great article on this issue as it relates to Central America a few weeks ago.

The talks in Costa Rica did not go well again yesterday. Costa Rican President Arias asked for 72 more hours to mediate an agreement between the two sides.

"What is the alternative to dialogue?... We could face a civil war and bloodshed that the Honduran people do not deserve."

Zelaya said he will walk across the border to Honduras by next weekend if the talks fail. Zelaya's spokesperson called the effort in Costa Rica a failure and said they would not return to Arias-led negotiation. OAS Secretary General Insulza supports Arias' call for 72 more hours and the General Assembly will meet today to discuss the progress (or lack thereof) on the negotiations. The US has said they support Arias' negotiations efforts.

There is still hope that negotiations can work and resolving this peacefully remains the best option. I don't know how likely "civil war" would be in Honduras if negotiations fail, but I agree with Arias that it would be better if the situation was never pushed far enough to find out.

Representatives for the the two sides in the Honduras crisis met yesterday in Costa Rica. Arias proposed, and made public, his seven point plan for peace. The plan included Zelaya returning to the presidency, a reconciliation government, an amnesty proposal, a change in election date and an agreement to not reform the constitution.

Word leaked out early that President Zelaya had agreed to the deal, but Micheletti's de facto government opposed it. Later in the evening, Zelaya's team slightly changed its public position, saying they agreed to the basic outline of the proposal but still did not agree to the specifics, especially on the reconciliation government issue.

On Friday I looked at reasons Zelaya would try to push forward before the negotiations began and the sides seemed to be softening. Today, here's some reasons why the Micheletti government would reject the agreement Arias proposed, which on the surface seems to be a significant compromise between the two sides.

1. They're holding out for a better deal. I don't know what that deal would be.
   
2. The Micheletti government is in a stronger position than most analysts believe (maybe the protests and international pressure aren't affecting them much). They don't believe they have to compromise with Zelaya.
   
3. The Micheletti government thinks their in a strong position. Even if they're weak weak, they're also in denial about how weak they are.
4. They are committed to keeping Zelaya out of the presidency, no matter what the cost, and will hold that position whether they're strong or weak.
5. They don't trust the negotiation positions to hold once Zelaya is back in power. They expect him to violate the agreement as soon as he's reinstalled as president.
6. They're just idiots. The coup government has proven to be incompetent at its ability to manage the situation. Maybe they don't have a good reason.
   

It's worth noting that nobody can be sure whether the Micheletti government is unified in its position. It's quite possible that there are members of Congress, the Supreme Court, the military or others who would support this agreement, but Micheletti himself opposes it (or it could be the other way around). I hope Arias has lines of communication open with all the branches of the Micheletti government, not just the "presidency."

The good news is that negotiations continue today. The two sides are still talking, so maybe a compromise can be reached.

AP:

An hour-long video police found in a computer of an alleged rebel appears to dispel any doubts that Colombia's largest rebel army gave money to the 2006 election campaign of President Rafael Correa of Ecuador.

The video shows the second-ranking commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia reading the deathbed manifesto of founding leader Manuel "Sureshot" Marulanda. The manifesto clearly acknowledges FARC contributions to Correa's campaign, but it's still possible that Correa wasn't aware of them.

AP's video experts say the video is authentic and the person speaking is clearly Mono Jojoy. The letter from Marulanda he is reading from has been publicized previously, but having video of one of the FARC's top commanders reading the letter should help convince some of those with doubts (although I'm sure there are those who will never be convinced). The letter also confirms the authenticity of the laptop data seized during the attack on the Raul Reyes camp in Ecuador in March 2008.

I'm very willing to believe Ecuadorian President Correa didn't know about these contributions. However, someone in his organization took that money from the FARC and promised them assistance in exchange for it. Correa needs to acknowledge that his administration has a problem and do more to weed out the corruption linking his political organization to the FARC.

NYT:

The chief negotiator for the political standoff in Honduras said Thursday that the two camps in the crisis had agreed to a number of compromises, including the formation of a so-called unity government and amnesty for crimes committed by both sides.

Good news that negotiations seem to be progressing quite well over the course of this week. Which makes this AP story seem strange:

A top aide said exiled Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was heading home Thursday to set up an alternative seat of government inside the country, and will use it as his headquarters in a "final battle" against the coup leaders.

Zelaya's foreign minister, Patricia Rodas, said he is "on his way" back, but refused to say how or when he planned to enter Honduras.

Why head back into the country for a "final battle" when negotiations are going well? It could be:

1. Negotiations really aren't going as well as Arias claims.
2. Zelaya doesn't trust Arias to deliver.
3. Zelaya isn't really returning but is using the threat to pressure Micheletti.
   
4. Zelaya feels he has the momentum (in part thanks to protests and blockades) and returning immediately is strategically useful.
   
5. Negotiations might be working, but Zelaya prefers to win his post back rather than negotiate a unity government.
6. Zelaya just likes the drama.

I'm not sure which is correct, but four and five are the most interesting options above. It could be negotiations would work, but Zelaya feels he has his opponents on their heels and wants to move in for the knockout. The question becomes whether he is judging his opponents correctly.

This morning I attended an event with OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza speaking about the coup in Honduras and the role of the OAS. The event was sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue and held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My rough headcount says there were over 200 people in attendance.

There were enough interesting details that I'm writing a summary of Insulza's points below. I tried to capture the most interesting information accurately, but I'm writing this up fairly quickly following the event. The audio should be online soon so people can check through and listen for themselves.

Intro: Insulza began with a condemnation of the coup without qualifications. He compared it to the "rape of democracy." He then moved on to discuss various issues, working off four questions brought up by Peter Hakim (paraphrased here):

1. What did the OAS do prior to the coup?
2. Did the OAS act appropriately after the coup?
3. What are the prospects for the Arias-led negotiations?
4. Where does the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter stand now?

OAS actions prior to the coup: Insulza said the OAS was aware of rising tensions prior to the coup and had sent people to Honduras several times to discuss the conflict with all the actors. In the week prior to the election, Insulza received permission from the OAS to send an emergency mission to Honduras but "Zelaya wasn't in a hurry." Specifically, Zelaya said he was going to the SICA meeting followed by the inauguration of the new Panamanian president, and told Insulza that Thursday or Friday (July 2 or 3) would be ok. Insulza moved it up to that Monday (June 29), but of course, the coup happened on Sunday.

Insulza said that the OAS had refused to send an official election observation mission to the non-binding referendum (which is contrary to some reports in the media). The people in country were not part of an election mission.

Insulza also said that he had met with the head of the Supreme Court in the week prior to the coup and knew that there was a pending case against President Zelaya brought by the Attorney General. He also stressed that the Honduran Congress met on Friday evening through 5AM the following morning trying to figure out what to do with the president. At that time they couldn't agree. He said that had they agreed the arrest order was legitimate and voted on it, the debate over whether this was a coup would have potentially been far more difficult. The fact they agreed on Sunday, after the military action, but couldn't agree on Friday when civilian institutions were still in control, helped create the unanimous consensus that their actions weren't justified and that a coup had taken place.

Later in the question and answer session, Insulza said that even though the OAS had acted, he wished the OAS has acted sooner (as in weeks sooner) and done more to bring the two sides together.

The day of the coup: Insulza says he received a call from President Arias the morning of the coup letting him know that Zelaya had been dropped off in his country. In a side note, he said that officials have told him that the president of the Supreme Court seemed confused the morning of the coup and had no idea what was occurring, even if a few days later they were acting as if everything had been done on their orders.

The role of the OAS post-coup: Insulza said the OAS has played a decisive role, getting a unanimous declaration condemning the coup the day that it occurred. It was the OAS action that has ensured no country has recognized the Micheletti government. He said that if the OAS hadn't acted, there would be a much more entrenched dictatorship in Honduras right now. His opinion is quick and decisive OAS action was necessary and improved the situation.

During the Q+A period, Insulza said that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was sending a delegation to Honduras soon (they can do that, even though Honduras has been suspended from the OAS) and that it would report on any rights violations that had occurred.

Zelaya's return attempt: Insulza said the OAS discouraged Zelaya from attempting to fly to Tegucigalpa on Sunday, July 5, and that he did so personally as well. He said that he (the secretary general) was actually barred from flying to Honduras that day by the OAS permanent council because of concerns over safety. The plan was for the other presidents along with Insulza to fly to El Salvador instead, where they could be close to the country, but they had no plans to land in Honduras. They could not stop Zelaya from attempting.

The role of Arias: Insulza said that he called Oscar Arias and asked him to serve as a mediator. Arias said he would agree if the OAS backed him and if both Zelaya and Micheletti would agree. When asked about Arias' formal legal standing on this issue, Insulza said he is designated as the mediator by both the OAS and by SICA. He said having high profile individuals serve as representatives or mediators is a normal OAS process (they name formal representatives for all their electoral missions among other issues), but Arias' qualifications as well as the nature of this event have increased the attention. There was no mention of the US in that process (or really, mention of the US in any of Insulza's remarks).

Insulza was obviously pushing back on criticism that Arias had been brought in after the OAS had failed. He said he wasn't worried about taking credit, but about getting the job done. Still, he seemed to care that credit fall to the correct place in his mind.

The negotiations: Insulza said that things have gone back and forth, but that he is cautiously optimistic for the negotiations this upcoming Saturday. He said he knew other people were becoming impatient, but that they should at least wait to see how this weekend's round of negotiations turn out. He indicated the OAS position is for Zelaya to return as president and that all other conditions that the parties agree to are secondary. He said that questions to resolve are the guarantees for the other institutions of government (the Congress and Supreme Court), questions about amnesty and what to do with the military leaders who acted in the coup.

What if?: Insulza dodged the question of what if negotiations don't work. Hakim pushed the question and Insulza said that the OAS would not justify military action to reinstall Zelaya, but wouldn't say how far the OAS was willing to go. He asked people to "not get restless" about what Plan B would be when Plan A of negotiations led by Arias has not even had time to play out.

Insulza also avoided the question of what if Micheletti holds out at democratic elections take place. Would Honduras be allowed back into the OAS under those circumstances? He said that would be a very unfortunate scenario and would likely divide the OAS. He stressed that the OAS clearly prefers a unanimous decision to one in which it's divided, even if it can get a 2/3 vote.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter: Insulza said that if you had asked him two months ago, he would have told you about his concerns of the democratic charter, but he believes after the OAS response to the Honduras coup, the charter is stronger than ever and at the center of debate. He said the charter was a success, but also had some limitations.

He noted two specific problems that should be discussed and reformed:

1. The charter does not grant easy access to the OAS by other branches of government. He specifically pointed to President Gutierrez dissolving of the Ecuador Supreme Court as an event that highlighted this limitation. The Supreme Court had no way to go to the OAS to ask for the invocation of the charter against the president.
   
   Also on this point, answering a question, Insulza said he saw no difference between a military coup and a "coup of the masses" in which a movement forces a president out of office. He said both fall under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. However, in the case of former Bolivian Presidents Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa, neither requested the OAS to invoke the charter.


2. The charter is not specific enough about what violations to constitutional order really constitute a break with democracy. In this example, he pointed to a set of reforms that President Carter recommended a few years ago that should be a starting point for debate.

Overall, it was a good event and Insulza was pretty frank in his opinions on what occurred. Let me know your comments via e-mail, your blogs or Twitter.

Ecuador's government has said Friday is the final day of US counter-drug surveillance operations out of the Eloy Alfaro airfield in Manta, Ecuador.

The US has been in Manta for ten years. Our presence takes up less than 5% of the space on the Ecuadorian base (which is also the city's civilian airfield; if you visit Manta, you're landing on the same runway US Awacs do). We built 22 buildings on the Ecuadorian base including dorms, commissaries and hangers that will now be transferred to Ecuador's military per the original agreement. We also modernized the runway, trained Ecuador's crew on maintaining the airfield at a high standard and improved the emergency response capability.

The presence in Manta has not been without controversy. The original agreement was signed by a disgraced president in the middle of the night with no Ecuadorian congressional approval. That president was soon forced from office over other issues, but it put a taint on the agreement from the start. While the US presence had a good amount of support inside the city of Manta, it was less liked nationwide due to what some people saw as an imposition on Ecuadorian sovereignty. Various controversies over the years, both true and false, eroded support over time.

So now, how does the US monitor and interdict drugs transiting the Pacific? Well, it looks like we're going to Colombia.

An agreement between the US and Colombia has been hinted at for months, but significant details have emerged over the past two weeks. There is coverage today in AP, El Tiempo and Cambio among other places. Also worth reading is the Cambio article from two weeks ago that really provided the first significant details.

Some of the main points taken from the media (none of which are final or verified):

• The agreement involves three air bases (Palanquero near Bogota, Apiay in Meta and Alberto Pouwels on the Caribbean coast). The agreement also says there will be increased US naval visits at Malaga Bay and Cartagena.
  
• The US military presence in Colombia will not exceed the current cap on personnel (800 military, 600 contractors).
• From a legal standpoint, most of the new agreement relies on previous agreements about US military personnel in Colombia.
• There will be no US bases in Colombia and no new bases will be built. The planes will use existing Colombian bases and the Colombian military will retain full control of the bases.
• That said, a bill in the US Congress authorizes $46 million for building a better runway and two airplane hangers at Palanquero.
• Operations will go beyond finding drug traffickers in the Pacific and Caribbean. While El Tiempo notes they could be used for "counter-terrorism" (surveillance of the FARC), I imagine that also means the US might do search and rescue or disaster relief/humanitarian missions (which were not allowed under the Manta agreement).
• The US military may not conduct offensive military operations from the base including operations against the FARC.
• US planes may not cross Colombia's borders into neighboring countries (Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador) without explicit approval of those countries. That should be obvious, but it's worth stating.

Some questions remain.

1. Perhaps most important, how does the US handle human rights concerns? Palanquero was once off limits due to various human rights concerns. Could it happen again? How would that affect the US mission?
   
2. How do Colombia's neighbors react? I'm sure a certain neighbor to the east will show his usual bluster and lack of restraint, but I think the reactions of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Panama to this agreement are going to be important over the long term.
3. How do we handle a change of administrations in Colombia? The Uribe administration wants this agreement. In fact, it may be fair to say they're pushing for more than the US wants. However, the president elected in 2010 could be a bit less eager and nobody can be sure how politics in Colombia (or any other country) will shift 5-10 years into the future.
4. Are these Colombian bases the "replacement" for Manta, or just one step of a broader strategy? Are there potential future agreements for "gas-and-go," overnight landing rights or emergency landing rights with Chile, Peru, Brazil, Panama or even Ecuador (Manta is still a nice runway, even if we don't have a US facility there, and Correa is a reasonable guy)? Those sorts of agreements could extend the range of US counter-drug surveillance without placing US troops on the ground. The Colombia negotiations were kept quiet; are there quiet negotiations going on elsewhere?

Update: More from Adam.

Washington Post:

Mexican authorities said Tuesday that a super-violent drug cartel called La Familia was responsible for torturing and killing 12 federal agents whose bodies were found dumped alongside a mountain road in the western state of Michoacan late Monday....

...The abduction, torture and execution of such a large group of federal agents marks a steep escalation in President Felipe Calderón's war with the drug cartels. Though drug mafias often clash with local police officials they fail to intimidate or corrupt, a direct counterattack against federal forces is almost unheard-of. The 12 agents represent the highest one-day death toll for federal forces in the three-year-old drug war.

If this didn't have your attention on Monday, it should now. La Familia's attacks are a style of insurgency I don't think the Mexican government was prepared to fight. They need to rethink their strategy on fighting this organization.

There are almost too many interesting angles to explore with the events in Honduras, but one of the most pertinent at the moment is the idea that we can be 95% certain there will be a democratically elected leader in six months. Whether or not Zelaya returns, it's almost certain that elections will be held in November (if not sooner) and a new president inaugurated in January. That's not something you can say about many coups.

In fact, in the Cold War era in Latin America, restoring democracy within six months of a coup would have been seen as a major triumph. It's a sign we have higher expectations for the region today that every country in the region including the US is still pushing to have Zelaya reinstated rather than just letting the timetable play out.

Last night, Zelaya gave a new ultimatum. Restore him to power within a week, or else. As we've all realized over the past few weeks, Zelaya likes the high-noon showdown in his cowboy hat.

There is a broad, though not unanimous, consensus that the restoration of Zelaya should be done peacefully through negotiations. Forcing democracy on a country isn't particularly easy (see Iraq) and comes with risk of violence and conflict.

But negotiations are slow. They're time consuming. They're boring. That pace works and may even be essential in normal negotiations to bring peace to a long standing conflict or restore democracy after an undemocractic regime has taken power. However, in this case, that amount of time may not be available because the negotiations could be overtaken by events, in this case, elections.

Or to put it another way: Arias sees this as a peace process and is willing to take the time to make it work; Zelaya sees this as a hostage negotiation and believes acting soon is the only option. Which analogy wins the international debate may impact the outcome.

Mexican authorities arrested Arnold Rueda Medina, one of the top figures in the La Familia cartel in Michoacan. The arrest was a serious hit to the organization and a win for Mexico's intelligence and security forces. What happened next, however, was a sign of just how powerful some of these transnational criminal organizations have become.

Within two hours, paramilitary units controlled by La Familia attacked the police station where Rueda was being held. Failing to free him, the group began a ten hour, eight city coordinated attack against security forces in the area. Media reports say the attackers used military grade weapons and grenades. Three police officers were killed as they responded to the scene of an accident, only to have a convoy drive by and shoot them down. Two soldiers were assassinated while returning to their barracks. 18 other police officers were wounded in the series of attacks, some of which attacked targets out in the open patroling while others assaulted buildings where security forces were located.

Two of the attackers were arrested and one killed, but it's uncertain at this point how many attackers were involved in all of the incidents combined. It looks like the attacks were focused on security forces with no civilians targeted.

I definitely agree with those who say Mexico needs police and judicial reform to fight the drug traffickers. However, the style of warfare used by La Familia this weekend goes beyond what most police units are capable of fighting. The bad guys are well trained, funded, armed and coordinated. They're willing to go on the offensive, target security forces on patrol, engage in ambushes, go after off-duty officers and assault police stations and military barracks. Most countries' militaries, much less their police units, would be challenged by that level of attack. And remember, most of this cartel is based in only one state in Mexico; there is a broader nationwide security challenge too.

La Familia spent several hours engaging in insurgency-style warfare against the Mexican security forces as a display of force and a warning to the government. I get the sense they held back from doing even more damage by avoiding civilian targets. Any government in the world would have to go back and ask themselves how to prepare for the next high level arrest after these attacks.

Also worth reading, today's LA Times discusses the complexity of the battle the Mexican government faces two and a half years into the Calderon administration.

UPDATE: See updates at the bottom of this post.

Everyone has wondered what the Honduran population thinks about the events over the past two weeks. I think the CID-Gallup poll gives us a first hint, but leaves more questions.

Asked whether they believed the removal of President Zelaya was justified, 41% agreed, 28% disagreed, 31% said don't know/won't answer. UPDATE: Asked if they agree with the actions that removed him, 41% agreed and 46% disagreed. See below.

47% of Hondurans believe Zelaya was convoking the constitutional referendum to change the reelection rules and remain in power. 36% believe he was just trying to change the constitution overall.

63% disagreed with Zelaya's call for a constitutional assembly (the question that was supposed to be asked in the plebicite the Sunday he was overthrown). 23% agree and 15% said they don't know.

In terms of party identification, 38% identified with the Liberal Party, 33% with the National Party and 27% with no party. Both Zelaya and Micheletti are members of the Liberal Party.

A couple warnings: First, these numbers come from interviews done from 30 June-4 July, so they are already a few days old and public opinion could have shifted within that time. Second, polling immediately after a coup comes with a huge set of difficulties. These numbers are probably relatively accurate, but there are some questions that need to be raised.

Some thoughts:

1) The 41-28 split suggests that there is a slight plurality in favor of Zelaya's ouster, but that there certainly isn't a solid majority either for or against it. These numbers suggests a fairly divided public. Even with plurality support, it doesn't look great for Micheletti. (I wrote previously that post-hoc public approval would not justify a coup, no matter what these numbers showed.)

2) Who are you 31% of people with no opinion on the issue? Do you really not know? Do you have a nuanced opinion that can't simply be answered with yes or no? Are you scared to answer because of the military? Are you embarrassed to answer that you're in favor of a "coup"? Do you just not care because you think all politicians are corrupt? It's probably some combination of all five of those choices (with many leaning towards the final "they're all corrupt" reason), but I think digging down into how a third of the population doesn't have an opinion is worthwhile. UPDATE: Now we know that this 31% was answering a slightly different question; see below.

3) While there wasn't a specific approve/disapprove number of Zelaya published, it's pretty clear from these numbers that he wasn't very popular and lacks majority support (in fact, 4 in 10 dislike him enough they think it was ok to oust him early). If he does come back, he's going to face significant challenges.

UPDATE: As discussed over at Greg's blog, there is some controversy over these numbers as there are now a second set of numbers being reported in the media. The Honduran media, most Latin American media, Reuters, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal report the numbers I have above. However, VOA, AP and the NYT report that the numbers are actually 41% in favor, 46% against.

The other number appear to come from an interview Carlos Denton, president of CID-Gallup, on VOA. You can hear the very short audio clip on the website, but there is limited context to it.

Which one is correct? Are they potentially both correct, but answering different questions (sometimes pollsters ask questions 2 or 3 different ways)?

CID-Gallup hasn't placed the data on their website yet and reporters haven't updated their stories or gotten back to me. I'm traveling this weekend, so I won't be around to update much, but I'll look into this more next week.

UPDATE: I have the data from CID-Gallup (thanks to them), and although I'm having a hard time formatting the document correctly to view the graphics, I think I've sorted out what occurred with these numbers. There are two questions related to the removal of President Zelaya. I'm going to keep them in Spanish so everyone can see them:
¿Considera usted que las acciones que tomó Mel Zelaya con respecto a la cuarta urna justificaban su destitución del puesto de Presidente de la República?
Yes 41%, No 28%, Don't know/No answer: 31%.

¿Cuánto está usted de acuerdo con la acción que se tomó el pasado domingo que removió el Presidente Zelaya del país?
Support 41%, Oppose 46%, Don't know/No Answer 13%.

Essentially, the first question asks whether Mel Zelaya deserved to be removed due to his power grab and the second asks if the person agrees with the action that removed him. This is a good example how the wording of questions matters in a poll.

From a media perspective, La Prensa didn't specifically lie but absolutely committed a sin of omission. They had that 41-46 number against the coup, that number is very relevant (potentially more relevant than the other one), and they should have published both numbers. Not doing so created an image about the poll that wasn't true and spread through many other media. They should correct their articles as should everyone who published using their information.

My quick analysis now having the full data: If this poll is accurate, there are (or were last week) 40% of Hondurans strongly in favor of the removal of Zelaya, 30% of Hondurans who strongly support Zelaya and 30% who have a nuanced view, disliking Zelaya but also disagreeing with or not comfortable with the coup and the Micheletti government. Specifically on the coup, 41-46 is essentially a divided country leaning against the coup.

As I've written previously, no post-hoc public opinion number would justify the coup, but none of these numbers are good for Micheletti. Having a 40% base of support would be a great start to running a winning election campaign. However, in trying to consolidate a coup, only starting with 40% makes life very difficult and doesn't suggest the majority public support the government claims.

The cover story in this week's Cambio looks at the increased forced recruitment of children by the FARC. As a large number of adult FARC combatants have deserted the group or been killed or captured by the military, the FARC have been using thousands of children in combat, to plant landmines and to guard coca fields.

The article, citing statistics from the UN and the Catholic Church, says the FARC are using younger children in recent years. Child soldiers in some FARC units average under 12 years old (This article says the average age is 11.8 years old; another NGO last year said the average age of FARC child soldiers is 11.5). At times, the FARC are kidnapping children as young as 8 or 9 from their homes and forcing them into combat.

The International Criminal Court considers the mass recruitment of child soldiers a war crime and certain members of the FARC leadership may be charged.

I've covered this issue previously on my blog and this Cambio article helps highlight it again. I highly recommend it for those who read Spanish.

Secretary Clinton met with Honduran President Zelaya to discuss the next steps to restore democracy in Honduras. The US played a major role in getting both Zelaya and Micheletti to agree to meet with Costa Rican President Arias tomorrow (Thursday). While neither side has signaled any movement towards compromise, the fact they're willing to sit down and meet is a good sign. Arias has made clear that he views Zelaya as the legitimate president of Honduras, but is willing to help these negotiations.

Some people have hinted that the selection of Arias is a shot by the US or others at OAS Secretary General Insulza. I don't think that was done intentionally. Arias was simply the person both Zelaya and Micheletti trust to mediate fairly.

***
President Obama mentioned Honduras during a speech in Russia this week:

America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of government on any other country, nor would we presume to choose which party or individual should run a country. And we haven't always done what we should have on that front. Even as we meet here today, America supports now the restoration of the democratically-elected President of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies. We do so not because we agree with him. We do so because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not.

I think the Obama administration response to the events in Honduras has been excellent (which I'll expand on in a future post) and this paragraph explains part of it. Being consistent on democracy issues, even when we have political disagreements, is key to repairing the US reputation in the hemisphere. While criticisms still come in from both the left and the right, I think President Obama is more concerned with improving the hemispheric relationship over the long term than responding to the short term whims of his critics. The administration's actions over the past two weeks will show results on that long-term agenda over the coming years.

A major three day strike is expected to begin today in Peru. Indigenous movements and unions are planning to protest the government and demand the resignation of President Garcia's cabinet.

In response, the Peruvian government has authorized the military to support the police in maintaining public order and secure key infrastructure including electricity, airports and roads. The Garcia government is also offering money to groups that work rather than protest.

The groups protesting lack a single leader or a cohesive agenda. The indigenous continue to protest over the Garcia government's development policies and they want the resignation of those responsible for the violence in Bagua. Teachers unions want better wages. Transportation unions have some dispute over traffic fines. Overall, social movements are angry that the Garcia government is restricting their right to protest peacefully.

On the other side, there are rumors of organizations within the police and military complaining that the government has not yet arrested those responsible for the deaths of 24 members of the security forces during the Bagua violence.

Combined with the tough economy, none of this looks good for Garcia. The image is that he doesn't have control over the country outside of Lima and his attempts to regain control look increasingly repressive. Garcia appears very unsure of how to handle the issues he is facing. No, there is no easy solution, but the failure of presidential leadership isn't helping.

Sam Logan's This is for Mara Salvatrucha will be released today.

There are weeks in which Central America's problems feel like a throwback to previous decades. Sam's book goes the opposite direction, dealing with the modern problem of youth gangs, illicit trafficking and transnational crime that extends from South America to inside the United States. The issue of transnational crime overlaps with every other key issue in the region including immigration, governance and economic integration.

Over the next few weeks he'll be blogging here about the issues as he's on his media tour.

On June 3, 2009, the OAS unanimously passed a resolution that created a path for Cuba to rejoin the organization, but said that Cuba must take certain steps. That resolution included the following:

That the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.

So what does the line "practices, purposes and principles of the OAS" actually mean?

On July 5, 2009, the OAS, perhaps unknowingly, answered that question almost perfectly. Here's the July 5th resolution, with a few minor edits in italics:

1. To suspend the Cuban state from the exercise of its right to participate in the Organization of American States, in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The suspension shall take effect immediately.

2. To reaffirm that the Republic of Cuba must continue to fulfill its obligations as a member of the Organization, in particular with regard to human rights; and to urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to continue to take all necessary measures to protect and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.

3. To instruct the Secretary General, together with duly designated representatives of various countries, to reinforce all diplomatic initiatives and to promote other initiatives for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Cuba.... No such initiative will imply recognition of the regime that emerged from this interruption of the constitutional order.

4. To encourage the member states and international organizations to review their relations with the Republic of Cuba during the period of the diplomatic initiatives for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Cuba....

To make the point about the precedent of the resolution, I obviously substituted Cuba for Honduras and removed portions about a specific elected government. Today, both Cuba and Honduras are undemocratic regimes and I expect both to be treated equally.

While most analysts are looking at the consequences of the July 5th resolution on Honduras, the real importance is that it sets the ground rules at the OAS for Cuba and any country in the hemisphere that turns undemocratic.

The June 3rd resolution eliminated a Cold War era anachronism and gave every Western Hemisphere country a path to enter the inter-American system; the July 5th resolution set the 21st century precedent for the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS in dealing with an undemocratic nation. I agree with both resolutions and they should be treated as a pair. Every country in the Western Hemisphere should work to make sure both resolutions are applied consistently.

Honduras' exiled President Zelaya likes the dramatic showdowns and he had one yesterday. Zelaya's plane circled the airport in Tegucigalpa as the Honduran military denied his plane the right to land. The military placed vehicles on the runway to prevent his landing. After giving interviews live with the Telesur crew that was on the plane, Zelaya flew on to Managua and later San Salvador to give an interview with other allies in the region.

Prior to the showdown, several key hemisphere leaders including OAS Secretary General Insulza asked Zelaya to delay his return to give more time for negotiations and avoid violence. Zelaya, however, wanted to force the issue and keep the pressure and attention on the Micheletti regime.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of protesters (estimates vary) marched to the airport and tried to enter. The military and police used teargas against the protesters and apparently also used live rounds as at least one or two were killed and dozens were injured (once again, estimates vary). The interim government extended curfew hours and continues to censor media and take other undemocratic actions on a daily basis.

All of yesterday's drama happened after the OAS officially suspended Honduras, only the second suspension in the organization's history (the other famously being Cuba).

Zelaya has said he will try to return again either today or tomorrow. Zelaya clearly believes he has the Micheletti government on the ropes and can regain control if he continues to pressure the issue daily. I think Zelaya also fears that he'll lose momentum if he stops to negotiate. The worst case scenario for Zelaya, if his goal is to regain power, is that people stop focusing on his fight against the coup and start focusing on the November (or sooner) election that will choose the next democratically elected leader.

UPDATE: As Greg writes, if Zelaya's tactic is to continue the pressure, then Micheletti's tactic is to delay, delay, delay. The challenge for the international community (the OAS in particular) is to find the balance between immediate action that would potentially create a violent confrontation and negotiations (delayed action) that would potentially give the Micheletti government time to consolidate its power. Neither of those two extremes is an optimal solution, but finding the optimal point between negotiations and action is quite challenging.

Happy Independence Day to everyone in the US. Even though it's a busy news season for Latin America, I'm taking the weekend off.

I'll be back on Monday with analysis of the Mexican elections, the crisis in Honduras and whatever other crazy things the weekend holds.

On May 9, 2009, responding to a condemnation by the Inter-American Human Rights Court, Venezuelan President Chavez said:

Venezuela could leave the OAS, convoke the pueblos of the continent and liberate ourselves from those old institutions....

On May 25, in the run up to the OAS meeting where Cuba's status would be debated, Chavez said:

We would feel proud to be out of the OAS and we wouldn't miss it at all.

On July 3, 2009, Honduran Interim President Micheletti quit the OAS, saying:

It is better to pay this high price [leaving the OAS] ... than live undignified and bow the our heads to the demands of foreign governments.

Clearly, Chavez has shown his influence by getting a fellow ALBA nation to quit the OAS just like he promised two months ago. This Micheletti guy must really be influenced by Chavez.

Wait, that's not what happened? :)

As events in Central America have dominated Latin America coverage this week, it's worth looking at what could potentially be a crisis on the horizon.

An Ecuadorian judge ordered the arrest of former Colombian Minister of Defense (and potential presidential candidate) Juan Manuel Santos over his role in ordering the military mission against a FARC camp in Ecuador that killed Raul Reyes in March 2008. Ecuador's government is backing the judicial order and the warrant has been sent to Interpol for consideration on their red alert list. That move would essentially prevent Santos from traveling abroad.

Colombian President Uribe rejected the judges jurisdiction and has promised to protect Santos against what he has deemed a foreign threat by "auxiliaries of the FARC." Extra guard has been placed around Santos to protect him from potential attack and Uribe has promised to extend Santos' diplomatic visa so he can claim immunity if someone attempts to arrest him in a foreign country. Colombia will also take the case to the Inter-American Human Rights Court and the Hague is necessary to defend the former minister.

Tensions between the two countries have continued since the raid 16 months ago. I think most analysts keep waiting for the tensions to die down over time, but this latest stage elevates it to a new level and is a major story in the media of both countries. Both Uribe and Correa get domestic political benefits by standing up for their country against the other. This would be a good place for a respected third party (Brazil?) to step in and try to walk both presidents away from the edge.

Interim Honduran President Micheletti signed a decree that was approved by the Congress suspending several basic constitutional rights for 72 hours including the right to protest, the right to travel freely around the country, the right to privacy of the home and the right to habeus corpus. In addition, media outlets continue to be pressured and censored.

That is not the action of a government that feels popular, safe and secure domestically.

***

Additionally, there is a potential divide forming between the interim president and other politicians.

Micheletti has been over the top with his rhetoric, not apologizing for anything and using foreign pressure as a way of galvanizing support. At one point yesterday, he said it would take a "military invasion" to reinstate Zelaya as president. It's worth recognizing that Micheletti gained a lot of domestic political capital due to Venezuelan President Chavez's statements on the first day of the coup threatening military action to topple him. Chavez backed down from his statement later (my guess is Correa or some other leader pulled him aside and told him to moderate his tone and stop giving the coup government material to work with), but that specific threat definitely strengthened Micheletti's government's position and he's reminding people of it as often as he can (sort of the same way Chavez likes to claim the threat of US interference).

Quietly, however, there are continued reports that other members of the Honduran Congress are working with the OAS and trying to find a compromise solution that would reinstate President Zelaya. There do seem to be some responsible (or at least pragmatic) politicians among the group that recognize the situation is out of control and that Zelaya's reinstatement is the best option. It could be there is simply a good cop-bad cop act going on between Micheletti and the Congress. It's more likely that there is a political divide between the two.

Yesterday, Zelaya received the backing of the United Nations. In a speech, he reiterated his promise to fly back to Honduras on Thursday and says he expects to be recognized as president when he arrives. Zelaya does have supporters in Honduras who may try to back him up. OAS Secretary General Insulza and Argentine President Fernandez de Kirchner will be joining him on his trip. UPDATE: Zelaya moved his trip to Saturday to match the OAS deadline. I've updated this post to reflect that.

Insulza, interestingly, delivered an ultimatum from the OAS last night: Honduras has 72 hours to restore democracy or the OAS will invoke the democracy clause and suspend their membership.

Micheletti, for his part, doesn't seem to be backing down yet. Appearing at a rally with thousands of people who support his government, the interim president denounced the external interference in his country. Micheletti said there is an arrest warrant for Zelaya and the military will take him into custody as soon as he arrives. Zelaya will face trial and a potential 20 year jail sentence. The military said they recognized Micheletti as their commander.

Several reports including today's Washington Post say there is a potential compromise bill working its way through the Congress. The bill would provide amnesty to everyone involved (including Zelaya, Micheletti, the Congress and the military) over the last week, reinstate Zelaya for the remainder of his term and ban him from attempting any constitutional reforms. Apparently, this bill is still in its initial stages, but it's one potential way to provide a peaceful resolution for everyone involved.

I don't know what will happen on Saturday. A compromise agreement like the bill described above may pass. Micheletti may step down unilaterally. Zelaya may be arrested as soon as he steps off the plane. There may be a standoff as security forces try to arrest Zelaya or dispute among themselves. The security forces may turn on Micheletti and reinstate Zelaya. Zelaya could be reinstated and immediately impeached. There may be fighting between Zelaya supporters and opponents in the streets. Micheletti may face a destabilizing internal power struggle within his government and the military. Zelaya may take the presidency, only to face significant protests. Or all may be calm.

Who wins? Victory by knockout or by judges' decision?