Bloggings by boz

This is an attempt to list the top ten events (as opposed to trends) that happened in Latin America in the past ten years.

The list:

1. Vicente Fox wins Mexican election; ends seven decades of PRI rule, 2000.
2. Argentina economic crash and multi-president change, 2001.
3. Venezuela coup attempt, 2002.
4. The fall of Fujimori, 2000.
5. Fidel Castro steps down (somewhat), 2008.
6. 9/11 attacks on US, 2001.
7. Honduras coup, 2009.
8. Colombian military kills Raul Reyes in Ecuador, 2008.
9. Mexico's close election, 2006.
10. UN peacekeeping force enters Haiti 2004.
    

Brief commentary:
I know the decade officially runs from 2001-2010, not 2000-2009. That's why this list is "of the past ten years," not "of the decade." I also know top ten lists are completely arbitrary and debatable. Feel free to write your own if you disagree with this one.

I went out of my way to avoid listing elections unless the elections in and of themselves were significant. Somehow, my arbitrary judgment on that issue managed to have Mexico make the list twice and no others make it (though more would have made the top 25). You can see the list below for the dozen other elections/referendums I considered that didn't make the top ten.

In trying to list out specific events over general trends, it's interesting what gets missed. I think the rise of Brazil and the leadership of Lula is one of the top stories, but there is no specific moment in time I would choose in the top ten. Similar trend vs. event incongruities occur with security, economics, regional institutions and political ideologies, where the trend is important but no individual event rises to the top of the list.

I placed 9/11 on the list because I believe the event had significant implications for Latin America, even though it occurred in the US. There were plenty of events and trends related to US-Latin American relations that could apply, but this was the only one I put in the top ten.

Also considered for this list:

• Elections of Uribe, Lula, Morales, Lugo, Obama, and Funes
• Governments fall in Ecuador (twice), Bolivia (twice) and Haiti.
• Constitutional rewrites and referendums in Bolivia and Ecuador.
• OAS signs Democratic Charter, 2001.
• Debate over Iraq war, 2003.
• Cuba cracks down on dissidents, 2003.
• Venezuela oil strike (2003), recall referendum (2004) and constitutional referendums (07, 09).
• APEC summit in Chile, Hu Jintao trip to Latin America, 2004.
• Colombia passes Peace and Justice Law as AUC demobilizes, 2005.
• Passing of DR-CAFTA, 2005.
• Diplomatic fights over OAS Secretary General (2005) and UN Security Council seat (2006).
• Summits of the Americas in Mar de Plata (2005) and T&T (2009).
• Passing of the Merida Initiative, 2008.
• Colombia hostage rescue, 2008.
• Bolivia Pando killings, 2008.
• Fujimori conviction, 2009.
• Colombia signs new security agreement with US, 2009.

I'm sure I missed some events. Feel free to email, Twitter or write on your own blogs with comments, criticisms, etc.

Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Argentina. That was the list of countries that I wrote in January were likely to be less stable than Bolivia in 2009 (go back to the post to see why I used that benchmark). I defined instability as facing threat of government overthrow or significant protests or violence. So how did I do?

As 2009 comes to a close, the Colombia-Venezuelan tensions are increasing. Yesterday, Venezuelan President Chavez said that the US and Colombia are plotting to attack inside of Venezuela and then place bodies at the site of the attack to claim it was a FARC camp. He displayed new weaponry, called on his soldiers to be alert and called on civilians to join militias.

Previously, when Chavez said he feared an attack like the March 2008 attack that killed Raul Reyes in Ecuador, Colombian Defense Minister Silva said that fear showed Chavez knows there are FARC leaders in Venezuelan territory. Chavez's claim of a future attack on a fake camp this week is probably a response to that statement.

Chavez's statement creates plenty of logical twists that can be played out to absurd levels (What if Colombia attacks a fake FARC camp? What if Venezuela fakes an attack by Colombia on a fake FARC camp to justify their own attack on Colombia? What if the FARC fake an attack on themselves to spark a war? What if pro-Chavez militias or Colombian paramilitaries attack a real or fake FARC camp in Venezuela to spark more violence? What if Brazil infiltrates the border region and creates a scene that looks like a Colombian attack on a fake FARC camp in Venezuela in order to spark a war between two rivals on the continent? What if...?) Or we can take the Occam's razor approach and think that if Colombia hits a FARC camp near the Venezuelan border it is probably real. Colombia doesn't want a war with Venezuela, but they do want to take out the FARC leadership.

As concerned as Chavez is about a Colombian attack, Colombia has also become very concerned about a possible Venezuelan attack on Colombian territory. El Tiempo has two articles on Colombia's defense strategy and spending over the coming four years, which includes significant spending on "dissuasive capacity," hoping to deter Venezuela from an attack. Combine that with the weapons Venezuela has purchased to deter Colombia, which were on display yesterday, and there is a significant capacity for destruction along the border.

The region needs to step up and get involved before those weapons are used. One way would be to put into place steps to be taken if a cross border attack occurs in either direction. There needs to be a capacity to investigate what occurred by a neutral party and there should be predetermined diplomatic steps that can slow down the tensions and prevent an escalation if an attack occurs. Investigating, slowing down and scaling back the tensions after an attack are key to preventing an unlikely but unfortunately possible full scale war. This would be an important job for the UN, OAS or UNASUR, should they want to get around to it.

Before Christmas, within the ongoing daily back and forth verbal battle between Colombia and Venezuela, President Chavez claimed an unmanned aerial drone had crossed the border. Colombian Minister of Defense responded that Colombia doesn't have that capability and perhaps Venezuelan soldiers had simply seen Papa Noel. It was an unserious response to an unfounded accusation.

I thought the issue would have been dropped, but it turns out that Venezuela sent a formal protest note to Colombia's foreign ministry over the comment. They said the comment about Santa was part of a policy of "provocations and insults." Essentially, they can't take a joke.

If the Venezuelan government wants this accusation taken seriously, then they need to provide some proof that the event actually occurred. A photo, video, radar signatures, or something that shows a UAV was in their airspace. Hearsay claims made by Venezuela's president during his weekly variety hour don't count. Neither are formal protest notes about Santa Claus. Until there is something more to this claim, it's more likely that Venezuelan soldiers saw a drug flight, which we know cross Venezuelan airspace on a regular basis, than a UAV, which are rather rare in South America.

Hope all my readers have a great day.

"If it ain't broke, don't fix it." It's a great motto for stability, but a terrible one for innovation.

I'm going to be breaking stuff around this blog for the next few weeks. I apologize for any inconvenience.

The Ecuadoran government suspended the Teleamazonas television station for 72 hours. The suspension comes as the government claims the station filed a false report last May that violated a section of the new constitution that requires truthful news. Many others believe that the television station was targeted because it is in opposition to President Correa's policies in general.

Receiving less attention, but perhaps more troubling, Ecuador's government also shut down an indigenous radio station La Voz del Arutam, claiming the station "incited violence" during the recent indigenous protests. In this, Correa takes a lesson from his neighbor to the south, Peruvian President Garcia. Peru's president shut down an indigenous radio station after the Bagua protests in June, claiming the exact same reasons Correa claims now. I was critical of Garcia's censorship at that time and I'm critical of Correa's censorship now.

Earlier this week I started, but didn't finish, writing a post with the following:

Mexico ends its year with a major success in its war, the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva. The killing of drug bosses disrupts the system, but won't likely lower the violence in any particular region.

The analysis went on from there. Somewhere between yesterday and today, what started as a major success has turned into a nightmare. On Monday, Mexico held a funeral with full honors for the marine killed in the attack on the cartel leader. Hours later, cartel members killed that fallen marine's mother and three other relatives in a violent attack meant to intimidate and terrorize those who fight on the side of the government.

There are some saying Mexico should be focused on law enforcement solutions to battle the criminal aspect of the cartels while others have said Mexico needs a counter-insurgency strategy to defeat what looks like fourth generation warfare. Sylvia Longmire writes that the drug trafficking organizations are "behaving like a hybrid of organized crime, terrorists, and insurgents." I think that's correct.

The hybrid nature of the bad guys means the Mexican government needs to bring a hybrid solution to the problem. A pure military solution will fail, as will a pure focus on civilian institutions or economic development. The Mexican government can't out-gun them or out-lawyer them or out-develop them. The DTOs are too swift to adapt and find the weak spot in any of those strategies. Some mixture creating a comprehensive strategy needs to be developed by implemented by the Calderon government.

The one thing the Mexican government can't do is cede the moral high ground or try to out-terrorize the cartels. Every government in this situation faces the temptation of taking the low road and using non-institutional means to take down their opponent. As discussed on this blog previously, there is a rise of vigilante justice and paramilitary structures in a number of countries currently in Latin America, not just Mexico. It's a temptation that has long term costs that far outweigh the short term benefits. The focus on democratic institutions and human rights has to be part of the long-term solution for the Mexican government, no matter how cruel the hybrid war turns.

There are weeks when it feels like the Colombian conflict has hit a turning point and is on its way into the history books. And then there are weeks like this one, when it feels like little has changed.

Luis Francisco Cuellar, the governor of Caqueta, was kidnapped on Monday evening by the FARC. Authorities found his body yesterday, his throat slit and explosives placed around the body.

The FARC have hit a series of setbacks over the past decade. Still, the kidnapping and murder of Cuellar shows they are still capable of some brutal violence directed at Colombia's politicians and civilians.

Also this week, Pablo Moncayo has now spent 12 years in FARC captivity, the longest held hostage. In a cruel manner, the FARC hold the lives of these hostages in their hands and hint at their potential release from time to time in order to seek negotiations with the government. A number of people are concerned about how Cuellar's kidnapping and murder and the Colombian government's response will affect the potential release of other FARC hostages. It's certainly not going to make the situation any easier.

I'm drafting a post for the end of the year based on something I wrote last January about the stability of certain Latin American governments. Looking back at 2009, my analysis in January about which countries could face serious instability was fairly accurate with a few exceptions. Then again, my predictions weren't too specific. I didn't predict there would be a military coup in Honduras in late June. Rather, Honduras was among a list of countries that for various political, economic and security reasons I saw as having a high percentage chance of facing instability (and I unfortunately turned out to be right). Similarly, Guatemala and Paraguay saw serious threats to their governments, though they survived, and several other governments faced instability of other types.

For the purposes of stability analysis, government overthrows are the sorts of events that I place in a "predictable surprises" category. We know that the government in some country (possibly several countries) somewhere in the world will be overthrown next year. We can perhaps come up with lists of where it's most likely to occur, place percentage chances on the event, identify factors that make it more likely or look for signals we might see ahead of time, but there remains a huge amount of uncertainty and chance in the analysis. The ability to determine where, how or exactly when are limited.

I preview that post today because Newsweek takes a different tact looking at next year. For 2010, the weekly news magazine predicts Fidel's death and a military coup in Venezuela. There is some minimal reasoning behind each, but really, they're just 2 of 10 shots in the dark taken by the magazine (which also predicts an economic boom for Brazil). In predicting a specific death and coup, Newsweek isn't providing analysis for its readers; it is engaging in guessing games about Latin America's future.

I'd differentiate what Newsweek writes with predicting the outcome of democratic elections, which can be done fairly analytically and doesn't usually portend doom. I'd also differentiate it from the outrage earlier this year when a US military study said Mexico was at risk for becoming a failed state. There was plenty of debate and disagreements over that analysis, but to its credit, it was interesting future scenario planning that tried to look at a broader threat, not predict the imminent collapse of a neighbor in the next year as part of a top 10 list.

I realize Newsweek is just being cute with their article and trying to draw readers by being controversial. However, playing top 10 list guessing games with the potential overthrows of governments really isn't really what the mainstream US media should be writing about. Is it possible that Newsweek is correct on one or both predictions? Yes it's possible, but that still doesn't mean it's good analysis or responsible journalism.

WSJ:

The chaos in Ciudad Juárez has snared Mexico's army, the country's most respected institution, in what may be a no-win situation. Even as the violence rises, so do allegations of human-rights abuses by the army. The failure to pacify Ciudad Juárez has put Mr. Calderón's antidrug strategy—based largely on using the military to retake control of the country from drug cartels that have corrupted local police and politicians—on embarrassing public display....

...in weary Ciudad Juárez, he is blamed for having gone to war without a comprehensive victory strategy.

I raised a number of questions when the troops first deployed to CJ. I give credit to the Wall Street Journal for getting that strategy line correct. As I wrote back in July:

In spite of the media's constant use of the word "strategy," troop deployments and the Merida Initiative aren't strategies, they're military operations and an aid package.

There is little indication that Ciudad Juarez ends 2009 any better than it began. President Calderon can't or won't admit that what was done in 2009 was a failure along the border. The Mexican government has promised more troops, more police, more resources. However, they've shown no indication of implementing a strategy that will successfully restore government institutions and reduce the power of illegal organizations. Returning to my July post:

Here's the essential problem. Nobody doubts Calderon has the resolve to fight a war against the cartels. But nobody is sure Calderon has a plan to win that war.

Looking at the start of Ciudad Juarez 2010, that appears to remain true.

Another weekend, another back and forth between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments.

Colombian Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva gave a lengthy interview to El Tiempo in which he said the Colombian military must prepare to counter or avoid an external aggression. The Colombian military also announced it would be building a base near the Venezuelan border and outfitting seven new battalions. In recent weeks, Silva has called on the Venezuelan government to turn over FARC leadership hiding in Venezuelan territory.

Venezuelan President Chavez countered on Sunday by claiming Colombia was the aggressor and saying that the US had flown a spy plane over Venezuelan territory. He ordered his military to shoot down any future spy planes. Earlier in the week, Chavez accused the Netherlands of helping the US plot a Venezuelan invasion.

Semana Magazine calls the Colombia-Venezuela tensions "the third front" facing Colombia (the first two being the FARC and other drug trafficking gangs/paramilitaries).

From the NYT:

At 7 p.m. Copenhagen time, Mr. Obama and Mr. Wen met again, joined by Prime Minister Mammoghan Singh of India and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil. [Later reporting suggests South African President Zuma also attended]

That sentence captures much about the shift in world politics. But let's just take that final point for now. At the moment for the final push to rescue global talks on climate change, Brazil's Lula was one of the few world leaders at the table.

Is it Brazil? Or is it Lula? Does Brazil get this seat because they are a rising regional and global power with real political, economic and diplomatic influence? Or does Lula sit there because he's a global rockstar, someone whose sheer personal presence seems to be a force on the international diplomatic stage?

These are the questions every analyst thinking about Brazil and Latin America's role in the world is asking. Brazil's president is one of the most powerful people in the world today. When the next leader of the US, China or India come along, we know they'll be sitting at that table. Will the next person who leads Brazil be there too?

I just finished reading Time's excellent story on Ben Bernanke as their Person of the Year. I also see many people discussing the top stories of 2009, including a few looking at Latin America.

What strikes me is a top story of 2009 for Latin America may be the story that didn't happen. There was no massive economic collapse amid the global financial crisis. Some countries had worse years than others, with Mexico taking a particularly large hit. Brazil did better than many other countries; it had a mild recession and should come booming back next year. Latin America as a whole should have a relatively good 2010 considering what the global financial system just went through.

There are plenty of reasons for this. Brazil's sound macroeconomic policy over the past two decades certainly deserves some of the biggest praise as well as smart targeted action by Lula's government and Brazil's Central Bank over the past 18 months.

Somewhere within those factors for Latin America and Brazil in particular is Ben Bernanke. Early in the crisis, lack of financial liquidity was among the key issues for Latin America. Back in October 2008 the US Federal Reserve opened a US$30 billion credit line to Brazil and Mexico among others. The credit line was extended in April. The US Fed's willingness act decisively early on and open up credit lines was a strong signal of US support and quite possibly prevented a more significant spiral downwards for the region's two largest economies.

The hypothetical is impossible to know, but it's interesting to speculate.

The US government delivered five Bell 412 helicopters to Mexico yesterday. According to USA Today, still missing are:

Chile's first round:
Sebastián Piñera 44%
Eduardo Frei 30%
Marco Enríquez-Ominami 20%
Jorge Arrate 6%

Chile is experiencing a realignment. A quarter of the electorate voted outside the two coalition structure that has existed since the return of democracy. Additionally, less than 10% of 18-29 year olds are registered to vote, many saying the political system doesn't represent them.

However, barring a dramatic political event, the second round of this election is not going to reflect that realignment. It will look like the same matchup we've seen for the past 20 years: right vs. center-left coalition.

So the traditional questions will still apply:

• Can Piñera win enough votes to close the deal? The right has not won a majority in a Chilean election in long, long time. Piñera has tried hard to distance himself from the right's legacy under Pinochet, but getting those last few voters to trust him to break the 50% mark is a challenge.
  
• Can Frei attract MEO voters even though the two candidates fought hard throughout the first round? A main reason voters defected from the Concertacion was that they disliked Frei and thought he represented the past. Convincing them to come back and vote for him will be hard.
  
• How does MEO try to influence his voters? Last night he said his endorsement would not mean anything as his voters would not simply follow his request. Previously, he made clear that he believed a win by Piñera would be a worse outcome for the country. Will he actively oppose Piñera and support Frei in the 2nd round or will he sit back?

No matter who wins, the Concertacion's continued existence is at risk. Even a Frei victory will only prolong the inevitable. The political coalition that formed to defeat a dictatorship can't fight Pinochet forever. For a generation whose political lives were defined by that fight, it's hard for them to accept that the next generation is not. If the old parties can't figure out how to move forward, as we saw in this election, they're going to leave space open for those who will.

The Economist has published the early results here. Polls were taken between 21 September and 23 October 2009, so they incorporate much of the events in Honduras, although not the election.

Initial thoughts:
1) Both Colombia and Ecuador saw surprising and troubling drops in support for democracy over other types of government. Both countries saw a 13 point drop from last year's numbers to well below 50%. I'm going to have to think about what changed in the last year in those countries that would cause that shift.

2) El Salvador saw a welcome 18 point rise in support for democracy since 2008. It's the Funes effect.

3) Venezuela remains with the highest support of "democracy" in the region. Why? Because both Chavistas and opposition believe they stand on the side of democracy. The polarization leads to increased support of democracy, but perhaps two different definitions of that word as well.

4) I'm going to guess a similar psychology is occurring with the boost in support for democracy in Honduras. Both the supporters of Micheletti and Zelaya believe they are the true representation of democracy and tell pollsters that.

5) This should scare you: "61% of those polled in Brazil, 58% in Mexico and 42% in the region agreed that the army should remove a president if he violates the constitution"

6) The number of people who believe a "market economy" is best increased in Venezuela and Argentina, decreased in Colombia. I'd call that the "grass is greener on the other side" effect.

7) Obama's approval is among the highest in the region, confirming the recent Gallup results. "The advent of Mr Obama has boosted his country’s standing in the region: 74% of respondents had a favourable opinion of the United States, up from 58% last year and the highest figure since the polls began. Nevertheless, more respondents now see Brazil as the most influential country in the region, ahead of the United States and Venezuela."

You can download the full results here.

It feels like a long time ago that the Argentine opposition won the legislative elections. They finally take power today. Clarin and La Nacion preview the new Congress.

Argentina's president now faces two years of an opposition Congress.  It's a Congress that will likely begin by rolling back legislation like the recent media law passed by the last Congress and signed by the president.

Yet, the new Congressional majority is only unified in their opposition of the president and her allies. There is no grand pro-active agenda to be implemented. Nor does the Congress have significant authority to implement an agenda that would be opposed by the president.

Moving into 2010, Argentina's institutions are ripe for a situation of stalemate, inaction and conflict. Avoiding that situation will take a greater willingness to dialogue and compromise by the Kirchners and their adversaries than we've seen over the past six years.

Yesterday, Amnesty International released a report saying civilian authorities are ignoring increased human rights concerns about the Mexican military. With the military deployed to civilian areas to provide security and combat drug cartels, the number of complaints has risen to several thousand over the past two years. The report highlights five cases in which the lack of justice is particularly bad.

Also yesterday, Human Rights Watch reported that police in Sao Paulo and Rio have engaged in 11,000 extrajudicial killings since 2003. Over 1,000 police killings happen each year in Rio, a far higher rate than other major cities facing crime problems. Hundreds are killed each year in shootouts or where the suspect allegedly resists arrest, but the cases are rarely investigated and the statistics don't seem to hold up the police claims.

Over the weekend, Venezuela's interior minister admitted that 15%-20% of all crimes in Venezuela are committed by the police forces. That disproportionately includes violent crimes such as homicide and kidnapping. If police are responsible for 20% of crime, and 50 people are murdered on average every weekend in Caracas, then the police are killing about 10 people per weekend in Caracas. The statistics for violence in Venezuela are worse than all of its neighbors and the police are responsible for a high percentage. UPDATE: Good article in Thursday's Miami Herald on the subject of police "death squads" in Venezuela and concerns that Chavez's plans to reform the police into part of the Bolivarian revolution injects too much ideology into public security.

Separate from this blog, in my life as a freelance consultant/researcher/writer, I'm spending hours and hours writing and editing for a major assignment due this month. While writing, I like to listen to music. I've gone through most of what I own several times over during the past few weeks. I need new music.

Here's what I'm looking for: Latin American progressive metal. I want something modern from Latin America along the lines of the bands Dream Theater or Porcupine Tree.

Anyone have similar music tastes and good recommendations? Please leave a comment or send me an e-mail. Thanks.

Mandate. Elected four years ago, even with a majority of the vote, I wrote that Morales' initial mandate still stood on shaky ground. There was a question of whether his coalition of rural and urban, poor and middle class, ideological extremes and moderates would hold once Morales started governing and implementing specific policies. The answer is that they did. Morales won over 60% of the vote this election and a majority in 5 or 6 of the 9 provinces. During his first term, his approval rating never fell below 45%. Morales has maintained a stable coalition and the majority of the population are rather pleased with how he's governed over his first term. They also just like him personally. With this victory, he clearly has a mandate and political capital to continue his agenda.

With authority. With 2/3 in both houses of Congress, Morales has the authority to implement his agenda. He can pass bills that were previously blocked. He can alter the constitution rather easily. Of course, this gives Morales less opportunity to blame the opposition for his problems. Overreach is clearly a concern, but Morales has already signaled that he's aware of the balance he must strike now that his party has full control.

A changing Bolivia. Regional autonomy was mostly ignored in this election's debate as everyone watches the national scene, but it could turn out to be one of the decisive legacies of the Morales administration. Layers of empowered local governments are fertile ground for political movements across the ideological spectrum to grow and thrive. It is also a potential source for conflict between local regions and the national government, both for Morales' presidency and for future presidents.

A terrible opposition. It's not just that Evo is popular. It's also that the opposition is rather awful. The choices of candidates were particularly uninspiring and they did a poor job identifying an agenda that appealed to a majority of the population. Criticisms of how the president has harmed democracy, corruption charges, or how his policies might harm the economy eventually only go so far. In an election, the opposition needed to make a case for how they would make the lives of Bolivian citizens better and needed to reach out beyond their base. In that, they failed.

Don't stay for 3. The night of the election, Morales hinted that he would be eligible for a third term as the election was his first under a new constitution. That trick has been pulled by others in Latin America including Alberto Fujimori and it generally ends badly. Bolivia's population didn't elect Morales to a second term so he could use the opportunity to run for a third. They elected him to continue and advance his agenda. Morales, like Uribe, would do more to cement his legacy by focusing on policies, not politics, and working to create a system and find a successor who will continue them. If his policies are truly strong, then they shouldn't rely on his personality alone.

Also see post-election analysis from Miguel and Jim. My pre-election post is here.

BBC and Globescan ran a poll of three questions in 23 countries, including five in Latin America, about climate change and the Copenhagen summit.

Percent saying climate change or global warming, due to the Greenhouse Effect, is a "serious problem.": Brazil 86%, Chile 86%, Costa Rica 83%, Mexico 81%, Panama 72%.

Should your country play a leadership role in setting ambitious targets to address climate change as quickly as possible? Chile 54%, Brazil 53%, Mexico 38%, Costa Rica 37%, Panama 25%.

Do you support or oppose the government making investments to address climate change even if this hurts the economy? Mexico 71%, Chile 67%, Brazil 62%, Costa Rica 60%, Panama 60%.

Latin America's answers averaged significantly higher than those in other regions of the world. I was particularly surprised by the numbers willing to act at the potential short term cost to their economy.

I called it a coup; I offered qualified support for the OAS resolution imposing the democratic charter kicking out Honduras; I wrote both how elections wouldn't return democracy and the case against rejecting elections. I stand by nearly everything in those four posts and if you want to understand my position in Honduras up through now, those are the four to read. I started writing the post below three weeks ago, before the election, trying to organize my thoughts and resolve the conflict between those last two posts.

For background on this weekend's election, see Jim Schultz (one, two, three), Miguel Centellas, Bloomberg and probably plenty more links I'm leaving out.

How big does Evo win? All of the polls suggest President Morales will win reelection in the first round and it would be very unexpected if that doesn't happen. With the outcome all but certain, it's worth watching Morales' vote total; winning above 60 would be a large victory, below 50 would be a disappointment given the expectations for his side. It's also worth watching how many provinces he will win. Winning in all nine provinces would be a boost to Morales' national mandate and his political capital while a win in only 4 or 5 would be a disappointment (though certainly still a win).

The 2nd place fight. If Manfred Reyes Villa can show a solid second place, he could cement his position as the key opposition leader for the next few years. However, potentially undercutting him, the Morales government has promised to charge Manfred with corruption as soon as the election is over and claim he will attempt to flee the country. A weak opposition finish or one where they seem to step on each other will throw the opposition leadership into more chaos than they already face.

The Senate. Will MAS take a majority? Will MAS take 2/3? The opposition has made clear they don't expect to win the presidency, but really want to keep the Senate. Maintaining control of at least part of one branch of government gives the opposition a chance to check the president's power. Morales has made clear he wants a legislative majority (or super-majority) to make more significant changes.

Autonomy votes. Five regions in Western Bolivia will be voting on autonomy referendums, similar to the ones previously approved by the East (quite controversially). Polls say it will pass in all five. It's hard to say what the precise effects of autonomy will be, but the vote is likely to be a shift in electorate in the West towards approval of autonomy. What does autonomy mean to the average Bolivian voter? I think that differs greatly across regions and income levels.

Results vs. Polls. This is more for the polling geek in me than of any political significance, but it will be interesting to see how the results of the election match up or don't with the polls prior to the election. Four years ago the polls greatly underestimated Morales' support, likely due to errors in turnout models and underestimating the rural vote (although some still claim conspiracies). Since then, pollsters have altered their models to adjust for greater MAS support in rural areas. Will Evo do better than polls again, as has occurred in previous elections? Will he underperform, suggesting pollsters overshot their adjustments or missed shifts within the MAS base? Or will they get close to accurate, finally finding the right balance?

Before the Merida Initiative had a name, this blog referred to the potential aid program as "Not Plan Mexico." It was a joke/criticism that while the Bush administration hadn't given the program a name, they insisted that it should not be called "Plan Mexico" or compared to Plan Colombia in any form. By not branding it early and saying what they didn't want, they handed the program's critics a gift. There are still plenty of writers in both English and Spanish who refer to it as Plan Mexico.

The story breaking today, however, places the name Not Plan Mexico in a whole new light. For all the debate, criticism, reporting and analysis that have been done, the Merida Initiative has essentially not happened. It's a myth. It's something in the future.

The GAO reports (online later today) that only 2% of the US$1.4 billion appropriated by Congress since October 2007 for the Merida Initiative has been spent as of September 2009. According to the AP, the $24.2 million spent "has yielded 26 armored vehicles, 30 machines to detect drugs and explosive materials and five x-ray vans, as well as software and several training programs," which is to say not much. To put it another way, the amount of money spent in the first two years of the Merida Initiative is about what the US spends in Iraq every two hours.

Everything you've read about Mexico's security situation and the government's military push for the past two years, whether you praise it or criticize it, has not come from Merida Initiative funds. Merida Initiative money has not played a role in any success or failure that President Calderon's administration has had. It hasn't played a part in major cartel arrests or corruption scandals or military deployments or human rights abuses or police reform. The Merida Initiative has done nothing.

Not Plan Mexico indeed.

Gallup polls conducted between July and September 2009 suggest President Obama has greatly improved the image of the US in Latin America.

Approval of "US leadership in the hemisphere" increased by double digits in all but five countries. A median of 51% in 16 countries approve of US leadership in the hemisphere, a 16 point increase over 2008. A median of 42% believe Obama's term will strengthen the relationship between the US and Latin America while only 6% think it will weaken.

Approval ratings for President Obama are strong, above 50% in all but three countries (Venezuela, Bolivia and Paraguay) and above 60% in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia among other countries.

This polling goes against the recent conventional wisdom in the media that the US is losing influence in Latin America. There's an obvious question whether the ongoing crisis in Honduras or the issue of the Colombia-US security agreement have cut into these approval numbers in the past 2-3 months since these polls were taken. Still, we now know in the first six months of the Obama administration there was the expected improvement in public opinion over the final years of the Bush administration and we now have a strong baseline on which to measure future shifts in public opinion.

The Ibero-American Summit was held this Monday and Tuesday in Lisbon. The group includes Latin America, Spain and Portugal, but not the US or Canada.

The focus of the Summit was supposed to be on "Innovation and Knowledge," but you wouldn't have known it from the news coverage, which focused almost exclusively on Honduras. On Honduras, even without the US present, the group could not agree on a unified position about the elections last Sunday. The declaration on Honduras condemned the coup and called for the restoration of Zelaya, essentially the same position as the OAS and the US.

The final declaration focused heavily on Innovation and Knowledge issues and included a call for more high speed internet access in Latin America (which I fully support) and future meetings at the regional level every two years to follow up on advances on technology issues. The group also released a declaration in support of the upcoming Copenhagen conference on climate change and called for greater support by developed nations for adaptation and technology transfers. You can find a full list of declarations from the Summit on the Segib website.

So was this Summit relevant?

The declarations were bland, contained few measurable goals and said little not already said by other regional groups. It made no progress on issues creating key regional tensions, particularly Honduras and the current Colombia-Venezuela dispute. Some key leaders were absent from the event. The presidents not attending were Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala & Honduras. The presidents of Brazil and Ecuador left early, with media reporting Lula was not happy by the progress there.

The Rio Group is looking pretty good right now.

Mexican President Felipe Calderon has enjoyed relatively high approval ratings for the past three years. The numbers underneath his approval such as approval of his cabinet or specific economic policies were weak, but his personal approval rating remained high. This was in spite of increasing violence from drug cartels and an economic meltdown.

As he marks the halfway point of his term today, however, polls show Calderon's approval falling to some of the lowest levels of his term. El Universal has Calderon at 50% approval and 33% disapproval. Mitofsky says the president has 58% approval, 40% disapproval. Mileno published additional results showing 49% believe the overall situation in Mexico is worse since Calderon took office three years ago (h/t Gancho).

All of the recent polls show widespread discontent with the economy and dropping approval on security issues. Citizens are generally pessimistic about Calderon's potential for the second half of his term.