Bloggings by boz

Brazilian prosecutor threatens Chevron managers with prison

2012-01-27T08:48:00.000-05:00

A Brazilian prosecutor plans to file criminal charges against Chevron Corp and some of its local managers within weeks, adding the threat of prison sentences to an $11 billion civil lawsuit as punishment for a November offshore oil spill.

As I wrote last November:

Brazil is going to do everything it can to blame Chevron for the offshore oil spill this month.

I don't have all the facts and can't judge whether Chevron deserves this sort of prosecution. We'll learn more in the coming months as the case goes to trial. However, if Brazilian law determines that the Chevron team was taking an unacceptable risk, then how are they ever going to permit the drilling for pre-salt oil, which is going to be far riskier?

One other question: What if this was Sinopec rather than Chevron? Chinese oil companies are making big inroads across Latin America including Brazil. At some point down the road, Chinese oil companies are going to make these same sorts of mistakes. Holding them accountable is going to be a different political game than going after US oil companies.

Funes turns towards the military

2012-01-26T07:36:00.002-05:00

Salvadoran President Funes named recently retired Army General Francisco Salinas as the head of the national police. This follows his decision in November to name David Mungia Payes, another former general, as his minister of ~~defense~~ justice and security.

Both posts are supposed to be led by civilian officials. Other members of Funes's own FMLN party are criticizing the president for violating the spirit if not the letter of the law. The president says that both men are retired from the military and qualified for their positions.

Related links: BBC, EFE, El Faro, Tim, CISPES Also see Mike Allison's column from last November about the Mungia appointment.

While the FMLN and the pundits have been very critical of Funes's decisions to name more retired military officers into civilian posts, most citizens will ultimately base their opinion on whether security improves.

Threat: Mackerel overfishing

2012-01-25T09:13:00.001-05:00

The most important article you'll read today about Latin America should be the one by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists on the overfishing of mackerel off the coasts of Chile and Peru and into the Antarctic.

Every expert quoted in the article says that the rate of fishing is unsustainable, leading to a potential collapse of fish stocks. Just between 2006 and 2011, mackerel stocks declined 63%. Continued decline would have direct consequences on the economies along the Pacific coast of South America as well as food security for the hemisphere and for Africa.

It's a major collective action problem in that no country wants to unilaterally stop fishing, knowing that other countries would simply pick up the slack. Fixing this requires regional (great issue for UNASUR or the OAS) as well as global multilateral coordination. Even if they coordinated, protecting the fish stocks would require enforcement of those regulations.

It's an issue that pits the environment against economic development and basic politics. Though the recommendation is for a five year ban on mackerel fishing, neither Chile nor Peru want to face the economic blow that would come from that. Pressure by individual fishers and large fishing corporations makes it much harder to politicians to act. Corporations in Chile have manipulated the scientific evidence to get the quotas increased. European and Asian governments subsidize their fishing industries, causing them to be overly large, even for the market.

It's a corruption problem. The reporters investigating this issue found that many ships under-report their catch in Peru. Ships don't adhere to quality standards, bringing in their catch in a way that wastes a significant amount of potential food. European ships flag their vessels from smaller and unregulated countries (Vanuatu for one) to dodge EU regulations on overfishing.

The potential collapse of fish stocks is a threat to Latin America in the coming decades. It's an issue that touches on stability, economics, politics, corruption and multilateralism. Go read this entire article.

2012 SOTU mentions

2012-01-25T07:03:00.002-05:00

Congrats to those of you who chose 'under' in yesterday's post. Only two countries in the hemisphere made the cut in a speech that was largely focused on domestic issues.

Trade:

We’re also making it easier for American businesses to sell products all over the world. Two years ago, I set a goal of doubling U.S. exports over five years. With the bipartisan trade agreements we signed into law, we’re on track to meet that goal ahead of schedule. And soon, there will be millions of new customers for American goods in Panama, Colombia, and South Korea.

Though he didn't mention any specific Latin American countries, his comments on immigration were welcome:

Let’s also remember that hundreds of thousands of talented, hardworking students in this country face another challenge: the fact that they aren’t yet American citizens. Many were brought here as small children, are American through and through, yet they live every day with the threat of deportation. Others came more recently, to study business and science and engineering, but as soon as they get their degree, we send them home to invent new products and create new jobs somewhere else.

That doesn’t make sense.

I believe as strongly as ever that we should take on illegal immigration. That’s why my administration has put more boots on the border than ever before. That’s why there are fewer illegal crossings than when I took office. The opponents of action are out of excuses. We should be working on comprehensive immigration reform right now.

But if election-year politics keeps Congress from acting on a comprehensive plan, let’s at least agree to stop expelling responsible young people who want to staff our labs, start new businesses, defend this country. Send me a law that gives them the chance to earn their citizenship. I will sign it right away.

Also some references to the Americas in the section on general foreign policy:

The renewal of American leadership can be felt across the globe. Our oldest alliances in Europe and Asia are stronger than ever. Our ties to the Americas are deeper. Our ironclad commitment -- and I mean ironclad -- to Israel’s security has meant the closest military cooperation between our two countries in history.

We’ve made it clear that America is a Pacific power, and a new beginning in Burma has lit a new hope. From the coalitions we’ve built to secure nuclear materials, to the missions we’ve led against hunger and disease; from the blows we’ve dealt to our enemies, to the enduring power of our moral example, America is back.

Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn’t know what they’re talking about.

That’s not the message we get from leaders around the world who are eager to work with us. That’s not how people feel from Tokyo to Berlin, from Cape Town to Rio, where opinions of America are higher than they’ve been in years. Yes, the world is changing. No, we can’t control every event. But America remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs –- and as long as I’m President, I intend to keep it that way.

Those hoping for more Latin America mentions will just have to wait for the speech at the Summit of the Americas in a few months.

2012 SOTU over/under for hemispheric mentions: 3.5

2012-01-24T09:50:00.002-05:00

As I have for several years now, the question is how many countries in this hemisphere (other than the United States) will the president mention in tonight's State of the Union.

This year's over/under: 3.5

You get bonus points for naming the specific countries that will be mentioned.

Last year those readers who took the over (2.5) won big as the president named five other countries (Brazil, El Salvador, Chile, Colombia, Panama).

Here's the number of countries mentioned for the last few years:
2011: 5
2010: 3
2009: n/a
2008: 6
2007: 1
2006: 0
2005: 0

Let me know your guess for this year in the comments or on Twitter.

New regional organizations

2012-01-24T07:20:00.001-05:00

Michael Shifter has an excellent article [PDF] in Current History about Latin America's new integration efforts. A few comments.

1) Whether or not you think these newer institutions like UNASUR and CELAC are relevant (my take), the discussion about these new institutions is a hot topic across the hemisphere. There is certainly an interest and a desire across the ideological spectrum to see something newer and better than what currently exists.

2) I think the Pacific Alliance among Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile has potential, though like all the other institutions, could stumble as it hits the hard questions about sovereignty. If those countries can achieve additional economic integration, they would be a real force in the hemisphere.

3) Brazil is boosting UNASUR and they see it as their best effort to influence hemispheric affairs in a multilateral way. However, the same way that the OAS eventually ended up being far less dominated by the US, if UNASUR is successful, Brazil's influence in it will eventually be balanced out by the other countries.

4) None of these new organizations is a threat to the OAS as they can all coexist without competing. It's the OAS's own dysfunction that is a threat to the OAS. The organization needs to reform and needs several governments in the hemisphere, including the US, to push for those reforms. Creating a modernized OAS would be a great topic for the Summit of the Americas.

Correa vs the media

2012-01-23T06:49:00.000-05:00

In a Miami Herald op-ed, Ecuador's new ambassador to the United State, Nathalie Cely, tries hard to defend her government from accusations that it restricts press freedom. She says the media commit libel, abuse power and then try to hide behind the shield of media freedom.

The defense comes as criticisms of President Correa's actions continue to rise.

Domestically, the president has taken a number of steps to restrict media freedom in the country. Correa, as an individual citizen, sued the newspaper El Universo over an opinion column and won a multi-million dollar libel case. It now appears that Correa's lawyer colluded with the judge to write the opinion. Separately, the government has ordered the editor of Hoy arrested over his reporting on corruption linked to relatives of the president. The president has also pushed new restrictive laws through the national assembly that will limit the media's ability to cover the next political campaign.

Internationally, Correa is leading the attack against the OAS Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Both organizations have been critical of Correa's attacks on the media. So Correa and some of his allies in the hemisphere are attempting to reduce the power of the organizations and their ability to individually criticize governments in the hemisphere that censor media and repress journalists. (LA Times, RSF, CPJ, Al Jazeera). UPDATE: (NYT, CPJ via Miami Herald)

The fight over media freedom at the OAS spills well beyond Ecuador's borders and could be a big test for the organization's influence and relevance moving forward.

Police corruption in Honduras

2012-01-22T09:32:00.000-05:00

As if to disprove some of my recent criticism that the media frame Honduran violence only as a "drug war" issue without considering the other problems there, both McClatchy and Miami Herald (aren't they the same company?) do an excellent job reporting on the issue of police corruption in Honduras.

From McClatchy:

Unlike other parts of Central America, where organized crime has relied on enforcers recruited from street gangs and unemployed youth, in Honduras entire units of the national police appear to work for drug and crime groups, preying on the public and gunning down foes.

From the Herald:

Another ranking police investigator told The Herald he discovered that his supervisor allowed members of the special forces squad to double as bodyguards for drug traffickers. That supervisor is now a commissioner, the highest rank in the police department.

“Maybe the ratio of honest to corrupt in the police is 10 to 1. But it doesn’t help that nine are clean if the one who is dirty is in charge,” the investigator said. “In this country, bosses are named to specific posts with the purpose of facilitating the entry and exit of drugs.”

This is a level of corruption that is very difficult to root out. After all, if top police commanders are corrupt, who is going to investigate, prosecute and arrest them? Lower level police officials who attempt to do so take a huge risk in terms of their careers and lives. Judges and other civilian authorities can attempt to investigate, but a judge can't arrest someone. That takes a police officer. When former Security Minister Alvarez attempted to fire corrupt police commanders, the police threatened to revolt and go on strike, not something that would help a country plagued with crime. Then there is the military, back in a domestic security role largely due to police corruption, but I've written before about the challenges on that front.

So what options remain, the Herald hints at them:

Many Honduran activists have called for the United States to “intervene” and help run the police. American technical security experts will head to Honduras soon. Colombia and Chile have sent teams to help investigate high-profile cases, and the Organization of American States sent a mission to figure out what role that diplomatic organization can play.

I'm not sure you could get too many activists inside Honduras on the record saying they want the US to "intervene", but I do think this paragraph gets at the point the potential solution may have to come from outside Honduras. Ideally, an organization similar to Guatemala's CICIG could be set up in the country and granted authority to investigate and prosecute. The UN, OAS or SICA would be the multilateral organizations to operate and monitor the group. Of course, as seen in Guatemala, that sort of solution is far from perfect and can only be a stop-gap measure.

Based on my research for the Wilson Center back in late 2010, I know there are officials inside President Lobo's government who want that sort of outside solution. At the time I wrote that report, at least one official said it was close to a certain deal. Obviously that hasn't happened. Political forces, some related to organized crime and others related to the 2009 coup, have so far blocked the potential for an outside investigative unit to be set up in Honduras.

Without any institution inside or outside the country that can clean up the police force, what's left is one of the most violent countries in the world with a police force that is too ineffective to stop the crime and too corrupt to reform and improve itself.

Nearly every analyst who looks at organized crime in the hemisphere will tell you that "police reform" is a key part to improving the security situation. But what's the answer when the police refuse to reform and the political system can't or won't force them to do so? That's one of the key challenges that Honduras poses today.

UPDATE: A sad postscript to the Miami Herald story: One of the sources who went on the record about police corruption was murdered.

More about the non-drug war

2012-01-19T13:46:00.001-05:00

Last week I criticized one article on violence in Mexico and Central America for placing it in the framework of the "war on drugs" while ignoring the many other aspects of organized crime that occur in the region. In a similar critique about media coverage of violence in Honduras, RAJ takes it one step further:

Impunity; the availability of guns; targeting of certain groups for political and structural reasons; and the ineffectuality and corruption of the police, who no one expects to actually investigate crimes professionally: all these factors should be the start of press coverage of crime in Honduras, not the end.

I disagree with some of RAJ's specifics, but agree on that general point. Violence in Honduras is complicated and there are key aspects related to weak state institutions, impunity and longstanding social divides that aren't directly caused by the current epidemic of organized crime. Violence and criminality were worsening during President Zelaya's term, then exploded following the coup due to an increase in political violence and a failure by the de facto regime to handle the organized crime problem. Even post-Micheletti, significant violence related to political issues remains including the targeting of journalists and vulnerable populations. There is both political violence and criminal violence today. They sometimes overlap, but they shouldn't all be lumped together by the media or by President Lobo and his administration as "drug war" issues.

Specific to the Bajo Aguan, the presence of drug trafficking and criminal organizations certainly exacerbates the conflict. In fact, the criminals have embedded themselves and armed certain actors on both sides of that conflict, making it even more difficult to sort out. However, that conflict has some deep roots in land issues and poverty and would likely be a serious social clash even without the presence of criminal groups and drug money.

POLL NUMBERS!!! Two presidents in rare positive territory

2012-01-19T06:30:00.000-05:00

Peruvian President Ollanta Humala is back at 54% approval according to an Ipsos-Apoyo poll. The president dropped below the 50% mark last month amid scandals and mining strikes. With his second vice president removed from office and the mining strike calmed down (though the conditions there could lead it to flare back up), Humala is back in positive territory and still capable of moving forward with his agenda.

Meanwhile, Ecuadoran President Correa is at 55% approval after five years in office according to a Cedatos-Gallup poll. In spite of his controversial style, most of the public still thinks he is doing a good job, particularly on the economy.

What's impressive is to see the Peru and Ecuador polls in the contexts of their predecessors. In Peru, the Garcia and Toledo administrations spent most of their terms in the 30s, 20s and even lower approval ratings. In Ecuador, well, Correa is the first president since 1996 to start and finish a full term, an accomplishment by itself. Maintaining a majority support at the same time is a big win for him.

If you care about US policy in Latin America, oppose SOPA/PIPA

2012-01-18T07:40:00.000-05:00

As a freelance writer, my intellectual property is my livelihood. I take protection of it seriously. I also live and work online in Latin America. I've seen the potential for the Internet to be a disruptive technology for good, creating conditions that promote democracy and cut down poverty.

It's unfortunate that a number of industries are lobbying for legislation and regulations in the name of intellectual property that would serve to undermine some of the basic architecture of the internet. Legislation like SOPA/PIPA directly and indirectly impacts US policy in Latin America in a negative way. That's why, like many other websites, I'm using my blog today to oppose this legislation. While that seems outside the usual sphere of US-Latin America policy, it is relevant to how this hemisphere is able to connect and communicate online.

How does it impact the hemisphere? If legislation like this were to pass, it would hold back economic innovation in the US and Latin America, shut down small businesses in the technology sector, impact our free trade agreements with Central America, Panama, Colombia, Peru and Chile, strengthen organized criminal groups that already traffic in stolen intellectual property, and limit cultural exchanges between the US and the rest of the hemisphere.

If the US passes legislation like this, it will be utilized by oppressive governments to go after democracy activists who use the internet to organize and communicate. The US will also lose significant moral high ground on censorship as the enforcement of this law would create a firewall limiting US internet users' access to numerous foreign websites, in some ways similar to how the Chinese government or the Cuban government block sites outside of their countries. The SOPA/PIPA legislation would set a bad international precedent for a region still struggling to figure out how to have smart regulations and security measures online.

At a very personal level, internet regulation poorly defined such as SOPA/PIPA could force me to shut down this blog. I'm an individual blogger who doesn't have the resources to monitor and verify the tens of thousands of links I've posted over the past seven years, placing me at risk to legal action under this legislation. I also depend on hosting sites like Google, Blogger, Tumblr and Twitter, all of which say that enforcement of this legislation would be too heavy of a burden on their businesses and could force them to change how they operate. It's not an exaggeration to say that if restrictive legislation passes and is enforced, this blog and every blog you read about Latin America policy could either be shut down or censored across borders. That's bad for you, the reader. It's worse for the nascent online community, which has grown over the past decade and given citizens the power to publish that that was once restricted to governments and big media companies.

If you care about US policy in Latin America, you should oppose SOPA, PIPA and other legislation that does far more harm than good when it comes to intellectual property online.

What you can do:

1) Learn. Most people who study Latin America aren't experts in technology policy, but you should understand where these issues overlap. Google, Wikipedia, EFF, Global Voices, Wired and MIT Media Lab are among the many with intelligent explanations as to why you should oppose these bills.

2) Contact Congress. Let them know that opposition to SOPA/PIPA is a policy issue that the Latin America policy community cares about. From human rights to free trade, this bill has the potential to impact a number of Latin America related issues.

3) Monitor: This SOPA/PIPA fight is just one of many over technology policy that directly and indirectly affects Latin America. You should continue to keep track of these technology issues in the US and around the hemisphere.

Thank you for your time and your readership.

Beyond 2012, the book

2012-01-17T08:10:00.001-05:00

Sam Logan and I have written a short ebook, Beyond 2012, that is available over at the Southern Pulse website for $4.99. The book contains six essays analyzing Mexican and Venezuelan politics, security in Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America, the potential for a regional influence competition between China and Brazil, and the cybersecurity policy debate in Latin America.

For me, this was an opportunity to experiment in some longer online self-publishing as well as write on some topics at a bit more length than my typical blog post. As always, thanks for reading!

Guatemalan military receives a new mission

2012-01-16T08:33:00.002-05:00

Just one day in office, Guatemalan President Perez Molina met with his military commanders and issued a new top priority for the military: "Achieve an interdiction of external threats and neutralize illegal armed groups, through the use of military power, by regaining and maintaining control of the air, maritime and land domains."

None of this is a surprise. Perez had promised to use the military to improve internal security throughout the current and previous campaign. Perez also promised to provide the military with the technology and equipment to meet that objective including surveillance systems, radars, speedboats and combat aircraft.

The use of the military isn't unprecedented. Former President Colom used the military in combating the Zetas and other Latin American militaries are deployed internally to fight crime. However, it appears that Perez went a step further, symbolically and perhaps legally, in making the mission to fight illegal armed groups the primary focus of the Guatemalan military.

Several key questions come from this statement. First, will this have a real impact on how the Guatemalan military trains, equips and deploys or was it just symbolic? Second, where is the money? Is Perez going to pass any new taxes, reform the budget or appeal for new international aid? Third, what is the long term strategy and goal? Is there a defined end state, perhaps including a return to a reformed, more capable and less corrupt civilian police force? How will Perez know when Guatemala has won? Like too many other Latin American presidents, it appears Perez is sending in the military to fight the bad guys before he has a strategy to win or a vision for what he wants to achieve.

I'm disappointed to see that "protect the population" wasn't in the main mission statement, at least as far as I can tell from the reporting. Protect the population and measure the results is a good general recommendation for Latin American countries trying to fight crime. Going on the offensive and fighting the illegal armed groups can lead to the wrong measures of success. Declaring protection of the population as the mission means the government must judge success based on less violence. Declaring the offensive fight as the mission generally leads to more violence, though I'd be glad to be proven wrong.

By starting with the military offensive, not focusing on protection of the population and not placing the military actions in the framework of a full government strategy, Perez threatens to make the same mistakes as his neighbor to the north. Perez should have a more comprehensive strategy in place before he deploys the military.

State building vs state cleansing

2012-01-14T18:07:00.001-05:00

Like many others, I've read Elizabeth Dickinson's recent drug war article in the Washington Monthly. Here's the analysis I thought was most interesting and on-target:

The very natures of the two states are different as well. “Colombia had never been in control of its territory, so the real challenge was to assert state authority for the first time,” explains Shannon O’Neill of the Council on Foreign Relations. “In Mexico, that’s not the problem. The government has a presence in every small municipality; the question is, who do they report to? It’s a very different challenge; Mexico’s challenge is corruption.”

Mexican institutions are hollowed out in a way that Colombia’s never were. Colombia’s police are national, and were never terribly corrupt. The 400,000-strong police force in Mexico is divided between federal, state, and local jurisdictions, and the closer to the ground you get, the more the drug cartels have been able to infiltrate. Often unpaid, underequipped, and terrified by the security situation, the local police take bribes or work as informants....

...Indeed, while Colombia was building institutions from zero in many of its most desperate communities, Mexico urgently needs to cleanse its state—a task that is impossible when it’s that very state that the government is trying to defend.

What I though was wrong with the article was the focus on drugs to the exclusion of everything else the criminals in Mexico and Colombia do. There was hardly any mention of human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, gold and oil trafficking and the other crimes that make up over half the revenue many of these groups take in.

It's no longer a "war on drugs." This is about reducing violence and criminality. It's about state building and state cleansing. Even if there was a way to instantly eliminate the drug money from the hemisphere, there are still violent criminal groups making money from other areas that need to be stopped and weak governing institutions that need to be strengthened and cleansed of corruption. That's why I thought the paragraphs above were the best from the piece.

2012-01-13T08:55:00.000-05:00

Two years after Haiti's earthquake, half a million people remain homeless. Most live in tent cities and temporary shelters. Spend some time thinking about that today.

2011's grim statistics

2012-01-12T06:53:00.000-05:00

With 2011 closed out, the murder statistics from each country are rolling in. They come from both official government figures and NGO's, often in dispute. Here are some of the figures. The per 100,000 rate can also vary based on what number you use for the population of the country.:

After some controversy, Mexico released the numbers for the first nine months of 2011 showing 12,903 murders related to the "drug war", an 11% increase from the previous year. Depending on how the final numbers look, the homicide rate remains below 20 per 100,000 nationwide, though the state by state numbers have a huge variance.

Guatemala reports there were 5,618 homicides. The number works out to be about 36 per 100,000 showing the trend line going in the right direction.

El Salvador saw a sharp increase with 4,354 murders according to the police. That works out to about 76 per 100,000.

Honduras is even worse, seeing a spike of 15% to 6,723 murders according to a local university that closely tracks the numbers. They say that number places the rate at about 86 per 100,000. That makes Honduras the most violent country in the world. To compare Honduras only had a rate of 38 per 100,000 in 2005.

Venezuela's statistics are always controversial as the government releases numbers manipulated far lower than independent organizations monitoring the violence on the ground. The OVV says there were 19,336 murders in 2011 while CICPC puts the number at 18,850. That works out to be a rate of 67 or 65 per 100,000. In past years, the government placed the rate closer to 50 per 100k.

Colombia reports 13,520 homicides in 2011, their lowest homicide rate since 1984. That works out to be a murder rate around 30 per 100,000.

I looked for the Brazil numbers for 2011 but could not come up with a good figure nationally (I'll update when I do). The 2010 number of nearly 50,000 murders placed Brazil at 26 per 100,000.

To be clear, whether the trend line is up or down in a country, all of these numbers are too high. It's good for Guatemala and Colombia to be doing better, but murder rates at four times the global average still likely place them in the top 15 most violent countries in the world. Sadly, Honduras, El Salvador and Venezuela will once again take the top three spots globally.

UPDATE: Via a Mexican NGO, here's the list of the top 50 most violent cities in the world, 40 of which are in the Western Hemisphere.

Ortega reaches out to (some) neighbors

2012-01-11T08:24:00.001-05:00

What little international attention was paid to Nicaraguan President Ortega's inauguration focused on the presence of the leaders of Venezuela and Iran. However, it was the presence of three other presidents and the absence of one that could have a bigger impact on the country's foreign affairs.

As Tim Rogers reports, Ortega gave an excessively long speech trailing off into random foreign affairs topics at times. Ortega took time to thank each and every foreign representative who attended the event, many of whom sat at the table with him. Ortega saw the foreign visitors as a legitimization of his controversial reelection, which other countries have criticized.

It was within that praise that Nicaragua's president appears to reach out to his neighbors. Ortega had high praise for Guatemalan President Colom. More important for the future, he warmly embraced Guatemalan President-elect Otto Perez, praising the former general for his role in helping bring about the peace process. Ortega gave a warm welcome to Honduran President Pepe Lobo, glossing over the events of 2009 and giving Lobo credit for managing the country through difficult political and security circumstances. Finally, Ortega cheered on Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes, with whom he's had some differences behind the scenes, saying the FMLN chose the correct candidate.

Left out of Ortega's friendship-fest was Costa Rican President Chinchilla. She and Ortega have a long feud over multiple issues including ongoing conflict over the management of development, environmental and sovereignty issues on both sides of the Rio San Juan. Chinchilla didn't attend and I didn't hear any kind words towards Costa Rica in Ortega's speech.

Over the past two years Ortega has at times distanced himself from the rest of Central America. The feud with Costa Rica and holding out on the readmission of Honduras were two big issues. At one point, the relationship was bad enough he skipped a presidential SICA conference in El Salvador to meet instead with the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Using his inauguration speech to praise Presidents Lobo and Perez may not make ideological "leftist" groups in the hemisphere happy, but may show Ortega returning to a type of pragmatism in which he works with his neighbors in spite of differences.

While I'm sure those politicians and analysts who want to see every country reject Ortega's reelection are frustrated by his neighbors' show of support, the fact is that the Central American countries need each other. They are better off working together except in the most extreme circumstances.

In some ways, the situation is comparable to Lobo's election in 2009 and readmission to the region in 2010 (something that Ortega opposed at the time). There were flaws with the Honduran election, but there are too many important issues to keep Honduras out of the regional dialogue for the next four years. The rest of Central America recognized the importance of working with Honduras and brought them back into the regional group. Similarly, it's not practical to expect Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala to reject Ortega over the election controversy and refuse to work with him for the next five years. It would do significant damage to the region's diplomacy and integration while providing limited or no benefits for democracy.

To conclude, yesterday's inauguration appeared to signal a stronger working relationship among Perez, Funes, Lobo and Ortega. It also signaled a continued distance between Ortega and Chinchilla. All of those relationships have far more direct and daily impact on the country and region than Ortega's relationship with leaders outside of Central America and are the ones analysts should watch closely.

Brazil's paramilitary problem expanding

2012-01-10T10:02:00.000-05:00

Today's NYT covers the issue of militias in Brazil, an issue this blog has covered several times over the past few years. The militias are often made up of off-duty or former police officers who commit acts of extrajudicial executions against gangs and criminals that the authorities seem otherwise incapable of catching or prosecuting.

A few trends noted in the story as to how this problem is changing:

The problem is moving outside of Rio, with militias now found in 11 states.
Police who commit these crimes are now being punished, with hundreds removed from duty and a lower but still significant number prosecuted.
One secondary effect of those prosecutions is that militia leaders are now growing, recruiting, planning and operating from Brazil's broken prison system.
Once involved in criminal acts, the militias often move from attacking criminals to working with or protecting criminals. A number of cops linked to militias are also found to have taken bribes from drug traffickers and gangs.

A pariah state looks for support in Latin America

2012-01-08T13:50:00.001-05:00

Over the next week, an important leader from a widely rejected government will be touring Latin America looking to shore up his country's international legitimacy in the face of increasing pressure and rejection.

Obviously, I'm talking about Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Minister Timothy Yang.

The inaugurations of Presidents Ortega and Perez are an opportunity for Taiwan to send a high level delegation to Central America and the Caribbean and shore up support in the few remaining countries that continue to recognize its legitimacy as an independent country. Yang began his trip in St. Lucia, which changed its recognition from mainland China to Taiwan in 2006 and has been generously rewarded with infrastructure projects since that time. With concerns that Nicaraguan President Ortega has considered changing recognition and Guatemala is getting a new president whose views on the China/Taiwan issue aren't particularly concrete, this is a serious trip for Taiwan to hold its ground in Central America.

For this reason, the trip may signal a renewed battle after several quiet years. Following the flipped recognitions of St Lucia and Costa Rica, China and Taiwan called an unwritten truce on their checkbook diplomacy in the region. Mainland China has taken a fairly enlightened view that it can still manage some economic and even backroom political relations with the governments that recognize Taiwan. The PRC appears to be building up a soft power sell in places like Nicaragua, El Salvador and Paraguay over several years rather than trying to force the hard and decisive switch as soon as possible. Taiwan has been happy to not have to actively defend their recognition in a few places remaining in the world where they can travel and have relations. Plus, it gives them an excuse to stop over in the US and Europe for informal discussions, which Yang will be doing on this trip as well. Taiwan does not want to lose that.

Taiwan knows it's tough being a state under international pressure from a much larger power with greater political, economic and diplomatic leverage. In such a position, a country looks for recognition where they can find it. Taiwan needs the international visits and big photo ops to show the world that they are not universally rejected. They are willing to sign big economic agreements with the few countries willing to host them in exchange for getting support at the United Nations.

Everything written above is not to deny the important contrasts between Taiwan and that other pariah state whose leader is visiting Latin America this week and receiving far more attention (even though the media should treat China-LatAm issues as more important than Iran-LatAm issues, but I digress....). Taiwan is a democracy that is not trying to build a nuclear weapon or back a terrorist group or shut down a major international shipping lane. Its leader isn't a holocaust-denying idiot who has had his soldiers fire upon crowds of peaceful protesters after a rigged election or threatened to wipe out another country if he gets the chance.

But the comparisons are important too. A state rejected by most of the world that has its back against the wall will take allies wherever it can find them. A state that needs support at the UN is going to try to keep as many votes as it can. When it faces certain economic restrictions from most countries, it is going to sign economic deals any place it can. If that happens to mean Nicaragua and Guatemala, even if they are not the biggest or most important countries in the world, then that state is going to make as big of a show of its support for those few allies as it can.

Taiwan's visit, like that of the other pariah this week, is an attempt to maintain the small number of allies it has against the pressure of a bigger opponent and the rejection of the international community. The fact they have to keep returning to the same allies over and over is a sign of international weakness, not strength. It's a tough position to be in. There are only a few options available, and they are making the most of the limited options they have.

Organized crime and Mexico's election 2

2012-01-06T16:39:00.001-05:00

Patrick Corcoran over at InSight Crime writes that surprisingly little has been said by the candidates about their strategies against organized crime, in spite of the focus on the issue by the domestic and international media. After mentioning the candidates' positions, or lack thereof, Corcoran concludes:

What this tells us is that for all of the dissatisfaction with the current state of security, there are no alternatives that slip easily into a campaign sound bite. While it’s easy to lament the spike in violent deaths under Calderon, it’s comparatively difficult to envision a reliable, short-term path out of the current morass. And any candidate who capitalizes on the security woes in order to win himself (or herself) the presidency would soon face the unenviable task of having to live up to his promises.

Absolutely. It's fascinating to see Peña Nieto and Lopez Obrador, heavy critics of the Calderon administration, offer only the most subtle of changes to his security policies when forced to discuss their own plans. Security is the issue about which most Mexicans are concerned, yet the candidates are afraid to touch it for fear of making an unforced error that damages their campaign early.

Part of this is due to the fact that while Mexicans are generally displeased by Calderon's results, polls suggest they are in surprising agreement with the basic outline of his strategy. Only a small minority of the public wants to see a pact with the criminals at one extreme or an even more violent military campaign at the other. So the candidates end up dancing around the issue, offering modest alterations to Calderon's framework.

What will be interesting is whether in the final months of the campaign as one candidate is down in the polls if he or she throws that Hail Mary pass and offers something completely different to try to distinguish their policies and draw media attention and votes.

Latin America mentions in new US defense strategy

2012-01-06T07:29:00.002-05:00

President Obama visited the Pentagon yesterday to unveil a new National Defense Strategy. The big story was the planned reduction of military spending and a "rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" following a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, for this blog, the interest is in any mentions of this hemisphere. The Miami Herald writes:

The new military strategy focuses on Asia, the Middle East and Europe and makes no specific reference to any single nation in Latin America or the Caribbean. Nor does it mention Southcom.

Defense Secretary Panneta added during the press conference:

"In Latin America, Africa, elsewhere in the world, we will use innovative methods to sustain U.S. presence, maintaining key military-to-military relations and pursuing new security partnerships as needed," he said.

Here's the entire paragraph mentioning Latin America from the document:

Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations a including those in Africa and Latin America a whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.

To be fair, it's a short document (8 pages) that is not meant to dive into too much discussion about each region of the world. Europe and China each get a paragraph. India gets a single mention as does the Korean Peninsula. The UK, Canada, Germany and Japan get no mentions.

So don't read too much into the fact that Latin America only gets a very short paragraph that it shares with Africa and that no specific countries are mentioned. The goal of the document is to present a very broad strategic framework to help shape the future of the US military, not a detailed operational plan for the world.

One interesting point, however, is to contrast the missions listed in this strategy with Southcom's priorities. General Fraser has consistently said throughout his time as commander that organized crime and illicit trafficking are the key security threats to the hemisphere. However, the national strategy does not include countering transnational organized crime or illicit trafficking as key missions for the military. That omission, perhaps, is a bigger issue for analysts watching the hemisphere than the narrow mentions of Latin America in the document.

Organized crime and Mexico's election: threat or issue?

2012-01-04T18:26:00.003-05:00

As international media ramp up coverage of the Mexican presidential election in 2012, journalists will discuss the impact of organized crime on the election in two ways. Some will portray organized crime as one of the main issues if not the top issue for presidential candidates and voters. Others will portray organized crime as an actual threat to Mexican democracy, something that is and will undermine Mexico's democratic institutions.

So which is it? Is Mexico's organized crime a threat to democracy or an issue in a democratic election?

In the case of the presidential election, it's just an issue. The criminal organizations are not going to control a candidate or rig the national election. They don't even have a collective preference in terms of who wins, though certainly some political pundits will try to make that case for one side or another. It's certainly a critical issue as the next president sets out a revised strategy to combat the influence and spread of crime and violence. But Mexican democracy at the national and presidential level isn't about to be toppled or significantly undermined, so it can't really be a threat to democracy.

For some states and municipalities below the national level, it is fair to say that criminals are an actual threat to democracy. Mexico's criminal groups kill mayors, corrupt police officers, deteriorate (and in some cases replace) government services and silence civil society in ways that undermine the basic social contract between the people and their government. While saying Mexico at a national level is on the verge of being a Failed State is an exaggeration and not particularly useful, it may not be too far off to give that failed label to some of Mexico's states, small 's', or municipalities.

Balancing that national vs local view will be a challenge for those covering and commenting on the Mexican election. We (I include myself) should avoid portraying Mexico's presidential election as a life or death struggle for Mexico's democracy. At the same time, we shouldn't downplay the very real threat that the criminal groups pose to the lives and ability to live in freedom for the populations in some parts of Mexico.

For 2011's elections, the trend is no trend

2012-01-01T15:55:00.000-05:00

I was going back through 2011 looking for trends in the region, and one thing that stands out is that the biggest elections of this year do not show any significant regional trend.

In Guatemala, after the disqualification of President Colom's ex-wife as a candidate, the country still healing from civil war turned to a former general to manage its security challenges. Security dominated the debate and economics barely registered as an issue. Where it did, it was notable that now President-elect Perez and his opponent Baldizon both fought over who would do more to keep the current government's social programs in place.

In Peru, in spite of strong economic statistics, the population was generally negative about the current direction of the country. The non-traditional candidates of Humala and Fujimori defeated the more traditional politicians in the first round, leaving the country with the choice of "AIDS or Cancer" as author Mario Vargas Llosa put it. Humala's smart campaign in which he moved to the political center along with concerns about Fujimori's past led Vargas Llosa with the majority of Peru in choosing Humala.

In Argentina, President Kirchner built a huge reelection win off the public perception of a strong economy and sympathy over the recent death of her husband. Though inflation remains among the highest in the hemisphere and there are concerns over long term economic issues, the Argentine opposition never even came close.

In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega led in the polls and could have likely won a democratic election if one had been held. But he didn't risk holding it to make sure the polls were correct. The Sandinista controlled electoral tribunal interfered in observation and appears to have manipulated the vote count, giving Ortega a large but disputed victory margin. The opposition has refused to recognize the results and international observers have criticized the conditions of the elections.

In Jamaica, the ruling party was defeated in snap elections called at the end of the year due to discontent over the weak economy and controversy over how security issues were handled by the previous government.

If you look at those five elections, there is no clear regional shift to the left, right or center, no clear preference for new or old politicians, no leaning towards incumbents or oppositions, no region-wide movement on economics or security. It's not just presidential elections. The same lack of a regional ideological pattern holds true if you look at legislative and municipal elections, major legislation passed, or protest movements. Every country is different and goes its own way and there is no one ideological direction sweeping the region.

While I look for regional trends, the country by country view always matters and sometimes there is simply no regional trend to be found in a certain area. The lack of a trend is just as significant to note as actually finding one.

Jamaican opposition wins election

2011-12-30T05:47:00.003-05:00

Jamaica's People's National Party (PNP) won this week's election by a surprisingly large margin. While polls and most analysts believed the race was going to be close, the PNP won 41 of the 63 seats in parliament. PNP leader Portia Simpson Miller will return to the post of prime minister (BBC, CSM).

The economy was the top issue in the election. The recent global economic weakness that has hit the entire Caribbean exposed serious long-term problems in Jamaica's budget. Given the general dissatisfaction with the economy, it was surprising that PM Holness, only on the job for two months, decided to call for elections.

Security played less of a role than in previous elections due to gains made over the past 18 months. In 2010, after months of protecting a key criminal from extradition, former Prime Minister Bruce Golding cracked down on the Tivoli Garden neighborhood and eventually arrested top drug lord Christopher Dudus Coke. The New Yorker this month did some great reporting on those events. The security situation in the country appears to have improved since the arrest of Coke, but it is unclear whether the improvements are sustainable.

So, this is the situation that Simpson Miller will inherit as prime minister. She faces a struggling economy where she will likely need to make budget cuts due to government debt. She also faces a security situation that, while improved, could see problems quickly return as criminal groups reorganize. Under a more closely divided government of the past few years, the two parties were able to blame each other for the country's problems on a regular basis. Now with the PNP holding almost two thirds of the seats in parliament, they are going to take all of the credit if Simpson Miller succeeds and all of the blame if she doesn't.

Youth unemployment in Latin America

2011-12-23T20:25:00.002-05:00

Felix Salmon comments on the "global phenomenon" of youth unemployment, pointing to both the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East and Occupy Wall Street in the US.

Of course, this is a serious issue in Latin America as well. Here is a recent speech from ECLAC on the subject and an article covering ILO statistics. Youth account for half the unemployed in the region and the rate of youth unemployment is between two and five times the average in nearly every country. The statistics are worse at lower income levels. The large number of "Ni-Nis", youth neither in school or working, is a large population that will face lifelong economic challenges and is increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by organized crime and gangs.

As you read the numerous articles and comments about economic growth in Latin America in 2012 being published around the new year, this is a good time to think about statistics beyond GDP. Many of the statistics for the studies on youth unemployment I cite above were taken during better economic years in Latin America. With growth projections decreased for 2011 and 2012, the current situation for youth unemployment is almost certainly getting worse. That could have major economic, political and social implications moving into 2012.

Will Venezuela follow Mercosur's rules?

2011-12-21T20:45:00.001-05:00

Venezuelan President Chavez needs to wait a bit longer for his country's entry into Mercosur, the Common Market of the South founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Though the group feels they found a procedural move to get around the opposition of Paraguay's legislature, the move will take additional time.

Much of the debate on Venezuela's potential entry to Mercosur has focused on shallow political questions about whether or not Hugo Chavez should be admitted. Paraguay's opposition has used its legislative control to block approval of Venezuela's entry on the grounds that Chavez's Venezuela does not meet Mercosur's standards on democracy. Meanwhile, Chavez and his supporters have treated Venezuela's entry into Mercosur as an obvious step for South American integration.

For those who've forgotten, Mercosur actually has rules with an economic impact. It's not one of those nominal integration organizations in which a group of presidents hang out and talk once or twice per year and then is forgotten. Mercosur rules, though sometimes poorly enforced, have an impact on its members trade agreements, customs, tariffs, monetary policies and contractual law.

Let's go over some of the potential impacts that will occur if/when Venezuela joins Mercosur, some of which are just as important even if Chavez is no longer president a year from now.

Free trade within Mercosur. Venezuela must allow the free transit of goods and services with Mercosur countries. It's the basic foundation of the organization.

Free trade with Colombia. Mercosur signed and implemented a free trade agreement with Colombia a few years ago. The sudden implementation of a new free trade framework between Venezuela and Colombia via Mercosur could have a major impact on both economies. Specific to the current Chavez government, how would Mercosur's regulations affect Venezuela the next time Chavez decides to shut down trade at the border over some random dispute, as he did when President Uribe was in office?

Free trade agreement with Israel. Mercosur has a signed and fully implemented free trade agreement with Israel. Separately, they signed a deal with Palestine during this week's meeting. Venezuela's ascendance means they must abide by the Israel free trade rules. How will Chavez's friends in Iran and Syria who cheered his breaking of diplomatic ties with Israel a few years ago take his sudden agreement to a free trade deal with the country?

Restrictions on unilateral trade agreements. With some leniency, all Mercosur members must negotiate trade agreements jointly. A few years ago, Mercosur prevented Uruguay from negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States. Could Chavez negotiate new trade deals with his ALBA partners without consulting Mercosur? Also, Venezuela would gain significant veto power over any potential new trade deals that Mercosur attempts to negotiate, which could significantly tie Brazil's hands.

Common external tariff. One of the biggest items agreed during this week's meeting was a new common external tariff on a number of goods from Asia. This tariff targets about 100 goods, most from China, to protect Brazil's and Argentina's manufacturing sectors from dumping. How does China feel about the fact Venezuela, to whom they just lent several billion more dollars, will be joining Mercosur and implementing a 35% tariff on certain Chinese goods? Additionally, Venezuela will be unable to enact new tariffs on many items without consulting its Mercosur allies.

Expropriation restrictions. Mercosur has some rather strict rules protecting member states from expropriating property of other member states. Joining Mercosur would restrict Chavez's ability to take over Argentine or Brazilian companies operating in his country and would force a fair compensation if he did. Being that both Brazil and Argentina have had issues with Chavez's sudden expropriations in the past, they likely want these new rules in place.

Currency transfers. Mercosur nations officially cannot adopt currency restrictions that would prevent the free transfer of funds across their borders. This is not the best enforced measure, but it's possible that Brazil and Argentina could use these Mercosur regulations to get around Venezuela's rather strict currency restrictions at the moment.

The likely big winner in this deal: Brazil. Many people have asked why Lula and Dilma would allow Venezuela to join Mercosur given the volatile and undemocratic nature of its current government leadership. Look no further than those economic points above. Brazil will get a free trade deal with Venezuela that will provide a big open market, create new multilateral legal protections for their companies and investments, allow them to get around Venezuela's currency restrictions and place a huge set of tariffs on all Chinese goods in Venezuela, making Brazilian companies more competitive. Venezuela under the Mercosur regulations could become an economic windfall for Brazil, which already is making big money on Venezuela's oil wealth and Chavez's economic mismanagement.

If Venezuela joins, one of two things will occur. Either they will follow those Mercosur rules and regulations, which could have a major political, legal and economic impact that few have foreseen and which will greatly benefit Brazil. Or, Venezuela will flaunt Mercosur's rules, making a mockery of the organization and leading to other countries, particularly Paraguay and Uruguay, asking why they can't also break some of the rules that would benefit them.

Mercosur has rules. Those rules aren't just the democracy clause that so many analysts have brought up, but actual economic regulations with real impact. Analysts should get past the Chavez show and current democracy debate and ask how implementing those regulations will impact Venezuela's and the region's economy. This could be a big economic shift that nobody is prepared for, especially not Venezuela.

Three Argentina stories

2011-12-21T07:55:00.000-05:00

Three Argentina-related stories coming out of the Mercosur summit that I mentioned yesterday.

First, the tragic suicide of an aide to President Kirchner led to the suspension of the summit agenda. President Kirchner, who has some minor health problems, required medical attention when she heard the news that Deputy Commerce Minister Ivan Heyn had taken his own life in his hotel room in Montevideo.

Second, as the summit gets back on track, one of the big items to come up will be a Mercosur rule banning Falkland-flagged ships from their ports. While Argentina already has this rule in place, a full Mercosur rule would significantly isolate the ships as they could not dock at Brazil or Uruguay. Whether the rule can be enforced is questionable, but it is a big step for the organization that raises tensions with the UK. (UPDATE: IPS summary of other items decided at the meeting).

Third, while the president was out of the country, authorities raided the offices of Cablevision. The media company is owned by Clarin, which has had a long-running feud with the president. The government says it is investigating unfair competition while Clarin claims it is part of an intimidation and harassment campaign by the government to pressure them into less negative coverage of government policies.

Mercosur stumbles over trade issues

2011-12-20T07:51:00.000-05:00

Mercosur will meet this week in Montevideo. Most eyes are on the question of whether the organization will change its rules to allow Venezuela to join over objections of the Paraguayan legislature. However, the bigger question may be whether Mercosur continues to be an effective organization for promoting regional trade.

IPS writes a strong analysis about the protectionism issue at Mercosur. Mercopress, BBC and Clarin all cover the potential new tariffs that Mercosur could place on imports from outside the region.

Separately, USTR Ron Kirk gave an interview last week with a Brazil's Estadao in which he suggested the Obama administration is looking to strike a new trade agreement with South America in general and Brazil in particular. The comments came just weeks after Senator Lugar criticized the administration for not doing more to promote trade with Brazil and Mercosur.

The US war in Iraq ends

2011-12-19T08:29:00.000-05:00

Over the weekend, the final US troops left Iraq, marking the end of the 9 year US war in that country.

The original debate over Iraq was controversial in Latin America, with most countries opposing the US invasion. Mexico and Chile indicated they opposed the action at the UN Security Council. Once the initial invasion was over, hundreds of troops from the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador participated in the Multi-National Force (MNF-I). Contractors from numerous countries including Colombia and Peru also went over to Iraq to work for US firms there.

The bigger issues with Iraq and Latin America were indirect. The US invasion of another country, no matter how vile its dictator, was viewed negatively by a region wary of US intervention. The errors of pre-war intelligence continue to create doubt about other US statements. The photos of abuse from Abu Ghraib and elsewhere remain a black mark from the war that still stains the US reputation worldwide. The focus on conflicts in the Middle East over the past decade drew time, attention and resources away from the Western Hemisphere.

Those factors weren't discussed in the pre-war debate, but they should have been foreseen and they should serve as a warning for future wars of choice. A war like Iraq shouldn't just be debated on its merits in isolation (should Saddam be overthrown or not), but also in the context of tradeoffs for other priorities, both foreign and domestic.

Potential budget cuts to the OAS

2011-12-16T09:46:00.000-05:00

Considering the harsh criticisms of the OAS launched by Presidents Chavez, Ortega and Correa during the recent CELAC summit, you might think that their most vocal opponents in the US Congress would work to strengthen the main inter-American organization.

Of course not. As the Nicaragua Dispatch reports, the Republicans on the House Foreign Relations Committee are urging a cut in funds to the OAS. If their amendment makes it through the budget process, money will be cut if the OAS fails to implement the democratic charter on Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Representative Eliot Engle, who dissented on the vote, was absolutely correct in saying. "We are doing Chávez’s bidding... He wants the OAS killed and we are doing it for him here today." As I pointed out previously, on the issue of the OAS, the rhetoric of the GOP members of Congress and the leaders of ALBA is surprisingly aligned. Cutting the OAS budget in the current environment hurts the standing of the US in the region and will harm efforts by the OAS, however limited, to protect democracy and human rights in the long term.

Journalists vs Lobo in Honduras

2011-12-15T08:38:00.004-05:00

Yesterday, a group of journalists attempted to protest in front of the Honduran presidential palace. The main focus of the protest was the recent killing of radio host Luz Marina Paz, but also the general climate against media freedom in Honduras.

The protesters ended up clashing with police and military forces guarding the palace and were eventually dispersed with tear gas. President Lobo defended the actions of the security forces, insisting the protesters were not peaceful.

Lobo also criticized the US for its insistence on investigations of journalist murders, saying that if the US wants investigations it should send aid to Honduras for investigators. Lobo threatened to pull out of the Millennium Challenge Corporation completely if that organization refuses to certify Honduras.

Hezbollah money laundering indictment

2011-12-14T07:58:00.000-05:00

The NYT and ProPublica have details on the indictment of Ayman Joumaa, a Lebanese citizen who has laundered millions of dollars for Hezbollah while assisting with cocaine trafficking routes out of Colombia and Venezuela. It appears his focus was routes through Europe, but he has also moved drugs through Mexico in coordination with the Zetas.

The case is notable for having all the key words that people get excited about: Hezbollah! Terrorist-financing! Cocaine! Zetas! Venezuela!. And all of that appears to be true.

At the same time, in spite of all the red flag key words, the details within these articles and the indictment show how the US government can deal with the issue of Hezbollah in the hemisphere without panic and over-reaction.

It's important to take down the hemisphere's Hezbollah money laundering networks because they do finance terrorism in the Middle East and violent criminal organizations like the Zetas in this hemisphere. However, in some ways, it's just one more criminal network to take down. As one official told ProPublica, "It’s not like there’s a sit-down between the leaders of Hezbollah and the Zetas." Nor is this about Presidents Chavez and Ahmadinejad plotting together. It should not be portrayed as such.

Hezbollah has been laundering drug money in the hemisphere for well over a decade, which is an intelligence and law enforcement issue. The US and other governments have used civilian investigators to track down the money routes and build a case to indict top personnel and seize funds. The US Congress, which has often expressed concern over Hezbollah's activities, should see this indictment as a sign of success by the US government and an argument to fully fund and support US civilian law enforcement efforts by DEA, ATF, Treasury and others to track and halt money laundering and other criminal activity in this hemisphere.

New PM in Peru

2011-12-12T09:51:00.006-05:00

Last week I taped a podcast with Steve Johnson of CSIS about regional groups in Latin America and the prospects for Peruvian President Humala.

Over the weekend, Prime Minister Salomon Lerner resigned, largely due to the recent protests over mining in Cajamarca. Humala had been using Lerner in a "bad cop" role during the negotiations, but Lerner seemed unable or unwilling to either negotiate a deal or crack down as hard as Humala had hoped. Now, Oscar Valdes will be taking the Prime Minister position (which in Peru functions more as a chief of cabinet than a traditional PM in a parliamentary system) and over half the cabinet ministers have been changed.

Some critics of Humala are already criticizing the appointment of Valdes as a militarization of the government, given his former role as an Army officer. Whether it shows a more military line or not, most expect Valdes to take a harder line than Lerner and help protect Humala's political agenda in Lima from being derailed by this protest.

One issue to watch is whether this cabinet shift was a one time emergency move by Humala or will become part of a trend. It could be Humala is a president who changes his cabinet every four to five months as he feels the need to shake things up and get them moving again. That sort of political movement creates a bit of instability and uncertainty for political debates and financial markets, but that instability may be seen as preferable to an otherwise inevitable slow decline of political support over time.

Journalist and former security minister killed in Honduras

2011-12-08T07:35:00.001-05:00

Former Security Minister Alfredo Landaverde was assassinated in Honduras a day after journalist Luz Marina Paz Villalobos was gunned down in the capital while test driving a car owned by an Army colonel.

Landaverde was outspoken about corruption in police and political institutions in Honduras and his murder is almost certainly linked to organized crime. Authorities are investigating various motives for the attack on Paz, but given her previous work for Radio Globo, political motives are certainly likely and should not be easily dismissed by police.

Earlier this week, the offices of La Tribuna were attacked by gunmen, injuring a guard.

Saadi's Zihuatanejo

2011-12-08T06:30:00.001-05:00

Mexico. Little place right on the Pacific. You know what the Mexicans say about the Pacific? They say it has no memory. That's where I'd like to finish out my life, Red. A warm place with no memory. Open a little hotel right on the beach. Buy some worthless old boat and fix it up like new. Take my guests out charter fishing.
- Andy Dufresne, The Shawshank Redemption, 1994

Sure, Saadi Gaddafi was heading to Punta Mita and not Zihuatanejo, but the idea was the same. Like Dufresne in the movie, the dictator's son believed he could escape to Mexico's Pacific Coast and live out his life anonymously.

Of course, unlike the movie, Gaddafi felt the need to pay consultants thousands of dollars each day to escape from Africa and set up properties and bank accounts under false names in Mexico. That didn't help his chances of not being noticed.

Canada's National Post broke the story and Mexico's El Universal has additional coverage of the government's actions. CSM compares the story to the successful operation against the Iranian terrorist plot a few months ago, while contrasting it with the high rates of impunity that typically haunt Mexico's justice system.

Local vs national in the Andes

2011-12-06T05:51:00.001-05:00

Peruvian President Humala declared a state of emergency in Cajamarca in order to halt a protest over a mining company. Local protesters believe the mine will harm the environment including water supplies. The government insists that the protesters are being unreasonable by refusing to negotiate. See BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg and Guardian.

Many articles portray this as a development vs environmental issue, which it is, but that framework pushes it too quickly to a right vs left debate. This is also a local vs national issue. National governments feel they have a right to extract resources to help the country's economy while locals often see disproportionate harm, want more say into how it is done, and want to benefit more from the development. This local vs national clash doesn't go away, whether there is a right-wing or left-wing president in office.

This is how Humala, along with Bolivia's Morales and Ecuador's Correa, have suddenly found themselves on the other side of the environmental ideological line. All three of them were once defenders of protesters who took on right-wing government development policies, either because they agreed with the protesters or because it benefited them politically. Now in charge of the national government and economy, they find themselves ideologically flip-flopped, clashing with protesters on the left while defending things like highways through the TIPNIS national park or mining in rural agricultural regions. That's why many on the left who are pro-environment and pro-indigenous rights have found themselves disillusioned when "leftist" presidents have taken power in the region, only to promote national interests over the more local concerns.

To be fair, it's not just politicians switching views. The private sector will gladly flip-flop on the federalism debate. If there is a business-friendly national government, they'll try to get the president to pressure local protesters and civil society to allow more development. However, as seen in Bolivia's Eastern regions, when there is a national government trying to tax and regulate more, the business community can suddenly become all about local rights in promoting development.

These aren't easy questions, but unfortunately, the issues do make for easy short term political attacks. The number of right-wing commentators I saw cynically supporting the pro-indigenous, pro-environment TIPNIS protesters in Bolivia was matched by the number of left-wing commentators I saw cynically defending Morales's highway plan and repression of protesters. We all know that if that was 2003 with President Sanchez de Lozada in office, many of those same commentators would be on the other side. We're starting to see the same thing in Peru, with Humala's long time critics suddenly finding cause celebre with the protesters in mining communities while Humala's defenders are justifying his state of emergency as a legitimate action, as if their opinions weren't the exact opposite under President Garcia one year ago.

It's that sort of cynical political game that keeps these issues burning in the Andean region. It's hard to discuss federalism, local authority and divided powers when so much of the political debate revolves around the single question of who holds the presidency today. The problem for these countries is that if the political system doesn't solve it, then the societies face serious instability. Local communities rise up and reject the national government and the national government is forced to perform a show of force to prove it is still in control. Until it is not.

I think President Humala understands this local vs national challenge, but it's just one of the challenges he faces. He also needs to keep the economy running. He also must maintain political capital in Lima to get other items on his agenda accomplished. He also must show he is a strong national leader and can't be pushed around. So he declares a state of emergency, gives the military police powers including arrests without warrant, stops the local protest and keeps the mine open for business. It doesn't fix the long term local vs national problems in Peru, but it may be the only politically and economically viable short term move he can make this week. Unfortunately, that means the bigger questions about local power will still be haunting his administration next week.

Should Chavistas get amnesty?

2011-12-05T09:03:00.001-05:00

As the Venezuelan opposition primary moves forward, one of the issues highlighting differences among the candidates is the hypothetical question of whether Chavez and other top government officials from the past decade should be tried for various crimes, human rights abuses and corruption.

Fringe candidate Diego Arria was quickly at the extreme, promising to deliver Chavez to the Hague for war crimes. He's already preparing his case. Other candidates have backed away from that view.

Maria Corina Machado appeared to take the other extreme, promising to pass an amnesty law within the opening days of her administration. I'm not quite sure what crimes her law would cover.

Henrique Capriles Radonski, the leading opposition candidate, provided a moderate answer at last night's debate. Asked about Arria's plan to try Chavez at the Hague, Capriles says the job of the president is not to prosecute the previous administration or do anything that is a judicial branch function. It's not amnesty, but prosecuting past abuses is also not a priority in a country that needs so much done.

On the traditional (and now outdated) left-right spectrum in Latin America, the debate over amnesty laws was long one of the left focused on the abuses of right-wing military dictatorships. In general, the center has favored "amnesty" as the least worst option for maintaining political stability while the left has demanded the prosecution of those who committed awful crimes as a way to punish impunity and deter others from acting in the future.

With Chavez and other "leftist" leaders who have abused their positions of power eventually leaving office, there are questions of how the political spectrum will shift on this issue. There are certainly some within the Chavez administration who could be tried for corruption and human rights abuses. However, is it really in the best interests of Venezuela's future to be so focused on the previous decade, or is it necessary to halt impunity and prevent future abuses of power? In this case, the center seems to once again favor amnesty or avoiding the issue while the extreme (this time right-wing) is demanding justice be done. The exception is Machado, who is fairly conservative but seems to be a moderate on this issue.

Of course, this hypothetical is putting the cart before the horse. Venezuela's opposition has a number obstacles in front of them before they can really address this issue, not the least of which is winning the 2012 election and successfully transitioning in to power. Those other challenges in transitioning to democracy are exactly why justice was long delayed or never implemented in places like Chile, Argentina, Peru and Brazil.

The trend from those other South American countries is that amnesty laws eventually faded as the country became more democratically stable. Ten to twenty years later, prosecutions finally began. I think it is likely Venezuela will see the same trend. Officials within the Chavez administration will not be tried by its successor, whether that comes in 2012 or at a later date. But wait a political generation of separation and there may be some very old Chavistas facing trial in 2030 for crimes from decades past.

The pace of the money laundering fight 2

2011-12-05T05:28:00.001-05:00

The NYT published a front page article this weekend on how the DEA launders millions of dollars for the Mexican drug cartels as it attempts to track the money and arrest the top bosses. The frustrating part:

It is not clear whether such operations are worth the risks. So far there are few signs that following the money has disrupted the cartels’ operations, and little evidence that Mexican drug traffickers are feeling any serious financial pain. Last year, the D.E.A. seized about $1 billion in cash and drug assets, while Mexico seized an estimated $26 million in money laundering investigations, a tiny fraction of the estimated $18 billion to $39 billion in drug money that flows between the countries each year.

I'd like to know how they run the cost-benefit analysis on these operations. Is it worth laundering $10 million in order to seize a $100 million in drug trafficking assets? I think that's a great ROI and would agree. Would it be worth laundering $10 million in order to arrest five guys and get back the $10 million? I'm not sure. Would it be worth laundering $10 million to make arrests that eventually prevent 100 murders in Mexico? I think that's a good question to ask, but I'm not sure something so complex can be measured clearly.

Patrick Corcoran writes on InSight Crime that the money laundering fight may never be enough to put a serious dent in the traffickers' finances. That's correct, but I'm not sure that seizing every dollar possible is the point of anti-money laundering efforts. The point is to gain intelligence on specific individuals (if you could launder $10 million and use the intel to track Chapo's location, would it be worth it?) as well as make money laundering a risky crime that people avoid. Right now, money launderers do not believe that there is a serious chance they will be arrested, prosecuted and have their assets seized. If anti-money laundering efforts in Mexico have one specific goal, it should be to change that attitude and make money laundering a risk worth avoiding.

I can't judge the DEA's programs here because, as the NYT indicates, it's not clear how they're measuring the costs and benefits. They could be awesomely effective or a complete waste of time and taxpayer money. We need more numbers and we need to have the debate over what results are expected for each dollar laundered.

CELAC's Troika

2011-12-04T10:12:00.001-05:00

Among the key questions facing any international organization are:
1) Who leads and sets the agenda?
2) How are decisions made?
3) Are decisions binding among all member states?

Those questions were on display at the founding CELAC meeting in Caracas this past week. Let me take them in reverse order.

3) Decisions at CELAC are voluntary and not binding. There are no penalties for countries that go against the resolutions or choose not to participate. This makes CELAC resolutions mostly symbolic for now and dependent on the willingness of every country to participate.

2) How decisions are made was a big debate behind the scenes this week and the Latin American and Caribbean countries could not come to an agreement. A group of countries wanted a majority or 2/3 vote to pass resolutions while others insisted on a consensus model (all countries must agree). Being that the countries could not agree on these rules, decision-making appears to remain consensus based. All countries must agree on everything. Any country should be able to object and prevent a resolution from happening.

1) On Friday night, Hugo Chavez declared that CELAC will be led by a Troika of countries: the current president pro-tempore (summit host) plus the previous and next hosts. Today, that means the Troika is led by Chile (President Piñera is now president pro-tem and the summit will be in Santiago in 2012) along with Venezuela, the most recent summit host, and Cuba, where the summit will be held in 2013.

How was this Troika organization decided? It's not quite clear. The Troika is written into the "estatuto de procedimientos" of the organization. Though countries agreed to this document, many appeared to be taken off guard by the announcement.

Doesn't CELAC's consensus model mean that all countries agreed to this model? Apparently not. Trinidad and Tobago strenuously objected on Saturday, saying that the English-speaking Caribbean must be represented in the leadership group and asking for it to be expanded to a quartet. Panama asked that CELAC establish a general secretariat. If Trinidad and Tobago and Panama objected and all decisions are consensus based, how did this Troika organization make its way into the document?

Also, it seems hard to believe that Brazil and Mexico would have handed over influence to an organization in which they have no say for the next four years. After Chavez announced the Troika, the presidents of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina left the summit and Brazil's foreign minister became uncharacteristically less enthusiastic about CELAC as a whole. The summit seemed to lose speed the second day and this Troika announcement appears to be part of the reason.

So what powers does the Troika have? The president pro-tem has significant unilateral agenda powers, but needs to consult with the other two members of the Troika on a number of issues. The Troika determines whether the region's foreign ministers must meet to discuss a breach in democracy. There are also indications that the Troika, if they agree, can release a statement that speaks for all of CELAC in an emergency with only 12 hours notice. Though CELAC resolutions are non-binding, the ability to release resolutions and call all foreign ministers shows some serious diplomatic power. Additionally, Chavez is already calling for a meeting of the three Troika nations to be held to determine next steps, even though this sort of meeting is not mentioned in the founding documents. You should be able to see why countries like Trinidad and Tobago are upset about being outside the Troika.

Chavez's response to the criticisms: The Troika will meet soon to discuss those proposals about changing itself. It's good to be on the right side of the status quo in an organization that requires unanimity to reform (see veto power and the UN Security Council reform debate for another example of that).

If the Troika remains as is, this time next year, it will change to Chile, Cuba and Costa Rica (the host of the 2014) and then will shift to Cuba, Costa Rica and whatever country hosts in 2015.

If CELAC has no significant power or influence, then this Troika really doesn't matter much. It will just be another platform for presidential speeches. However, if the CELAC organization begins to show signs of life over the coming year (and it will be the leadership of Chilean President Piñera that will largely determine that), you can bet that discussions over the 2015 host and Troika reform will become hot topics in the region.

CELAC and UNASUR, style vs substance

2011-12-02T08:12:00.000-05:00

Blogging by boz general rule of international organizations: Any international organization that spends most of its time discussing who is or isn't a member is not being effective.

This is essentially the fight over CELAC today in Caracas. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez wants to focus discussion on the organization as an "anti-imperialist" unit, one without the US and Canada, and one that is an alternative to the OAS. As I wrote earlier this year, the fact the CELAC meeting was postponed due to Chavez's health crisis already shows a lack of seriousness in this debate. Another group of countries, led by Brazil, have a more substantive agenda for CELAC that includes responses to the global financial crisis and a democracy clause for the new organization. The winner of this style vs. substance debate will determine whether CELAC has a hope of becoming an effective organization in the future. I'm pessimistic.

What analysts should be watching is the UNASUR meeting happening concurrently in Caracas. The media aren't focused because UNASUR isn't arguing over who is a member or how they're better than the OAS or US. Instead, UNASUR has an substantive agenda of its own and has been implementing it all year under the leadership of Maria Emma Mejia. Just in the past month, UNASUR has announced plans for a regional infrastructure development plan including new fiberoptic connections, a potential regional space agency, a new counter-drug agency and various other programs that are all happening under the radar. The meeting today will define their plan of action for 2012.

UNASUR has turned themselves into a viable alternative regional organization not by rhetorically bashing the perceived flaws of the OAS and US, but by putting their head down and providing budget and personnel to move forward with regional integration initiatives. UNASUR has turned into a "non-US" organization, as opposed to an "anti-US" organization which is what Chavez wants it and CELAC to be. It turns out that the best way to set up an organization outside of US influence is to simply do it, not talk about it.

The biggest challenge for UNASUR in the next year will be maintaining the substance over style as Ali Rodriguez of Venezuela takes over the leadership of the organization. However, with other South American countries now seeing some real results and potential out of UNASUR, it may be that they work hard to prevent the organization's non-US agenda from being hijacked by the rhetorical flourishes of anti-imperialism.

US reaction to Nicaragua elections

2011-12-01T14:28:00.035-05:00

The US House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing yesterday on Nicaraguan democracy while Senator Rubio introduced a resolution calling for the US to oppose Nicaragua at international financial institutions and to vote to suspend Nicaragua from the OAS via the Democracy Charter.

From the hearing, let me recommend the testimonies of both former Ambassador Robert Callahan and the Carter Center's Jennifer McCoy. Callahan, who is very critical of President Ortega's attacks on democracy, ends his testimony with this recommendation for US policy:

For the moment, at least, I think we should stay. We should continue to promote economic development, especially through our programs in health and education, which both benefit poor Nicaraguans and demonstrate our nation's commitment to them. We should continue to champion good governance openly, in every appropriate way, and with everyone, including young Sandinistas, who want to create a genuinely democratic future for their country.

The Obama administration, for its part, told the Miami Herald that they are consulting the rest of the hemisphere on the next steps. Their goal is to take multilateral action, possibly through the OAS. Unilateral US responses and statements may get cheers on Capitol Hill, but helping Nicaraguan democracy will require a regional response that goes beyond anything the US can do alone.

Honduras military will get police powers

2011-11-30T12:00:00.001-05:00

The Honduran government is pushing forward a law that would grant police powers to the military. This would allowed domestically deployed soldiers to use warrants, collect evidence and arrest suspects. CNN and BBC cover the law. RNS raises concerns about the law including questions of whether it is constitutional.

The argument in favor of using the military is simple: The current security situation in Honduras is terrible. The public demand an improvement in the situation. The police as they are currently structured cannot manage the security challenges the country faces. In one recent controversy, numerous police officials threatened to resign and other officers indicated they would go on strike if the government cracked down on police corruption. Responding to that sort of institutional threat requires that some group can take the place of the police and not allow them to hold the government hostage to their corruption. The only institution currently capable of stepping up and taking on the criminal groups is the military.

Of course, that justification avoids all the problems that come with using the military. The military is not designed to be a police force. Using the military brings a number of legal and constitutional problems. Any country using the military domestically will see an increase in human rights abuses by government forces, and Honduras is likely to be worse given its recent history of military involvement in politics. Additionally, while the police have a corruption problem, the military aren't saints. On top of human rights abuses committed during the Michelletti regime and never prosecuted, there is corruption including arms trafficking occurring within the military ranks. There are also accusations (likely true) that some military moonlight working as private security guards/militias/mercenaries for various criminal organizations and members of the Honduran oligarchy.

A temporary use of the military would be more palatable if: 1) it would actually be temporary, 2) there was a plan to provide some training and vetting of military units acting as police, and 3) there was a realistic plan to transition away from the military and back to full civilian policing. How does Honduras know when its military can/will return to their quarters? There is little indication from what I've seen so far that President Lobo has a broader strategy that creates stronger civilian institutions and puts the military back in their proper place. Even if the president does have a plan, implementing it past the obstructions in Congress, the police and the military will be quite difficult.

Criticisms aside, President Lobo is going to get his way on this issue and the military are going to begin a policing function. Three critical points to watch:
1) How will abuses be prosecuted? Abuses happen and they increase when military are involved domestically. The Lobo government needs to be clear about how soldiers who commit abuses will be tried, in a military or civilian court.

2) How will the US assist while monitoring the situation? Will the US monitor abuses by the military and refuse to work with units that commit abuses? Southcom Commander General Fraser was just in Honduras discussing the challenges of organized crime. The DEA and other civilian government agencies are also regularly assisting the Lobo government. Does any particular agency have the lead in helping the military function in a police role? Is this something the US is willing to assist or something the US should discourage?

3) How can civil society help provide oversight and transparency? This sort of operation is where a free media and civil society should play a key role. However, Honduras is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists in the world. This military operation and the need for a strong civil society to monitor it should be seen as another reasons for President Lobo to do a better job investigating the attacks on the media that have occurred while working to prevent future attacks. His administration should also be pro-active in promoting civil society groups who can monitor government actions. If government, military and police corruption is a problem, then non-governmental institutions that increase transparency must be an important part of the solution that will help increase security in the country.

2011-11-30T06:00:00.001-05:00

“I know that God exists and I know that evil exists. And the FARC are evil.”
- Police Sgt. Luis Alberto Erazo via the Miami Herald

Erazo was a FARC captive for 12 years who escaped while four other hostages were executed. It's a horrific event that highlights the FARC's continuing human rights abuses. As most NGOs and governments have pointed out since the executions, the FARC have the obligation to unconditionally release all hostages.

Brazil's unconventional World Cup preparations

2011-11-29T08:46:00.001-05:00

BBC:

Add the former sports minister resigning amid allegations of multi-million dollar kickbacks, and marines taking control of favelas or shanty towns in Rio de Janeiro with the support of tanks and helicopter gunships, and Brazil has certainly garnered some negative headlines around the world.

The global image of Brazil has been very optimistic over the past few years, with the awarding of the World Cup and Olympics seen as a sign the country is ascending to the status of a major power.

However, the preparations for those two events have exposed some negative aspects of the country that were otherwise ignored by the international media. Not many countries have had to run military operations in urban areas before they could hold the World Cup.

Within the decade, Brazil will be judged on the results of the two events. If everything goes well, the controversy over the preparations will be mostly forgotten and it will be a big victory for the country's image. However, if things don't go well.... Brazil doesn't even want to consider that possibility.

The pace of the money laundering fight

2011-11-28T05:14:00.001-05:00

The LA Times covers Mexico's efforts to combat money laundering, the US blacklisting of businesses that launder money and accusations that big banks have helped launder criminal money in Mexico. The general message is that officials in both countries want to increase prosecution of money laundering, but it is a slow process that has shown only limited success so far.

One thing to consider here is the speed of the different government actions. President Calderon entered office in late 2006 and almost immediately deployed thousands of troops to combat the criminal groups. Five years later, with thousands of military personnel in the field, Calderon still can't get many basic reforms to combat money laundering through the Congress and implemented in the bureaucracy.

The next president needs to learn from Calderon's actions. There are decisions that the Mexican president can take quickly (moving troops around) and others that can only be implemented really slowly (reforming a seized assets law). In 2006-07, Calderon sent troops to fight criminals without having the other government law enforcement and institution building efforts prepared to follow up and consolidate any gains made. If a comprehensive strategy is necessary for Mexico to successfully fight the criminal groups, then the next president needs to consider the pace of his actions and how to align them.

Plan Colombia's limited scale

2011-11-27T09:35:00.001-05:00

Michael O'Hanlon and Paul Wolfowitz argue that the US should strive for a "Colombia standard" of success in Afghanistan. They argue that though Colombia continues to have a conflict (in fact, a higher homicide rate than Afghanistan), its relative success in reducing the conflict, providing state presence in the population centers and having a fighting force capable of managing its own conflict should be seen as a model for "success" in Afghanistan.

They write:

While Colombians deserve most of the credit for success, they depended on a long-term U.S. commitment that was limited in scale but not in time.

I agree with that sentence, but not the rest of the paragraph.

I once wrote that Latin American analysts liked to refer to Plan Colombia not because of any specific details as much as it was "very big." That's true in terms of security assistance to the Western Hemisphere, where Plan Colombia was bigger and longer lasting than any other comparable initiative. The Merida Initiative in Mexico and the more recent CARSI and CBSI in Central America and the Caribbean are quite undersized compared to the scale of resources and commitment the US gave Colombia in the late 1990's and throughout the 00's.

That said, compared to Afghanistan or Iraq, Plan Colombia is peanuts. Over the past decade, there have been times the US has spent more in a day on its two wars than was spent in an entire year in Colombia. Additionally, Plan Colombia limited the number of troops and contractors in the country to less than 1,500 at any given time and the US was often well under the limits. Compare that to the 150,000 military personnel that were in Iraq at its peak or the about 90,000 that remain in Afghanistan today, and neither of those numbers include thousands of additional contractors.

Those limitations benefited Colombia. Having a smaller budget and a troop/contractor cap prevented the US from throwing excessive troops and resources at the problem, which often creates temporary success but also a level of dependency that make it hard to step away. The limitations on US assistance meant Colombia had to succeed on its own because the US was legislatively self-limited from imposing temporary "success" from the outside by ramping up troops or aid.

But here's the rest of the paragraph from O'Hanlon and Wolfowitz:

Afghanistan will need that even more. With a desperately poor economy (one-sixteenth the size of Colombia's), Afghanistan cannot sustain the army it needs without help. The country will need some $3 billion annually in foreign military assistance for an extended period after 2014, as well as a continuing military presence in the range of 10,000 U.S. and other NATO troops in a supporting role.

Look at those numbers. $3 billion in military assistance plus 10,000 troops (plus how many contractors?) on top of the money spent over the past decade. That's five to ten times the size of Plan Colombia in any given year. They are recommending a "post-war" spending package of more money on security aid in Afghanistan than the US spends in the entire Western Hemisphere today. They are recommending far more US troops deployed in Afghanistan than the US uses to train and support all the military and police in this hemisphere.

The military aid package suggested by O'Hanlon and Wolfowitz is only "limited" in comparison with the war-level spending in Afghanistan over the past decade. It is still far more costly than Plan Colombia, less likely to succeed, and without a plan to reduce that level to a more reasonable support package at any point in the future. In terms of Afghanistan, the right lessons from Plan Colombia are to look at the self-imposed limitations on aid, leaving the US in a supporting role while Colombia led the fight. Afghanistan is not going to lead on its own security if the US doesn't limit its own involvement.

Now go back to a fact I put in the first paragraph: Colombia still has a higher homicide rate than Afghanistan. So do the parts of Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico most heavily affected by the criminal groups.

Budgeting is about priorities. That $3 billion and 10,000 troop plan proposed by O'Hanlon and Wolfowitz can't be analyzed in a vacuum. Spending more on security in Afghanistan than we spend on all of Latin America and the Caribbean seems to me to be a poor use of limited resources moving forward. There is a need in this hemisphere, the money spent is more effective and the direct impact on US security and prosperity is likely greater. That's one more factor to consider as the US plans a more "limited scale" of aid to Afghanistan.

GOP LatAm policy at November 2011 debate

2011-11-23T09:08:00.001-05:00

There were a lot of mentions of Latin America, or at least Mexico, in last night's GOP debate. Enough mentions that I saw several Asia experts complaining that the debate spent too much time on Mexico and immigration and not enough on China and India.

Here are the comments related Latin America policy other than immigration.

Asked a question about US-Mexico border security, here was Rick Perry's full rambling answer:

Well, let me kind of broaden it out. I think it's time for a 21st century Monroe Doctrine. When you think about what we put in place in the -- in the 1820s, and then we used it again in the 1960s with the Soviet Union. We're seeing countries start to come in and infiltrate. We know that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico, as well as Iran, with their ploy to come into the United States.

We know that Hugo Chavez and the Iranian government has one of the largest -- I think their largest embassy in the world is in Venezuela. So the idea that we need to have border security with the United States and Mexico is paramount to the entire western hemisphere.

So putting that secure border in place with strategic fencing, with the boots on the ground, with the aviation assets, and then working with Mexico in particular, whether it's putting sanctions against the banks, whether it's working with them on security with Mexico, all of those together can make that country substantially more secure and our borders secure.

As the President of the United States, I will promise you one thing, that within 12 months of the inaugural, that border will be shut down, and it will be secure.

Herman Cain's follow on comments:

Number one, we know that terrorists have come into this country by way of Mexico. Secondly, 40 percent of the people in Mexico, according to a survey, already believe that their country is a failed state. Thirdly, the number of people killed in Mexico last year equals the number of people killed in Afghanistan and Iraq combined.

Ron Paul called for an end to the "war on drugs" and received applause from the conservative think tank audience.

Here was Rick Santorum's answer on what issue isn't getting enough attention:

Well, I've spent a lot of time and concern -- and Rick mentioned this earlier -- about what's going on in Central and South America. I'm very concerned about the militant socialists and there -- and the radical Islamists joining together, bonding together.

I'm concerned about the spread of socialism and that this administration, with -- time after time, whether it was the delay in moving forward on Colombia's free trade agreement, whether it was turning our back to the Hondurans and standing up for democracy and the -- and the rule of law.

And we took the side with Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro for a corrupt President. We've sent all the wrong signals to Central and South America.

Romney:

But I happen to think Senator Santorum is right with regards to the issue that doesn't get enough attention. That's the one that may come up that we haven't thought about, which is Latin America. Because, in fact, Congressman, we have been attacked. We were attacked on 9/11. There have been dozens of attacks that have been thwarted by our -- by our security forces. And we have, right now, Hezbollah, which is working throughout Latin America, in Venezuela, in Mexico, throughout Latin America, which poses a very significant and imminent threat to the United States of America.

Is there any chance a GOP candidate can talk about Latin America without mentioning Hezbollah, Islamic terrorists and Iran? It makes them sound incredibly out of touch with the major issues in the region.

Beyond that point, to the extent Latin America policy is discussed in this election, I think Rick Perry's comment about wanting a "21st century Monroe Doctrine" sets up the basic debate between the Republicans and Democrats, no matter who the GOP candidate ends up being. The Republicans want to return to a position in which the US dictates the policies and alliances of the region. Contrast that with President Obama's comments at the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad:

All of us must now renew the common stake that we have in one another. I know that promises of partnership have gone unfulfilled in the past, and that trust has to be earned over time. While the United States has done much to promote peace and prosperity in the hemisphere, we have at times been disengaged, and at times we sought to dictate our terms. But I pledge to you that we seek an equal partnership. There is no senior partner and junior partner in our relations; there is simply engagement based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values.

There isn't any GOP presidential candidate who has "an equal partnership" as his stated policy towards the hemisphere. They're all too busy being afraid of Hezbollah and Hugo Chavez, trying to figure out how to apply a 19th century doctrine to the current situation.

Two reports on Cuba's economic reforms

2011-11-21T11:59:00.001-05:00

Two reports were published last week on Cuba's ongoing economic reform process. Richard Feinberg at Brookings looks at Cuba's reforms and suggests ways Cuba could slowly be reintegrated into the community of international financial institutions. Collin Laverty at Center for Democracy in the Americas also reviews the recent economic policies in Cuba and how it is affecting ordinary Cubans. Some coverage from the Havana Note.

Jinotega, Nicaragua results show the importance of election observers

2011-11-21T06:42:00.001-05:00

Prior to the Nicaraguan election, there was significant controversy in how the government managed the topic of international and domestic observation of the elections. International actors were only allowed to "accompany," not observe. On election day, officials from the OAS were barred from 20% of the sites they tried to visit to monitor the election.

The domestic observation efforts were even tougher. Several civil society groups were told they would not be able to monitor the election. The main opposition party, Fabio Gadea's PLI, says the election council (CSE) rejected or stalled the credentials for a number of poll watchers who were to monitor the vote for each side. That last point on credentialed poll watchers is very important for understanding what occurred on election day.

The Nicaraguan website Confidencial describes the results in the department of Jinotega. The PLI worked hard to get every voting site observed in that department, but had a number of credentials for observers blocked. In the end, the PLI deployed observers to 94% of the sites, 690 of the 732 poll stations (Junta de Receptora de Votos, JRV).

In those 690 stations, according to the opposition observers, the PLI led the FSLN by a slim margin of 48% to 46.8% in the congressional vote. Yet, the CSE announced the results of the department showing FSLN 50.2%, PLI 44.7%, giving the FSLN the extra congressional representation.

For that result to occur, it would require that the 6% unobserved vote sites had a 70-30 lead for Ortega's party. According to Confidencial, cross checking with the historical record, in half of the 42 sites that were unobserved, the opposition had won in previous elections. The unobserved JRVs were not Sandinista strongholds, meaning a 70-30 split going against the trend in the rest of the department would be highly unlikely. The government's CSE has not released the results by JRV, making confirmation of those results impossible.

The story from that one department can be replicated across the country. The final results counted by the CSE show a big FSLN win, but that isn't matched by what observers saw during the day. That would mean that the JRVs where credentialed opposition observers were banned reported statistically improbable margins in favor of the FSLN.

This is why observers and a transparent vote count are important for elections. The fact the CSE will not publish the results for each JRV is problematic as it prevents civil society from checking the results compared to the limited observations that they were able to make. The blocking of domestic and international observers combined with such a strange pattern of results at the unobserved sites raises serious questions about the credibility of the election, Ortega's margin of victory and the congressional results.

Also see my article from Americas Quarterly about previous disputed elections in the hemisphere and what lessons they might hold for Nicaragua.

Oil spills and Brazil public opinion

2011-11-20T09:02:00.001-05:00

Brazil is going to do everything it can to blame Chevron for the offshore oil spill this month.

Certainly Chevron deserves some, if not most or all, of the blame. The company has already indicated that their pressure miscalculation led to the leak. Brazilian politicians and police are investigating the incident to see whether other errors were made, as they should. There are also complaints that Chevron did not share information in a timely manner. For more info, see BBC, AJE, NYT, Reuters and CNN.

But whether it turns out that Chevron should receive some, most or all of the blame, it's clear that Brazil's politicians are going to try to push all of the blame on the US oil company. Why? Brazil does not want to discuss the possibility that a similar spill could happen to them during their "moonshot" effort to drill to the pre-salt oil. If they can fully blame Chevron, then they don't have to acknowledge that it could also happen to Petrobras. They need this spill to be portrayed as a malevolent accident by a foreign oil company, not something that can happen to any effort to drill off shore.

Deep water drilling always has risks and Brazil's pre-salt deposits are an attempt to get oil that nobody has ever reached. No matter how many safety precautions are put in place, there is a risk of something going horrifically wrong. That doesn't mean all offshore drilling is wrong. However, it does mean greater precautions should be taken, more debate should be had, and some offshore drilling should be blocked when the risks are too high.

Without having that debate, Brazil has made the pre-salt oil part of their future narrative. Most politicians from the major parties don't want to debate the risk vs the reward because doing so raises the potential that the public decides drilling is not worth the risk. For Brazil's politicians, their biggest fear isn't this particular oil spill as much as the potential that the Brazilian public begins to turn against offshore drilling in general.

But what if there is a big oil spill in the next few years, one far bigger than Chevron's spill this month? Brazilian public opinion on the pre-salt issue could shift dramatically following any spill in the coming years. It would be an unexpected and unlikely event, but it would have a large impact on the economic environment and political narrative in the country. In terms of potential low probability, high impact events to consider in South America, the oil spill this month should give everyone a scenario to think about.

UPDATE: After I wrote this post, Chevron accepted full responsibility for the oil spill.

China's backyard analogy 2

2011-11-19T08:37:00.001-05:00

BBC:

"External forces should not use any excuse to interfere," [Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao] said in a speech carried by state news agency Xinhua.

"The dispute on the South China Sea is a matter that been going on for years. It should be resolved by the relevant sovereign states through friendly consultation and discussion directly."

US President Monroe's Seventh Message to Congress in 1823:

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety.

I made the comparison between China's current foreign policy and the Monroe Doctrine in a blog post a year ago, but since then China's rhetoric about the South China Sea has become even stronger. They insist that the region is their sphere of influence and that external powers (such as the US) should not interfere in the region's affairs.

One additional question that will follow from this comparison is whether Latin America will support China's position due to trade ties or if they will identify with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam in their efforts to limit China's influence.

Tech startups in Guatemala

2011-11-18T07:58:00.001-05:00

Damien Cave does NYT readers a favor by writing an article that breaks away from the usual narrative of Central America and to describe technology startups in Guatemala. The article has one obligatory paragraph on the violence in the country, but otherwise focuses on the technology and culture. Taking five or six blocks of the capital and turning them into a tech zone to encourage businesses is smart policy.

On the issue of tech startups, nearly every country in the hemisphere has a technology community that is building and innovating. There are large differences in how countries are encouraging those businesses and building the infrastructure to handle both the businesses and the demand-side (you usually need internet users to use internet businesses, though some of these startups are focused on cell phone technology). TNW is the site to watch if you want to follow the issue more in depth.

AMLO tops Ebrard in PRD poll

2011-11-16T07:24:00.001-05:00

The big news out of Mexico yesterday was that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) topped Mexico City Mayor Marcelo Ebrard in an official PRD poll, which means he will be the left's candidate in the 2012 elections.

The conventional wisdom is that AMLO's nomination helps PRI candidate Peña Nieto.

There are two reasons for that. First, if you view Mexico's parties as a left-center-right ideological spectrum (I don't, but it's not an unreasonable model), then the left nominating a more extreme candidate should cause a group of center-left voters to vote for the center. Second, if you view this coming election as a referendum on Calderon's policies, then having a heavily unfavorable candidate like AMLO as one of the two "anti-Calderon" candidates will certainly help the other candidate.

On the other hand, should this election be viewed as a referendum on the PRI, AMLO's nomination could benefit Calderon's party. An Ebrard nomination could have split the anti-PRI vote evenly between the PRD and PAN, allowing the PRI to win a plurality even if they were opposed by a majority (imagine a 40-30-30 election). With a more extreme and less liked PRD candidate, those anti-PRI votes should go to the PAN (imagine a 45-40-15 election). While that model is not liked by people who focus on the left-right spectrum, it is essentially what occurred in 2000 when Fox united the left and right anti-PRI votes to end that party's dominance of Mexican politics.

Which model is correct? I think this election is going to be a referendum on Calderon's policies and AMLO's nomination helps Peña Nieto. So yes, I go with conventional wisdom here. However, that third model helping the PAN could emerge in the coming year depending on how the election debate plays out and how Peña Nieto campaigns.

What model don't I have here? I don't have a logical way that AMLO's nomination helps his own PRD win. Ebrard was a more moderate and better liked candidate nationally, even if AMLO's diehard supporters divided the activist base of the party. Ebrard was clearly the more viable choice for the PRD.

Does that mean AMLO can't win? I can't say that definitely. You can't count out a candidate who won nearly 40% of the vote six years ago and missed the presidency by about a half of a percent after being the front runner for several months of the election. But I do think AMLO's image has taken some serious hits since that election loss and it is a much harder road for him in 2012. Bouncing back is going to be tough for him.

Humala at 100 days, small problems but doing well

2011-11-15T08:10:00.001-05:00

Peru President Humala is still popular and doing well. Polls by CPI and Datum around the 100 day mark have the president receiving 59% and 57% approval. Considering the previous two Peruvian presidents barely topped 35% for most of their terms, any number above 50 is a big win for Humala.

However, two small stumbles over the past month may cut into the president's approval. A corruption scandal involving Vice President Omar Chehade has been a short term headache for Humala. Chehade allegedly had the police evict protesters off private land during a business dispute. The VP has refused to resign and Humala cannot constitutionally fire him, but the president appears to be pushing him aside anyway.

A longer term problem involves protests over mining. Humala inherited this problem from the previous Garcia government. While Humala plays the good cop, negotiating with the protesters and showing respect for their positions, his Prime Minister Salomon Lerner is playing the bad cop and threatening to break up any protests that are destabilizing or block normal operations. There is no easy answer and Humala is likely to face similar challenges throughout his term in office.

Protect the population; Measure the results

2011-11-12T08:03:00.001-05:00

WOLA, LAWG and CIP have a new report out called "A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia's Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond." There is plenty I agree with and other points I disagree with, but overall it's a useful analysis to think about the various security issues around the hemisphere. Go read it.

I was immediately drawn to point #12: First and foremost, protect the population. Absolutely. In fact, I think that's so important that I would have made it the first point, not the last.

However, I found myself in strong disagreement with the report's analysis of that point. The report authors view Colombia as a failure on protecting the population, citing civilians caught in the crossfire, extrajudicial executions and the scandal over body counts. While those issues tragically occurred, overall, Colombia has seen a major reduction in homicides and kidnappings. Unlike Plan Colombia, which was initially focused on drug trafficking, President Uribe's Democratic Security Strategy placed protection of the population near the top of its list of goals along with consolidation of state control over territory. The result is nearly 14,000 fewer murders per year since 2002 when that strategy began and a reduction in kidnappings that has made Colombia's anti-kidnapping units among the most respected in the world. Though there have been some recent setbacks on the security front, still nearly every public opinion poll taken over the past decade shows the Colombian population feels they are safer now than they were before Uribe's strategy took place.

I would argue that the biggest difference today between Colombia and Mexico is this point. Colombians feel safer following the Uribe and Santos government efforts to provide security because the government placed an emphasis on reducing homicides, kidnappings and the levels of violence in the country. Mexicans feel that they are less safe following President Calderon's offensive, which has increased the violence in the country while focusing on combating the criminal groups.

So let me take this to point #6: Measure the results that matter. I fully agree with that statement. As the report says, less homicides, less kidnappings and public support for government institutions are the measures of success, not hectares sprayed or bad guy body counts. Unfortunately, the report doesn't take its own advice here. The authors publish graphs measuring the failures on drug trafficking while dismissing the statistics showing a reduction of violence in Colombia as "not the full human rights story" and ignoring public opinion polls about perceptions of security in Colombia.

The authors should realize that this point, measuring the results that matter on protection of the population, is why Plan Colombia and Democratic Security are viewed as a success today and a "model" by so many analysts and by the Colombian population. Colombia didn't stop the drug trafficking, but they did make the population safer and reduce violence committed by illegal groups. Polling and statistics show the population feels and is safer. The results that matter are also why analysts believe Mexico is not succeeding at their security efforts. Authorities keep holding press conferences showing off captured or killed drug traffickers or seized drugs while the civilian death toll has risen and the overall problem of criminal groups has gotten worse. Colombia measured and got results that mattered; Mexico has not.

So, somehow, I agree with these two recommendations while disagreeing with the authors on their key point. Mexico should follow Colombia's model on these two recommendations. First, Mexico needs to place protection of the civilian population as their top goal. Second, their most important measurements for success should be reductions of homicides, kidnappings and violence as well as public perception of security. Following these two recommendations is why, despite problems with human rights and parapolitics and corruption, Colombia is viewed as a success story over the past decade by its own population and by the international community.

My criticisms noted, go read the report. I do think questions about human rights and civilian-military balance on aid packages are important in Colombia, Mexico and elsewhere. I don't think Colombia's relative success on reducing violence forgives the other scandals and problems that have occurred. Colombia's model has both positive and negative lessons to teach and everyone needs to be cautious not to be too positive or too negative about them.

Brazil arrests top drug trafficker

2011-11-11T09:31:00.001-05:00

Brazilian police arrested Antonio Francisco Bonfim Lopes, the top drug trafficker in the Rocinha favela.

The government has been preparing for the past few days for an operation to retake the neighborhood. In the meantime, they set up checkpoints around the area to prevent any of the known bad guys from escaping. The police stopped a car leaving the favela that claimed to be a diplomatic vehicle carrying the consul of the Democratic Republic of Congo (worst cover story ever). When police said they didn't believe that story, they were offered a half million dollar bribe. When police turned that down, they found the trafficker hidden inside.

Police are hoping that this arrest will make the retaking of the favela this weekend a bit easier and less violent. It's going to be one of Brazil's largest domestic security operations and it is a neighborhood they need to control in order to improve Rio. I think they should be able to take it relatively easily this weekend, but like previous operations, the harder task will be providing the resources and personnel to hold the neighborhood for months as other civilian government services enter.

On weapons trafficking, is Pakistan:Afghanistan :: US:Mexico?

2011-11-10T11:41:00.001-05:00

Steve Coll:

If Mexico had America’s relative global military power, its own drones would probably be hovering over gun marts in suburban Phoenix and Tuscon, perhaps unleashing a few Hellfire missiles at the owners, under the same interpretations of international law that the United States now employs to justify cross-border drone strikes against Pakistan’s logistical “safe haven.”

Ignore the armed UAV issue for now and simply focus on the Pakistan comparison related to weapons trafficking. The US often accuses Pakistan of providing safe havens for weapons and explosives to cross over in to Afghanistan to be used to attack US troops and the Afghan population there. Pakistan insists that they are cracking down on the illegal militant groups and occasionally manage a successful operation, but few believe they are actually trying all that hard. Pakistan's government could certainly do more, but doesn't for complex domestic political reasons.

Russian cybercriminals vs Central American websites

2011-11-09T09:53:00.002-05:00

I just stumbled across a good article from The New Yorker in 2005 on "The Zombie Hunters", white hat hackers who defend against botnets used by criminals (h/t to Instapaper for highlighting the article). Within the article is an interesting example from 2003-04 related to Latin America.

Russian criminals used botnets for a denial of service attack against gambling websites based out of Costa Rica, Panama, Jamaica and elsewhere in Central America and the Caribbean. In the case described, the attack was so powerful it took down the entire internet service provider (ISP) in Costa Rica, not just the gambling website. The criminals demanded tens of thousands of dollars per month in protection money or else they would continue their attacks and prevent the website from doing business.

The white hats led by Barrett Lyon set up servers in the US that could handle much higher traffic loads than anything in Costa Rica. They used those servers to defend the Central American websites, fighting a three week "chess match" against the extortionists to hold back the botnet attack. Lyon's team succeeded and ended up winning contracts with a number of other gambling firms to protect them against the Russian criminals.

At that point, the white hats founded a new cybersecurity firm in Costa Rica and engaged in a bit of vigilantism themselves. They tracked down the chat channel that controlled the zombie botnet and engaged in deception to gain information about the bad guys responsible for the attack. They handed the info to the US FBI and the UK's NHTCU. A few months later the criminal was arrested by Russian authorities.

Go read the whole article for additional details. Though the technical aspects are different today, similar cyber-extortion scams exist throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Increasingly, local criminal organizations (particularly in Brazil) are learning to run their own botnets and other attack methods, though most of the crimes still originate in Russia and Eastern Europe.

DEA FAST

2011-11-08T09:59:00.001-05:00

NYT:

The D.E.A. now has five commando-style squads it has been quietly deploying for the past several years to Western Hemisphere nations — including Haiti, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Belize — that are battling drug cartels, according to documents and interviews with law enforcement officials.

The program — called FAST, for Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team — was created during the George W. Bush administration to investigate Taliban-linked drug traffickers in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2008 and continuing under President Obama, it has expanded far beyond the war zone.

The article helpfully links to this document that outlines a fairly militarized vision of the DEA comparing and discussing the links between drug trafficking organizations and foreign terrorists. The list of DEA FAST training being supported by the US military's special operations forces:

As the drug traffickers and criminal organizations have become more militarized, so have the forces to fight them. The actions of both sides blur the line between law enforcement and the military. I'm not going to say it's right or wrong; it just is. That's the nature of 21st century conflict.

However, it's up to the side of the good guys (that's the US) to be more transparent about their activities. A potential "backlash" of public opinion in the region is not a good enough reason to be unclear about what the US is doing. As I've written previously about US activities in Mexico, we should be transparent about discussing US programs and let the political controversy hit then, not wait for these things to be exposed by the media, which just makes suspicion about them grow in the region.

Second, the military side is necessary and I think a program like the DEA FAST could be a useful component to helping counter crime in the region. That said, in my usual tired old refrain, I want to stress that we need to be careful that it is not the only component and that there is focus and resources on softer civilian elements. We need equally well-trained and funded teams of police investigators, prosecutors, judicial reform experts, and civil society programs building up journalists and human rights defenders to combat the criminal organizations and impunity in these countries. The military stuff is cool and sexy and makes for great powerpoints and exciting newspaper articles, but it's the boring institution building that is needed to succeed in the long term.

Five points on Perez

2011-11-07T10:37:00.000-05:00

The candidate they knew…. This was an election where there would be controversy no matter which candidate won as there were a number of voters who distrusted both Perez and Baldizon. Otto Perez Molina's history in the military, including allegations of human rights abuses and his praised work on the peace process, along with questions about recent campaign financing created distrust. That said, given his history and his previous campaign, Perez was a known quantity for Guatemalan voters. They voted for him both for and in spite of his record, but also because he was a well-known candidate in a campaign full of relatively less known politicians.

...and the candidate they didn't. Baldizon's campaign was a surprising mix of economic and security populism combined with a murky background. He promised more social welfare than Colom/Torres and a stronger mano dura than Perez. He promised every other opposition candidate and party positions and policies in an attempt to win votes. Still, even more than Perez, there were serious questions about who was financing his campaign, with allegations that organized crime was involved, and what his actual policies would be once in office given the wide-range of his promises depending on his audience. Outside of the Peten province, few people knew of Baldizon. According to polls and analysts on the ground, many of his votes were anti-Perez rather than in favor of Baldizon. In the end, I think questions about Baldizon, what he supported and who financially backed him kept a majority of Guatemalan voters from jumping to his campaign.

Voters want mano dura. Many analysts (myself included) are skeptical of mano dura policies due to their focus on short term results over long term institution building and their lack of success in the past. However, the results in the first and second rounds of this election suggest that voters in Guatemala who are living with the constant threat of criminal violence want those policies. They want policies that punish the violent criminals and get quick results, with less regard for their long term consequences. It's for this reason that both candidates attempted to out-do the other on security issues and all the candidates in the first round took a tough line on security. Perez's background as a military officer brought him credibility on the issue and made him the winner on that issue alone. Now he must deliver. I'm hopeful that Perez looks beyond the short term and continues some of the smart and successful policies that are currently in place including maintaining the current Attorney General and the CICIG.

Non-security issues matter too. Guatemalan politics isn't just about security, though this election focused heavily on that issue. Food and nutrition are vital, as pointed out previously, more people died in Guatemala of malnutrition than of violence last year. The country needs improved economic development and a reformed tax system, as every nearly analyst has pointed out for the past two decades. Climate change adaptation, preparation for natural disasters including the yearly heavy rains and energy issues all should rank high on the new president's agenda, though they were barely discussed in the campaign. Behind much of these issues, Guatemala needs a president who will take on the "parallel power structures," the families and businesses that push their agenda for the country from behind the scenes. Few people expect Perez to actually do this (some of his opponents accuse him of working for those parallel powers), but a new president is always a chance for a new set of policies and a chance to surprise those who give him slim odds for success.

Perez's opposition gives him a limited window to succeed. Though there appeared to be wide agreement on agenda items during the campaign (all candidates pushed for improved security and more social welfare), the political reality is that Perez now faces opposition on multiple fronts. Baldizon has increased his national profile. Sandra Torres, the former first lady who was disqualified, retains wide support and a number of supportive members of Congress and mayors who can block Perez's agenda. The business community that backed Perez will oppose fiscal reforms. Organized crime structures are going to push back hard against Perez's security agenda. Perez now has a mandate and a hopeful chance to improve the country, but if he stumbles, the opposition is going to pounce on him quickly and try to make him pay. So while I stressed the importance of long term success above, the politics of Guatemala mean that he needs some early wins to build momentum or he is going to have a rough few years in office.

Also read Mike's analysis on what Perez inherits.

Ten thoughts on hackers vs TCOs in Mexico

2011-11-04T10:34:00.000-04:00

Numerous media are covering the Anonymous vs. Zetas fight. There are conflicting messages about the validity of the operation, whether Anonymous as a group is backing it and whether anything will occur this Saturday when they are expected to release the names of Zeta collaborators. It's not even clear who was kidnapped as the original video claims and whether that person was released. For those who want the most recent news, Stratfor has done a good job covering the issue (some of their analysis overlaps with mine) and the NYT's Damien Cave has been all over the story on his Twitter account.

Without getting into the gritty details about the current event, I wanted to provide some strategic thoughts that look beyond the specifics of this weekend to the general cyber-activist vs cartel situation.

This is primarily a fight over transparency and media. Mexico's transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) target media outlets of all types to control the information flow in the country. They shoot journalists, throw explosives at television stations and hang bloggers off bridges all for the same reason: They are opposed to media outlets exposing their activities. On the other side, the cyber-culture is one that takes joy in exposing the secrets of closed organizations, whether governments, corporations or criminals (though they take great offense at those who would expose their supposedly anonymous identities and personal information). The cartel wish to suppress media clashes directly with the cyber-culture attempts to push organizations towards transparency. That clash is the basic ideology behind this fight.

Hackers are going to attack Mexico's criminal organizations. Whether or not significant operations occur against the Zetas in the coming days, this style of operation is going to occur at points during the coming years. It doesn't take a group of thousands or even hundreds to try to hack into TCO secrets. A small group of 6-12 people could easily start hacking into government police databases or try to get into TCO emails to post them online. The attacks may eventually come from big 'A' Anonymous the group or 'little 'a' anonymous hackers not affiliated with the international organization. It is nearly certain that small groups of hackers are going to turn their sites on Mexico's criminal organizations and expose information about them. To a more limited level, the criminal organizations will increase their own cyber capabilities to do damage to each other and the government.

Hackers can do damage, but criminal targets are limited. In the cyber domain, the Zetas and other Mexican criminal organizations are much lower tech than governments or corporations. The don't control big servers containing significant data that can be hacked. They don't have critical infrastructure such as electrical grids or heavy machinery that could be vulnerable in a cyber attack. They aren't particularly concerned about protecting their intellectual property. They don't even keep most of their secrets online. So while there are certainly targets for the hackers to hit (emails, police records, financial data, propaganda), it's not the same as attacking a government or corporation. That said, I think hackers may be able to damage TCOs if they can figure out how to exploit the financial info they can obtain.

The Mexican government, local officials and businesses are going to get caught in the cyber crossfire. The biggest source of data is going to come not from cartel servers but from government and private sector servers that are hacked by people looking for information. Further, companies may see data exposed online as people try to link them to corruption or cartel operations. Local government officials and police may see themselves accused (accurately or not) of being on the payroll of the criminals based on information posted online. Both corporations and the government should be considering how they will be vulnerable if this conflict between hackers and TCOs escalates online.

The Zetas and other criminal groups have some limited counter-offensive capabilities in the cyber domain. The Zetas have a small group of individuals who are online attempting to track down the hackers who are going after them. They are also employing their offline networks to track down people using cybercafes and university computer labs to post information about their criminal activities. The Mexican criminal capabilities online are nowhere near as sophisticated as those of the best hackers in Anonymous or the cybercriminal groups in Brazil or Eastern Europe or various governments. Nobody should pretend the Mexican criminal organizations are that capable online. But even some limited skills online may help them turn up local hacker identities, putting those people at risk.

Many Mexican hackers are worried about the "Anonymous" video. Mexico's cyber culture has avoided calling out specific enemies up until this point. The video targeting the Zetas does not represent all of those participating in Mexico's online community. Many cyber-activists and hackers are concerned that by having someone call out the Zetas specifically, they have placed a target on all computer-savvy activists who may be involved in spreading information about Mexico's criminal conflict.

Anyone can be anonymous; Anonymous isn't unified. The reason for the conflicting messages over the past week is that anyone can declare themselves a member of Anonymous and there is no leadership within the group that decides whether statements made in the name of Anonymous actually represent the group. This is both a big strength of the group and a big weakness. It's a strength because anyone can anonymously join and participate in operations. It's a weakness when there are divisions over strategy and message among those who have declared themselves to be Anonymous. With that in mind, it explains why a number of Mexican hackers who consider themselves members of Anonymous disagree with the current operation while others continue to push forward.

Mexico's criminal groups face a challenge from non-Mexican hackers. The cyber domain is one where geography is much less of a factor (though not a non-issue as some claim). This means hackers in the US, Europe or elsewhere in Latin America can go after the Zetas and other groups from the safety of their homes. While analysts often portray the transnational criminal groups as being able to cross borders with impunity, that generally refers to illicit trafficking operations more than their violence. The Zetas aren't going to be able to easily target hackers in the US or Europe, even as they are vulnerable to attacks and exposure online from those people.

Hackers walk the line between transparency and vigilantism. In exposing the names of people who work with criminal organizations, hackers aren't simply creating transparency. They are also giving targets to other cartels to kill. Some people have asked whether Anonymous wants to become a part of the violence in this manner. Three points on this: First, as mentioned above, Anonymous isn't unified. Second, though close analysts of Mexico's conflict know how that vigilante situation would play out, not all hackers would realize the consequences of their actions. Third, some hackers, either individuals or those working for other groups, may know the consequences of their actions and willing to carry them out because they feel Zetas collaborators deserve their fate. The motivations of the cyber community aren't going to all be the same on this issue.

This cyber-activist vs. cartel discussion is a secondary issue in both the cyber domain and Mexico's conflict. From the cyber perspective, Mexico faces much bigger threats from viruses, botnets, phishing scams, banking hacks, and espionage by foreign governments and corporations. The fact some cyber activists are targeting the criminal organizations is very interesting, but I would hope Mexico's cybersecurity professionals are spending more time on preparing for and combating threats like Duqu, botnets and corporate espionage than on whether the Zetas are getting hacked. On the conflict side, as anyone who watches Mexico knows, the violence and corruption goes far beyond the killings of a few bloggers or attacks against hackers. Mayors, local police, traditional journalists and illegal migrants, are among the many people targeted by the criminal organizations. Tens of thousands have been killed in recent years. The threat to Mexico is much more offline than online and the solution must be more about actions on the ground to improve institutions, combat corruption and stop criminal violence than any actions that cyber-activists may take.

A preview of Nicaragua's election

2011-11-03T08:38:00.000-04:00

Two pieces of analysis you should know about the Nicaragua election this Sunday:

1. President Ortega is the favorite to legitimately win the most votes in the November 6 election in Nicaragua. He leads in all the polls. Barring a 10 point swing in the final week or a fifteen point hidden "gueguense" vote (both are possible, but not likely) the president should win in the first round by a decent margin. Why is he leading? The economy is doing relatively well and many people feel they are doing better today than they were five years ago. It certainly helps Ortega that the opposition has been divided, run a poor campaign and has uninspiring leadership.

2. President Ortega has rigged the system to help him win the election. He has used his control over the courts to run for reelection in spite of constitutional restrictions. He has maintained control of the Supreme Electoral Council and left in a corrupt official to run it. The government has been selective with distributing new identity cedulas, creating controversy. The government is not allowing full international observation, only "accompaniment." A number of local civil society organizations say they are unable to properly monitor the election given the government restrictions. Recently, the government has threatened to disqualify a number of opposition candidates for Congress, which could create a controversy in the weeks following the election.

The combination of those two points raise a pretty clear question, one that is hard for many outside observers to understand: Why would Ortega bend the rules and manipulate institutions if he's capable of winning fairly?

He wants to be certain to win. Ortega led all the polls in 1990, only to lose on election day. He doesn't want that to happen to him again.
He wants to win big. It's not enough to just barely squeeze a win past a divided opposition as he did in 2006. Ortega wants to win big to claim a mandate for his policies.
He wants to win at all levels. It's not enough to just win the presidency. He wants to fully control the legislature as well the courts and local levels of government. Ortega understands the importance of controlling all levels of government (which also explains the electoral fraud in the 2008 municipal elections), not just creating a super-empowered executive branch.

Here's what to watch on Sunday:

Does Ortega win in the first round as expected and by how large of a margin?
How does the opposition respond to an Ortega victory? Some have threatened to protest the problems with the election, However, they will have a hard time arguing that the presidency was "stolen" being that Ortega is expected to win a plurality of votes.
In the event that Fabio Gadea wins enough votes to force a second round, how does Ortega respond?
What happens to the Congress?
Are there allegations of fraud and are they credible?
How are domestic and international groups attempting to observe the election treated and are they restricted?
What are the statements from the US and European countries who condemned the 2008 municipal elections and cut off aid in response to that event? Do they accept Ortega's victory fully, with some hesitation or not at all? Do they offer to return some aid or do they threaten to cut even more?

Additionally, the story will continue beyond Sunday night. The court battles over candidates and ballot counting will take time, even if the initial election results are announced and accepted.

Additional items to read: BBC, McClatchy, TicoTimes and be sure to check out The Nicaragua Dispatch and Confidencial for more coverage of everything going on.

POLL NUMBERS!!! Progress, or lack thereof, 2011

2011-11-02T17:44:00.004-04:00

The Economist posted their annual LatinoBarometro article last week. I want to highlight the question about whether countries are "making progress," as I think it shows a bit about the mood across the region. It's a question about expectations and a question about leaders successfully implementing policies and running countries.

Panama and Uruguay are the most positive about their progress. Uruguay has been an outlier in these polls in recent years and is quite positive about itself on nearly all questions. Panama is a bit more surprising, but perhaps can be credited to the economic boom and the fact they are doing quite well on their building of the third lane of the canal.

Guatemala and Honduras are very pessimistic, with both scoring under 10% of the population feeling progress is being made. I think that goes to problems across the board (security, economics, political) in both countries. It should be a very troubling number for Honduran President Lobo being that citizens do not see his administration as improving the country following the events of 2009. It should be a signal to the next president of Guatemala as well that serious change is needed.

Brazil saw a significant drop in the past year, though they are still positive. The fall is not surprising given perhaps the "irrationally exuberant" positive feelings that were flowing during the final year of the Lula administration.

Peru and Argentina saw big increases. I think that goes to improved economies in both countries, but want to dig down into both numbers before I can be sure. Peru's may also be credited to the poll being taken immediately after Humala's election, while the country was feeling quite positive about everything in all polls.

Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica and the DR all saw significant decreases, suggesting those countries have been hit particularly hard economically and politically this past year. The governments in each of those countries have lost some popular support. Chile's drop is notable throughout the poll in a number of areas, a sign of the protests and discontent with the current government.

The other thing to note is that only five countries (Panama, Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru) are at or above the 50% mark, where a majority of respondents see progress. There is a large gap in terms of feelings of progress that needs to be filled across the region. Citizens do not feel their governments and societies are living up to expectations.

OAS and CERTs

2011-11-02T06:17:00.002-04:00

Buried inside the McClatchy article on political hacking in the hemisphere is this point:

In 2006, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile and the United States were the only countries in the hemisphere with national Computer Security Incident Response Teams. Now more than 15 nations have them, the OAS said.

It's not just "the OAS said." The OAS is a key reason this has happened. The organization deserves credit on this issue for encouraging countries to focus on cyber issues while providing training and assistance to countries across the hemisphere to build this capability. The OAS is also providing a forum for countries to talk with each other about the online threats they are fighting.

The map of the CERTs/CSIRTs above is taken from this recent briefing on the OAS cybersecurity programs.

Colombia's local elections

2011-10-31T09:15:00.000-04:00

On Sunday, Colombia held local elections for governor, mayor and town council posts. El Tiempo breaks down the complex numbers while La Silla Vacia has ten points of analysis worth reading.

One key point of this election is the continuing breakdown of Colombia's political party system, something I've commented on before. No single party dominated this election across the country.

Additionally, this was an election with significant political violence (41 candidates murdered) and a troubling level of influence by criminal groups in certain regions of the country.

InSight Crime, Just the Facts, El Tiempo, BBC and Al Jazeera all analyze the influence of criminal groups in these elections. The BACRIM certainly won some key local elections, providing access to local corruption, money laundering, land deals and drug trafficking routes. Violence by former paramilitary groups and the FARC played roles in corrupting and influencing local elections in various regions.

All of this is separate from the most watched race in the country, the mayoral post of Bogota. Gustavo Petro won 32% of the vote to defeat former mayor Enrique Peñalosa and numerous other candidates. Petro ran on an anti-corruption platform, neutralizing the left vs right debate and distancing himself from former mayor Samuel Moreno, who was forced out due to corruption.

It's that divide between the big cities and the other regions that deserves watching. The race in the capital, along with some of the other big cities, were fascinating democratic campaigns held almost in isolation from the other elections in the country. While Colombia as a country is democratic and the major population centers have strong democratic elections, some local elections contained a level of violence and corruption that should have the hemisphere questioning the democratic legitimacy in those regions.

Unfortunately, among the many continuing weaknesses of the Inter-American Democratic Charter is that it can't deal with democracy at a local level. A stolen mayoral election or a corrupted town council are not the sort of grave breaches in democracy that a coup or a stolen presidential election are.

Anonymous vs the Zetas

2011-10-30T15:53:00.002-04:00

A group claiming affiliation with the international hacking group Anonymous posted a video demanding that the Zetas release a hostage in Veracruz. The person in the video claims to have information about the names of the Zetas and of corrupt public officials working with the Zetas. They say they will release the names and addresses of people linked to the Zetas online.

The group then hacked the website of the former attorney general of the state of Tabasco, someone who has previously been accused of ties to criminal organizations, and posted a note claiming he works for the Zetas.

This is an interesting cyber twist to the ongoing conflict among criminal groups in Mexico. Due to the fact Anonymous is, well, anonymous, it's hard to verify the claims they make. However, clearly someone with some computer skills has decided to threaten the Zetas and those working with them.

Beyond the cyber angle, this is also a twist on the recent spree of vigilantism and paramilitarism that has been seen in Mexico. By threatening to post the names and addresses of officials working with the Zetas, the hackers are obviously aware that groups like the "Mata Zetas" and rival criminal organizations could use that information to commit violent actions.

The hacking and cyber messages are important, but it's always good to remember that the Zetas often prefer low tech messaging to respond. The Zetas know they can't win by trying to out-hack Anonymous; it doesn't play to their strength. I wouldn't be surprised in the next few weeks to see someone in a Guy Fawkes mask hanging off a bridge with a message painted on a bed sheet next to him. That would match the typical Zetas response in this case.

UPDATE: More from Wired's Danger Room.

Creel's 24 month security timeline

2011-10-27T06:08:00.001-04:00

Santiago Creel, one of the PAN candidates for president, says that he would withdraw the military from the conflict starting on the first day of his administration. He would aim to have the Mexican military completely withdrawn from the streets within 24 months of taking office.

It's not exactly a new security strategy, being that he doesn't say how it will deal with the continuing challenges. However, it is a major shakeup to the current strategy and tangibly different direction from the current administration. I don't think any other candidate has yet made such a specific promise about how they will deal with the military. Peña Nieto and others have generally stuck to vague and generic statements about changing the direction of the current president's policies, but provided few specifics. Everyone, including Calderon, says they want to use more police and less military. Creel is the first major candidate (that I'm aware) of to put a timeline on it.

Vazquez Mota has previously said she wants the military off the streets. Will she set a deadline like her PAN opponent? Will Peña Nieto or Ebrand? Will anyone attack Creel for acting too quickly? Are Mexican voters following the details of such proposals closely?

UPDATE: Malcolm Beith also commented on Creel's plan yesterday.

Martelly proposes reestablishing Haitian Army 2

2011-10-26T07:35:00.000-04:00

Today's NYT has an excellent article on President Martelly's proposal to reestablish the Haitian military. The reporter talks with men training now in the hopes they can join the military and finds many of them simply hoping to obtain a paying job. He also talks to former military officers, some of whom run reconstruction groups and others appearing to operate militias that are training in case they are needed. The former officers seem to be behind part of the political push for a military.

The head of MINUSTAH told the AP earlier this month that any new Haitian military would require the approval of the United Nations. I'm not sure whether he is legally correct. If Martelly pushes forward, what is MINUSTAH or the UN prepared to do to stop him?

Perhaps the most interesting part of this debate is how Martelly has turned the anti-MINUSTAH arguments on their head. Haitians and foreign analysts against the UN peacekeepers argue that the blue helmets violate Haiti's sovereignty. The UN presence has lost some of the Haitian population's support that they regained post-earthquake. Martelly's main argument in favor of reestablishing the military is to promote an effort to regain Haiti's sovereignty and reduce the influence of MINUSTAH.

Politics isn't always fair. Many of the most outspoken opponents of the MINUSTAH mission are also very critical of a plan to reinstate the military. They are certainly troubled that Martelly is using their anti-UN critiques to promote the reestablishment of the Haitian military. However, with Martelly linking the pro-sovereignty, anti-MINUSTAH and pro-military arguments, he has managed to find a sweet spot in the Haitian political game that is allowing him to move his proposal forward.

As I wrote in my previous post on this issue, there should be concern that this military proposal takes attention and resources away from other needed efforts including the strengthening of Haiti's civilian police and judicial institutions. I also question the government's pushing the jobs that this military proposal will create. If Martelly wants to create 3,500 government jobs, have those people clear rubble or dig wells or fix buildings. There is plenty of work to be done in Haiti that doesn't require a military.

Five points on CFK

2011-10-24T09:08:00.005-04:00

A big win. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner won an impressive reelection in Argentina with over 53% of the vote in the first round. She won a majority of the vote in all but three provinces and only lost in one province (San Luis). Her party also won a Congressional majority and nine provincial gubernatorial races. She deserves to celebrate.

Economic boom. Fernandez won because the average Argentine citizen perceives the economy as doing quite well, better than it was before the Kirchners came to power in 2003. This is a combination of luck (high demand for soya, particularly from China), good policies (conditional cash transfers and welfare for the poor have improved the livelihoods of many in the lower economic classes), populist policies that are still working (price controls) and pushing some macroeconomic problems off until the future (including inflation, federal to state transfers, foreign debt and currency flight). Whatever the analysis as to why, the economic situation at election time was good for the average voter, which translates to a win.

Divided opposition. The runner-up in this election with 17% of the vote, Hermes Binner, is much closer to Kirchner ideologically than the other opposition candidates. The next three opposition candidates were Alfonsin with 11%, Rodriguez Saa with 8%, Duhalde with 6%. By winning over half of the vote, CFK supporters could argue that they could have defeated any unified opposition. That said, the divisions within the opposition certainly did not help. There was no leading opposition candidate for most of the race with two, three or even four people competing at times to be the leading alternative to the president. Now, a divided opposition lacking clear leadership will make the president's job even easier.

New mandate with an unclear agenda. Fernandez's win provides her a mandate to continue being herself. She controls the presidency, the vice presidency, the Congress, most of the biggest provincial governments, and the internal Peronist party structures. Yes, she still has sharp divides with opposition parties and even within her own party (including an ongoing fight with some unions and senior leadership), but her majority win means she controls the agenda and her opponents will need to respect her popular mandate early on and give her a chance to succeed.

However, the president didn't propose big new programs in this election and it's not particularly clear what she will do with her renewed power. Her best case scenario is to try to enact some of the tax reforms and other economic legislation that was stalled by the previous opposition-controlled congress, allowing her economic agenda to be fully implemented and seeing if it brings even better results (in spite of what most experts think). Her worst case scenario is to use the new authority to renew her battles with the media, give unfair economic benefits to her base of supporters, or try to divide the opposition further. Citizens want to see results, not fights and not backroom deals for economic spoils.

CFK owns her success or failure. By controlling most of the power in the country, the president will own the results. She will have nobody else to blame if things go wrong and nobody else to share credit with if things go well. Voters reelected her to see continued economic growth and policies that distribute that growth over the population. If she delivers (via good policies, luck, populism or deferring tough decisions), the voters will continue to support her. This election proved voters care more about results than process. If the economy starts to falter, then voters will blame the process and will look for a viable alternative (if one can be found). For now, President Fernandez has her mandate and the backing of the population. She should use it wisely and take credit if continued results follow.

Time off

2011-10-18T21:10:00.000-04:00

Why am I taking a few days off from blogging? This guy:

My son was born 17 October, just after midnight. He's 6 lbs 14 ounces (3115 grams for those of you who think in metric). He and my wife are doing great. Like other bloggers, he'll soon be my reason for writing posts at stranger hours of the night and morning than I already do.

UN extends Minustah, but cuts force

2011-10-14T15:11:00.001-04:00

The UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the Haiti Peacekeeping Mission MINUSTAH by a year. However, the organization also cut the number of troops from about 13,000 to 10,500. The troop cuts were justified by Haiti's "improving" security situation. (BBC, UN)

The last time I wrote about this, I hinted that there might be a bit of tension during this debate. The compromise to cut the troop levels and begin to wind down the mission appears to have staved off a tough debate at the UNSC and allowed this to pass with ease. That's good news for Haitian President Martelly, who wanted the peacekeepers to remain and didn't want a public fight on the international front over the issue.

Did Uruguay and Argentina almost go to war?

2011-10-14T09:30:00.001-04:00

It's a statement so ridiculous that it would be dismissed if made by anyone other than the highly respected former president of Uruguay. (BBC, Mercopress, El Pais)

Tabare Vazquez told a group of students that he was concerned that the diplomatic dispute between Argentina and Uruguay over a paper mill on the border could potentially escalate into an armed conflict between the two nations. Vazquez added details that ensured it wasn't just a slip of the tongue. The former president said he consulted the Uruguayan armed forces about military strategies (the commanders told him that they'd lose a conventional war and would need to prepare an asymmetric or guerrilla strategy). He also claims he approached the Bush administration at one point to see if they would support Uruguay if a conflict broke out.

Uruguayan and Argentine officials strongly deny the account and say Vazquez is playing political games. Specifically, they say he is attempting to smear President Fernandez right before the election as Vazquez supports socialist candidate Hermes Binner. I think it's fair to say this hasn't helped the Binner campaign and his advisors are now trying to avoid a controversy during an already tough election.

Due to the controversy at home, Vazquez has now announced that he is leaving Uruguayan politics for good, a surprise as he was widely considered the early frontrunner for the 2014 campaign.

This is a strange story and a strange shakeup in Uruguayan politics. Was Vazquez trying to influence the Argentine campaign? Was he trying to affect internal Uruguayan politics? Was he just telling students an exaggerated story that got out of hand? Or is this real and were Argentina and Uruguay closer to conflict than anyone realized at the time?

Congress renews ATPDEA through 2013

2011-10-13T05:44:00.000-04:00

Ecuadoran President Correa is celebrating the passage of the Colombian free trade agreement by the US Congress

Within the bill passing Colombia's agreement was an extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPA or ATPDEA). The ATPDEA was extended through July 2013 and applied retroactively back to February of this year, when it expired. The retroactive effects and current implementation are designed to make sure Colombian exporters continue to receive preference, as they have for the past two decades, while the bill is implemented.

The biggest beneficiary may be Ecuador. With no trade agreement on the agenda and with bilateral relations not doing so great, Ecuador was not going to have an easy time getting its trade preferences passed through the US Congress. By piggybacking on the Colombian bill, Ecuador receives two years of trade preferences without the controversy of going through the renewal vote on their own. Whether they can get an additional renewal in 2013 is going to depend on a number of political factors within both the US and Ecuador, but for now, it's good to have their status set as the status quo.

Hypothetically, Bolivia could benefit as well. However, President Bush suspended Bolivia's participation in the ATPDEA benefits in 2008 and President Obama has maintained that suspension with Bolivia refusing to cooperate with US counter-drug efforts, which are a congressional requirement of this bill.

Comments on Iran-Zetas plot

2011-10-12T07:34:00.000-04:00

The FBI charged two men, one tied to the Iranian IRGC's Qods force, with plotting to blow up a restaurant in Washington, DC in order to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US. One of the men attempted to contact a Mexican criminal organization (likely the Zetas) to pull off the job, but ended up meeting with DEA sources posing as cartel members instead. There were discussions of other potential attacks including some against the Saudi and Israeli embassies in DC. However, the killing of the Saudi ambassador seems to have been their main focus and they actually went through with wiring $100,000 to the source as a down payment for the attack.

Some initial comments and analysis below

1. There are questions about how high up in the Iranian government this plot went and it seems uncharacteristically bold for Iran to act on US soil, but let's be clear that this was a real plot. The evidence is rather clear that officials within Iran's Qods force were involved, approved the operation, assisted in sending money, pressed for their US contact to work faster, and are now being sanctioned by the US government.

2. In some ways, this plot is the worst case scenario some people have dreamed up over the past decade ("What if the Islamic terrorists teamed up with the Latin American criminal groups...?"). On the other hand, the clearly amateurish nature of Iran's involvement here shows that we have less to fear. The fact that an Iranian Qods-linked official is poking around the border looking for Zetas sicarios and ends up with the DEA informant suggests that Iran and Hezbollah have far less ties to the Mexican organized crime scene than some analysts would want you to believe. If they were as linked and conspiring as some analysts claim, they would have just picked up the phone and called their friends to either set up the operation or at least verify that the guy they are paying $1.5 million to is legit. Instead, they screwed up and got caught relatively easily.

3. In spite of all the controversy over the Fast and the Furious, where guns were lost while the government worked to trace the criminal groups trafficking them to Mexico, the details of this plot show a level of confidence by the US government. They let the defendant in this case travel back and forth to Mexico and to Iran while they collected evidence and unraveled this plot. Could you imagine the Republican anger at hearings if this guy had gotten suspicious and not returned from Iran during one of his trips? Yet, the success in breaking up this plot and waiting until the full links to Iran's Qods force were revealed shows why it is sometimes worth taking the risk to let someone walk while collecting additional evidence. Attorney General Holder and the civilian government leadership running this operation deserve a lot of praise for successfully managing this operation and stopping this threat.

4. To the extent the Mexican government was involved in this operation, they cooperated with the US and worked to keep both sides of the border safe. Thanks Mexico.

5. As for the Zetas or other criminal groups, it does not appear that they were actually involved. Iran simply thought they were dealing with them when they were actually dealing with an informant. However, it's worth considering that the organized criminal groups might have been approached at some point previously or in the future to commit a similar action. Would they do it? I think the top leadership of the Zetas and others are very aware that any involvement in a bombing on US soil or trafficking of WMD would bring a lot of additional focus and resources against them. They certainly wouldn't do it for the price of one truck of cocaine.

However, these criminal organizations are not just top-down strategists who want to avoid a confrontation with the US. There is also a decentralized component to the criminal groups. It may be possible for terrorists to purchase the cooperation of a small unit of 10-20 without the full involvement of a major cartel. That is probably the bigger threat to watch. I don't worry about El Chapo or El Lazca making a strategic deal with Ahmadinejad. That is unrealistic. I worry about some small quasi-independent Mexican criminal group desperate for cash making a deal with a mid-level Iranian official believing he can boost his standing in the regime. Those are the threats that are hardest to detect and most important to stop.

Chile student protests continue

2011-10-11T06:12:00.000-04:00

Chile's student protests are now in their sixth month. The students recently voted to extend their protest, rejecting negotiations with the president (which they view as unproductive) and refusing to return to class. Coordinating with the unions, they are planning a big general strike on 18-19.

Perhaps the biggest show of force was their symbolic "referendum" on educational issues. While it's not surprising that most people who participated in the unofficial vote supported the students' reforms, it was impressive that they managed to mobilize a million people out to vote in an event that was only symbolic (BBC, EFE).

One of the things that has kept the protests going strong and given them so much public support has been a specific set of demands that include free public education for all and reduced education subsidies to private universities. They have focused on education and delivered a clear explanation on why they consider the current situation unjust.

The government remains unsure how to respond. They've tried to negotiate, but are unwilling to concede to all of the protesters' demands. They have considered increasing penalties for protesters who break the law. The protesters have sapped support for President Piñera to below 30% and have stalled nearly every other item on his agenda.

POLL NUMBERS!!! CFK leads with 2 weeks to go

2011-10-10T08:19:00.001-04:00

A number of recent polls show President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner maintains an overwhelming lead with two weeks remaining in the election.

Management &Fit has the race CFK 53, Binner 12, Alfonsin 8, Rodriguez Saa 7.

Poliarquia published CFK 49, Binner 14, Alfonsin 10, Rodriguez Saa 8. The Poliarquia poll says that CFK will be above 52% once undecideds and non-voters are factored into their results.

I've seen at least three other polls showing CFK obtaining above 50% in the first round. The best second place candidate numbers I've seen is Binner at 16%.

To win in the first round, the president only needs to win above 45% or win above 40% and be at least 10% above her nearest opponent.

Mitt Romney's Latin America policy

2011-10-07T15:51:00.000-04:00

Without commentary, I provide a summary below of Romney's plans for Latin America released in his foreign policy white paper today.

Strategically, Romney sees the two big threats to the region as:

"Venezuela and Cuba are leading a virulently anti-American “Bolivarian” movement across Latin America that seeks to undermine institutions of democratic governance and economic opportunity."
"The region is also witnessing an epidemic of violent criminal gangs and drug cartels, which have wrought death and mayhem across much of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean."

Within that framework, Romney proposes the following actions for US-Latin American relations:

During the first 100 days in office, Romney promises to launch a public relations effort called the Campaign for Economic Opportunity in Latin America (CEOLA). This will "Capitalize on the benefits arising from the ratification of the Colombian and Panamanian free trade agreements to launch a robust public-diplomacy and trade promotion campaign in Latin America that contrasts the benefits of democracy, free trade, and economic opportunity with the ills caused by the authoritarian model of Venezuela and Cuba."
Long term, he plans to create a "Reagan Economic Zone" in the Americas.
He will form the Hemispheric Joint Task Force on Crime and Terrorism, which will coordinate intelligence and enforcement. He will use this to "sever all financial, logistical, and material connections" between the region and foreign terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.
On Mexico, Romney will explore the need for enhanced military-to-military training cooperation and intelligence sharing similar to what was done in Colombia.
Romney promises to complete the border fence.

Also of note, looking at the past four years, Romney says he would have done the following things differently:

Sent the Colombia and Panama trade agreements to Congress sooner.
Supported the removal of Honduran President Zelaya.
Not eased restrictions on Cuba.

I'll try to do this sort of summary for any other serious candidates who release specific plans for the region. I will provide commentary separately.

Malnutrition more deadly than crime in Guatemala

2011-10-06T16:32:00.004-04:00

Statistically, between 15 and 17 people are killed each day in Guatemala by violent crime. Meanwhile, 18 Guatemalan children die each day due to malnutrition. Over 6,500 children died in 2010 from lack of food.

Plaza Publica lays out the numbers in a very stark way (h/t to Pan-American Post for the article).

A few weeks ago a representative of the UNDP spoke at the Wilson Center on this problem. About 50% of children face some form of malnutrition and that number is as high as 70% in rural indigenous communities. He noted that Guatemala can't just blame poverty, because the child malnutrition situation is much worse than in economically comparable and poorer neighbors such as El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (all of which have some food security problems, but none of which reach the tragic levels of Guatemala). He also called malnutrition a lifelong curse, because when it doesn't kill a child, it stunts their growth and education for the rest of their lives.

Why doesn't this crisis receive as much attention as violent crime? Malnutrition tends to affect rural indigenous communities. It doesn't have the same impact in urban communities where most media report. It does not immediately corrupt Guatemala's institutions or affect its political stability. It doesn't have the same shock value in the media as a shooting or beheading. And there is no specific "enemy" to point at and blame like the gangs or the Zetas. It's a failure of society at a very basic level and a problem that requires a sustained commitment of resources to overcome.

Why the US should care about social media in Latin America

2011-10-06T06:48:00.000-04:00

Carl Meacham has a new report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on internet technology and social media in Latin America. This list of reasons why the US should care about social media in the region is important for Congress and the US foreign policy community to understand:

Promoting Internet freedom is aligned with the U.S. strategic goal of strengthening civil society worldwide. This is consistent with core American beliefs regarding freedom of expression and unencumbered access to information.
Greater Internet connectivity opens new opportunities for the United States and for countries in Latin America. Latin American countries are among the fastest growing export markets for the United States. The growth of this market provides the opportunity for innovation and commercial gains for United States technological industry and for Latin American entrepreneurs.
Greater Internet connectivity and the use of social media platforms allows for individuals in Latin America to establish links or ‘‘connect’’ with individuals in the United States and individuals in countries around the world in all spheres of life—culture, politics, business, and academia....
Social media can strengthen civil society and the public sphere in Latin American countries. These technologies can allow for individuals to engage more effectively in the formation and function of their own societies.
Social media can strengthen the ability of governments to be more responsive to their citizens. Through social media governments can provide services to their constituents and communicate directly with them. The use of this tool can improve government effectiveness, and make for fulfilled citizens in Latin American countries, and help bolster stable democracies in the entire region.

The report also lists activities being done by the State Department to promote social media and technology in the region and several recommendations:

Implement technology training programs.
Establish basic information technology outreach.
Provide support for local technology developers to create language resources.
Generate low-requirement infrastructure.
Assess critical risks.

Diplomacy used to be exclusively government to government, but social media increasingly provides the space for diplomacy to mean government to citizen, citizen to government and citizen to citizen. The US should embrace this trend and encourage the growth of technology, bandwidth and connectivity among all populations in Latin America.

Is Latin America prepared for geoengineering debate?

2011-10-05T10:04:00.001-04:00

The Bipartisan Policy Center released a report this week on geoengineering research, also covered by the NYT, Rolling Stone and the Natural Security Blog.

For those unfamiliar with the concept, geoengineering (or "climate remediation" to use the term in the report) is the controversial concept of using technology to intentionally reshape aspects of the Earth and its atmosphere in a way that counteracts climate change. For example, imagine if you could release a gas into the air that would cause global cooling and could balance out the global warming (see this article from The Atlantic in 2009 for some good discussion on the topic). Obviously, attempting to do something like that would be challenging, have significant impacts around the globe and could be devastating if done incorrectly.

There are many debates surrounding the issue, but for Latin America, four questions are pertinent.

1) Within Latin America, who can do the scientific research? Latin America needs the science and technology base, if not to attempt geoengineering, then at least to help policymakers understand the issue and have an informed position on the debate as it occurs globally. Without more scientists working on environmental issues, Latin America will sit on the sidelines of this debate.

2) Who should govern geoengineering globally? Given that any attempt to do this would have a global impact, most people feel some sort of international governance and regulation should be created. The rules of this are up in the air and Latin America will certainly want a seat at that table, even if they are not the ones attempting the science.

3) How should a rogue geoengineer be managed? This is perhaps one of the hardest questions out there on this debate. What if some country decides to go against the global governance structure and acts unilaterally to reshape the atmosphere? Is it an act of war? What happens if it is not a government but a corporation or crazy billionaire? While all that seems to fall in the realm of science fiction, we're not too far away from these questions.

4) Where do Latin American countries stand on geoengineering? This is perhaps the hardest question and it's likely that the region will not be united on the answer. If governments even have an official position today, I'm sure it is against. It just seems too far out there to be in favor of it. However, as heavier storms hit some countries while droughts and water shortages hit others, a regional movement in favor of this effort could begin to emerge.

Like many issues, this seems to be one where the OAS or UNASUR could help get the issue on the agenda and at least get countries thinking about their positions. I don't expect them to have well thought out and nuanced positions today. No country does currently. However, while it seems a long way off and far removed from Latin America's current urgent priorities, it could be a serious international debate within the next few decades and it will certainly impact the entire region if anyone attempts one of these geoengineering experiments.

For any think tanks out there writing the next Latin America 2025 or Latin America in 30 years report, this is the sort of topic that should be on the agenda. It's forward leaning, it's off the radar, it will have a big impact and the region needs to begin discussing it.

Some items to read on Mexico's security

2011-10-05T06:33:00.000-04:00

On the list of things you should read today, include yesterday's testimony on the Merida Initiative from INL, DHS and DEA. Once you get past the happy, positive language about how well US-Mexico cooperation is going (and the DEA's seven page intro of the problem), there are a lot of specifics about the programs being implemented by the three organizations and some of the stats on their results.

Near the end of his testimony, Assistant Secretary Brownfield notes:

It is critical to note that U.S. support under Mérida is just a small fraction compared to the resources that the Government of Mexico has invested itself. For every one dollar of assistance the United States has provided through the Mérida Initiative, we believe that the Government of Mexico has dedicated roughly $13 to combating cartels and improving its security

Two questions from that:
1) Does anyone have that budget breakdown for Mexico?
2) What are the numbers for each of the Central American countries? As in, how many dollars are Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras spending compared to US assistance?

Also, I'd like to recommend Vanda Felbab-Brown's recent report analyzing Mexican security programs. I think it's a realistic look at some of what has gone right and wrong over the past few years.

Robert Ford and Cuba

2011-10-04T10:04:00.000-04:00

The Senate finally confirmed Robert Ford as the US ambassador to Syria. Previously, the GOP had opposed Ford's nomination and called for him to be pulled from Syria to protest the repression and human rights abuses of that regime. The Obama administration held steady and Ford has proved to be an excellent representative for the government and the people of the United States. He has stood up for US values even as our diplomatic relations have been maintained. Ford's example shows how diplomacy and engagement can advance US interests abroad.

So why not Cuba? Ambassador Ford's example in Syria is proof the United States can engage countries with which we have clear disagreements diplomatically while also representing our values. Having an ambassador in Cuba representing the US would show the US is prepared to engage while also giving us a more powerful voice in standing up for the rights of the Cuban people.

And if Cuba rejects or PNGs a US ambassador for being too outspoken for human rights and democracy? Well, let them. In that case, the world will see that failure to engage diplomatically is on Cuba and not on the US.

Either Cuba accepts the offer and we use diplomacy to promote our interests as we have in Syria or Cuba rejects the offer and shows once and for all they aren't interested in engagement. Offering an ambassador representing our country is a win-win for the US. The only losers would be any forces within the Cuban government that want to continue their isolation from the US and their ability to blame the US for all their problems.

The next time the Congress debates Cuba policy, they should take a look at what's going on with US policy in Syria. Diplomatic relations and engagement at the ambassadorial level can make a difference.

Brazil wants more control over the Internet

2011-10-03T12:48:00.002-04:00

Reuters:

India, Brazil and South Africa have also proposed setting up a new UN body to form global Internet policies -- frustrated that their growing economic power is not reflected in the multiple bodies that together keep the Internet running.

Brazil is taking a leading role among emerging countries in attempting to reshape the structure. Supporters of Brazil say that developing nations do not have enough power or influence within the current system because they were not included in its original design. It's a very valid concern and one that the current system of governance is having a hard time balancing. More info on the recent IBSA meeting is available here.

Opponents of the IBSA proposal have three concerns, which are also valid. First, the proposal is too government-based, lacking room for civil society and non-governmental groups. Second, the additional regulations imposed by governments under the IBSA proposal could stifle innovation online. Third, while Brazil and India have generally good motivations for their proposal (like countering cybercrime) other BRIC countries like China and Russia are working with Brazil and pushing even more radical proposals hoping to gain additional control of the Internet for purposes of censorship and control.

I do give Brazil credit for getting involved in this issue and attempting to shape Internet governance, even if I disagree with some of the specifics of their proposals. This is a tough, wonkish issue that won't give them much media attention but does increase their global leadership role.

GOP plans for US military in Mexico

2011-10-02T20:56:00.000-04:00

Rick Perry, Texas governor and GOP presidential candidate:

“It may require our military in Mexico working in concert with them to kill these drug cartels and keep them off our border.”

The first instinct of many other analysts is to criticize the statement. I'll avoid criticism of a plan without details and want to hear more about Perry's plan and what the other GOP contenders think. Journalists need to follow up with Perry at future events or at debates about the details of what he wants to do.

Roughly, how many US troops does Perry think should be on the ground in Mexico (10, 100, 1,000, 10,000, or 100,000)?
How long should they be there?
What is their mission?
What are the rules of engagement?
How does Perry define victory for the US military in Mexico?
How much is Perry willing to spend on the operation?
How will he pay for the mission?
Are there any other countries where Perry is considering sending troops?
What would be the threshold for doing so?
How does he balance sending troops to Mexico with other national security priorities?
Beyond the military, what is the civilian and contractor commitment to this effort?

Additionally, the other candidates participating in the next GOP presidential debate should be asked whether they plan to send US troops to Mexico. They could do this by raising their hands to start (as they have done for other questions in previous debates), and then each person who says they may commit troops could be asked to provide additional details about their plan. Any candidate who is planning to use US troops in a foreign country should have the details on their website, because the debate format is good for getting candidates on the record at a basic level, but poor for outlining more serious details. For any candidate planning to use the military in Mexico (or Iran or Syria or elsewhere), it's a big promise and a serious commitment that could reshape our foreign policy and should not be taken lightly.

If the next potential commander-in-chief is coming to office with a plan to send US troops into a foreign country to fight a non-state threat, as Rick Perry says he is, then voters deserve to know about it. Now that the issue of potential US troops in Mexico has been raised in the presidential campaign, and continues to be raised by some members of Congress in the context of counter-insurgency, we should be having this debate. We should be informed about how the next Republican administration hopes to use the military and how they will fund the effort.

Criticizing a vague comment by Perry is easy. Getting him and other candidates to actually outline their plans for countering Mexico's violence would be useful. Knowing if and how they plan to send US troops into harm's way before they are elected is critical. Details matter. This is too serious an issue to let drop.

Paramilitaries in Colombia and Mexico

2011-09-30T11:27:00.000-04:00

The appearance of the Mata Zetas has set off a new round of debate about "paramilitaries" and vigilante justice in Mexico. The government is denying the existence of "paramilitary" groups, saying they are just criminals masquerading as something more. (WashPost, El Universal, InSight, SSI)

One of the common refrains in the coverage coming from government and some analysts is that the groups calling themselves paramilitaries in Mexico are not like the paras in Colombia because of ___________. Feel free to fill in that blank however you want.

The problem with that analysis is that it very much over-simplifies the paramilitary threat in Colombia over the decades that it has existed. Since they were formed in the 1970's and 80's, Colombian groups called "paramilitaries" have taken on a diverse and changing structure.

There were Colombian paramilitary groups formed as private armies by landowners. There were citizens groups who united to provide their own security. There were groups ideologically committed to defeating the FARC. There were groups that cooperated with the FARC on a number of levels. There were groups tacitly backed by the government and military. There were groups made up almost completely of current soldiers or former soldiers. There were groups that had no military links. There were groups that fought against the government. There were groups that moved from ideology to drug trafficking. There were groups that served as the armed wing for drug cartels. There were groups that were simply drug traffickers masquerading as right wing militias with ideology. There were groups that focused more on extortion than drug trafficking. There were groups that avoided criminal ties. There were paramilitary groups who united (most famously the AUC) and others who fought para vs. para for years. Like the FARC, paramilitary recruits joined the groups for various ideological, economic or opportunistic reasons, and at times some people including children were forced to join against their will.

Though some people believe they have a very clear image of what a paramilitary is in Colombia, the term "paramilitary" has become a catch-all for any violent group that wasn't a communist guerrilla or a straight drug cartel. It might be better if Colombia analysts didn't use the same term "paramilitary" for the Muerte a Secuestradores, Los Pepes, the AUC and the Aguilas Negras as they are very different groups at different points in history, but that's how it goes. It's tough to change lexicon once it is in place.

I agree the Mata Zetas look nothing like Colombia's AUC of the late 1990's, which is often how people stereotype Colombia's paras today. I also agree that no two groups are going to be exactly alike. But there are certainly parallels between the Mata Zetas and the activities of some of Colombia's paramilitary groups over the past three decades.

Whatever word you want to use for the Mexican vigilante/paramilitary/militia/criminal issue, learning from the parallels with Colombia is the important part. Non-state violent groups are bad, even when they claim to be fighting on the side of civilians. Mexico needs strong civilian and military institutions that can handle security on their own and that do not tolerate violence by illegally armed groups, even if it is the "enemy of my enemy" variety. To that end, I'm glad to see President Calderon come out in vocal opposition to the Mata Zetas, whatever his political reasons for doing so. I'm disappointed by those who claim that the people killed somehow deserved it because they were criminals. No Mexican leader should ever praise or ignore violence by non-state groups believing it to be good for security. That's a dark path.

Brazil deal with Foxconn at risk

2011-09-30T06:40:00.000-04:00

Reuters:

A much-hyped $12 billion plan for Taiwanese manufacturer Foxconn to produce iPads in Brazil is "in doubt" due to stagnant negotiations over tax breaks and Brazil's own deep structural problems such as a lack of skilled labor, government sources tell Reuters.

This deal is important not just for the jobs and economic benefits, which are significant, but for the symbolism of Brazil obtaining tech manufacturing jobs from their trade with China. Brazil has hyped this deal as proof that their trade with China isn't just one direction and that they aren't just providing raw materials for China's manufacturing sector.

Unfortunately for the Rousseff government, Foxconn isn't particularly interested in the political message. Taxes, infrastructure, slow customs bureaucracy, currency issues and a lack of human capital are all issues for Foxconn and contributing to this deal falling apart. Brazil will need to reform or bend a number of their current regulations in order to get this project off the ground.

Venezuela's succession void 2

2011-09-29T08:38:00.001-04:00

Renewed rumors about Chavez's health have led to a new round of jockeying for power and influence in Caracas. I don't claim to know the specific details about Chavez's health situation. However, I do know that there are a number of people and factions within the Chavista ranks and the opposition who are planning for what they hope to do if Chavez passes away or is incapacitated.

So let me be clear on my opinion: Venezuela's Vice President (currently Elias Jaua) is the only legitimate constitutional successor to President Chavez. Anyone else from the Chavistas, military or opposition parties who attempts to take the role of president in Chavez's absence would constitute an undemocratic change of power. Any attempt to halt the 2012 election process similarly constitutes a breach in democracy.

It's possible that Chavez will attempt to replace Jaua with someone else. That process should be watched carefully to ensure it is done democratically (and not manipulated behind the scenes while the president is too ill to function).

I'm hopeful Chavez's health improves and he's able to complete his term (and perhaps consider retiring instead of running for reelection). However, if his health does worsen prior to the election, the international community including UNASUR and the OAS need to step up and make sure that the Venezuelan constitution is followed and the vice president gets support in the power vacuum that Chavez will leave. An orderly succession process and the holding of scheduled elections is necessary for a democracy.

Bolivian indigenous protest against Brazil funded road 4

2011-09-29T07:14:00.000-04:00

On Tuesday I wrote:

People across the political spectrum are not happy with how Minister of Government Sacha Llorenti has handled the situation with the police and the protesters, and the minister may be forced to resign in the coming days or weeks.

It actually only took about twelve hours after I wrote that for Llorenti to resign. The government has announced an investigation of the former minister for the repression of the indigenous march. They are looking for a scapegoat, someone to blame so that President Morales, who during a speech yesterday publicly apologized and denied ordering the police repression, can escape responsibility.

Thousands of protesters took the streets on Wednesday as the biggest labor union in the country, the COB, continued on with its protests in spite of recent government concessions. There is genuine anger and frustration at the government right now and a concern that their concessions are more of a stalling tactic than an actual change of course.

Jim Shultz has returned from his blogging hiatus to deliver a lengthy analysis of the protests, Llorenti's role and the damage to President Evo Morales's image.

The indigenous continue their march to La Paz to protest the building of a highway. It's a long, slow walk that has definitely captured the attention of the nation and the region.

Martelly proposes reestablishing Haitian Army

2011-09-28T16:39:00.000-04:00

AP:

The role for the army replacing the former discredited military would be to patrol Haiti's border, keep order during times of crisis and provide opportunities for young people, says the document outlining the plan....

..."The fragility of the Haitian state now makes it vulnerable to the risks of internal unrest that could plunge the country into anarchy," the document says.

The document outlines a restructuring of Haiti's national security strategy. A copy has been published online, though its official status has not yet been confirmed by the government.

Beyond the new military forces, the document outlines roles for the national police, a civil protection agency to assist with disaster planning and response and an office of public security (BSESP) that appears to have authority over a wide range of issues including food safety, environmental protection, smuggling and police ethics training.

Also of note in the document is the discussion of a national intelligence agency with the missions of preventing and fighting terrorism and organized crime, surveillance of extremist and anarchist movements in the country, fighting cybercrime, and monitoring strategic sites/critical infrastructure.

I think Haiti would be better off spending more resources on the national police and the civil protection agency than rebuilding a force of military personnel and bases. I'm sure I'm not the only person concerned that maintaining stability during times of crisis is a role written for the new military units.

Throughout the document, the new strategy is justified as a replacement for MINUSTAH. The UN peacekeeping force arguably plays a stabilizing role (though some of its critics would disagree), but having a military force in that role should be seen as a short term, worst case scenario for a country, not a model for how to build stability over the long term.

Honduran coup general will run for president

2011-09-28T16:01:00.000-04:00

Retired General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez is close to making it official that he will run for president of Honduras in the next election. Vasquez was the head of the armed forces in 2009 when the military overthrew President Zelaya in a coup and then backed the de facto administration of Roberto Micheletti.

RAJ has some of the details about the parties supporting Vasquez, the Alianza Patriótica Hondureña.

In case it's not obvious, let me point out that I'm opposed to Vasquez running and think this is a terrible idea. As a general principle, any military officer who participates in a coup should not be elected to public office. For Honduras, where the country needs to find some reconciliation and move beyond the events of 2009, having the general who orchestrated the coup and remains unrepentant for his involvement running for president so soon afterwards is going to keep the wound open.

Unfortunately, Vasquez has some powerful allies and financiers behind the scenes. Additionally, in spite of his rather terrible record in fighting organized crime and illicit trafficking while a general, he is going to use the military image to appeal to the citizen security message that is a top concern for Honduran citizens. Honduras is still two years away from the next presidential election, but Vasquez throwing his hat into the ring early suggests that some of the forces behind the 2009 coup hope to regain or increase their political power and influence.

Obama nominates Jacobson as Assistant Secretary

2011-09-28T08:56:00.000-04:00

After several months of having her serve as acting assistant secretary, the White House made it official yesterday in nominating Roberta Jacobson as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. She was previously the deputy assistant secretary in charge of North America, the director of the Office of Mexico Affairs and the DCM at the embassy in Lima, Peru.

Valenzuela's last day was July 15 and there have been questions about when the administration would get around to officially nominating someone to replace him.

Jacobson is a career diplomat, the current acting assistant secretary, and I don't know of any reason why she wouldn't be confirmed. Promoting a career diplomat instead of nominating someone from the outside usually (but not always) makes the confirmation a bit easier. That said, senators can find ridiculous reasons to hold up nominations, meaning a confirmation fight is possible. At the very least, the hearings should be a good opportunity for the Senate to dig down into the administration's policy for the region.

Once confirmed, Jacobson will be the first woman to hold the assistant secretary job for the hemisphere.

Bolivian indigenous protest against Brazil funded road 3

2011-09-27T05:34:00.000-04:00

Bolivian President Evo Morales backed down last night, suspending construction of the TIPNIS highway.

Indigenous groups protesting the road through their rainforest claimed that Bolivian police repression left one dead and many missing or arrested. Other protesters came to their aid, blocking the police from using the highway or the airports to transport the prisoners out of the region. At least twenty social movements in eight departments around the country organized protests to show solidarity with the indigenous. The Minister of Defense resigned, complaining in a publicly released letter about the police action.

If Morales had pushed forward, continuing to demand that police stop the protesters, his government would have fallen before the end of the week. That is how serious this situation became yesterday.

So Morales changed course. He suspended the construction of the road, distanced himself from the police brutality, delayed future decisions and tried to calm down the situation rather than escalate the tensions.

This protest fits the patterns of how President Morales has handled social conflicts. The president begins by clashing hard with the protesting groups, insulting them, claiming they are linked to the US, trying to undermine them. However, whenever he realizes that he can't win, Morales backs down and gives in to demands. This is at least the fourth protest this year in which Morales has given in to some or all protester demands in order to halt the conflict that threatened his government. Give him credit: in spite of initial stubbornness and refusal to negotiate, the president eventually knows when he can't win and accepts his loss before things get out of control.

That said, Morales is not in the clear yet. There remains significant tension in the country. His suspension but not cancellation of the road may not be enough for indigenous groups or may just push the continuation of this protest to a future date. There are other protesters with other issues based in urban regions who have latched onto this TIPNIS issue in recent weeks but who may try to now get their issues heard and resolved by the government. People across the political spectrum are not happy with how Minister of Government Sacha Llorenti has handled the situation with the police and the protesters, and the minister may be forced to resign in the coming days or weeks.

Morales pushed this social conflict further than previous ones before backing down. Playing politics so close to the edge is dangerous.

Coverage: BBC, Al Jazeera, La Razon
Previous posts: 1, 2. Also read my post from August 2008: Evo's Karma.

Brazil says that Brazil is prepared

2011-09-26T08:47:00.000-04:00

On Friday, I attended a Brazilian economic forum in Washington DC sponsored by the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce. Speaking there were the Central Bank Governor, the Minister of Finance and various other public and private sector officials.

The basic messages from government officials:

Brazil is doing well economically.
Brazil made it through the first part of the financial crisis in 2008 quite well and is even better prepared for current problems.
Specifically, Brazil has a huge buffer of financial reserves, a smart and flexible monetary policy, a determination to "hold the line" on fiscal policy, an increased middle class leading to domestic demand, and a flurry of infrastructure projects related to the World Cup and Olympics.
Brazil is on target to meet its inflation targets. Growth estimates will likely go down, but Brazil is still growing much more strongly than developed economies.
Brazil thinks Europe and the US are moving too slowly to resolve the current economic problems.

Of course, this was all a very optimistic portrayal of Brazil by Brazilian officials trying to promote their country. Any time economists show up and only provide the optimistic projections, I have to wonder about the worst-case scenarios. What if Europe doesn't avoid crisis? What if Brazilian politics mean the government can't hold the line on fiscal policy? What if commodity prices and/or Chinese demand drop? What if Brazil loses its "currency war"? A few similar questions were asked of both Tombini and Mantega and were effectively dodged.

The officials made a very good case for Brazil doing well in the coming years and for being prepared for another round of global financial problems. I hope they're right. However, it's hard to judge the potential resiliency of Brazil's policies when officials are afraid to even utter a pessimistic scenario in public.

Bolivian indigenous protest against Brazil funded road 2

2011-09-25T15:36:00.001-04:00

BBC (also La Razon):

Indigenous protesters in the Bolivian Amazon have broken through a police blockade to continue a long-distance march on the main city, La Paz.The protesters forced their way through police lines by taking the Foreign Minister, David Choquehuanca, hostage, officials said.

This is an escalation of the protest that has gone on for over a month. While the indigenous group says they did not force the foreign minister to march with them, the photos from the protest show him being held and pushed to the front of the protest group. The government has said they will investigate and possibly punish the incident.

Meanwhile, non-governmental groups of Morales supporters have indicated they are organizing and mobilizing to counter the indigenous protesters as they continue the march to La Paz. When those two groups of protesters and counter-protesters meet, it could be ugly.

Update: Police retaliated by breaking up the march with significant force on Sunday. As the AP reports:

Witnesses including an Associated Press photographer saw about 500 police surround protesters, including woman and children, just before dusk Sunday and set upon them with gas and clubs.

Via NACLA, a recent urban poll showed 83% of urban citizens believe the Morales government should do more to negotiate and 60% agree with the indigenous protesters that the road should be rerouted around the rainforest instead of through it. Also see IPS for additional coverage.

Finally, Bolivian President Morales announced a potential referendum in two departments to determine the future of the road. The rules aren't set in stone for the referendum, but it could potentially assist Morales negotiate his way out of the conflict or just buy him some more time.

UPDATE 2: Bolivian Defense Minister Chacon resigns over how Morales government used police to repress the protest march.

Paraguay has FMD outbreak

2011-09-23T05:41:00.000-04:00

UPI:

Paraguay faces a worsening crisis in its fragile agriculture and livestock sector as mounting losses from a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak threaten to decimate exports and make thousands jobless.

Financial losses exceed $300 million and are on the rise, official figures showed. More than 5,000 farm workers who lost their livelihoods have nowhere to go and have little community or industry support.

Also see coverage by BBC, Reuters, MercoPress and Bloomberg.

Brazil and Argentina were quick to shut their borders and attempt to prevent further spread of the outbreak. Argentina and Paraguay are already fighting over trade and transport issues, and this outbreak will give leverage to Argentina's position.

For Paraguay, this will be a serious economic blow that will be felt for months.

Mexican government vs social media 2

2011-09-22T05:22:00.001-04:00

The government has Veracruz has released two Twitter users who were being held on "terrorism" charges for having published false information about violence (LA Times, BBC, CNN). The local government created a new regulation against "disturbing the peace" that might be used for future cases, but said the two released Twitter users are unlikely to be charged with it.

The case received international media attention and brought embarrassment on Veracruz and Mexico as a whole. I condemned the case as a violation of free speech and free media rights. Immediately following the attention grabbed by this case, two social media users in Nuevo Leon were found executed by a criminal group for using blogs to spread information about the ongoing violence, bringing further attention to the issue.

35 murdered bodies were found yesterday in Veracruz, killings likely by a rival criminal group. The possibility that the government would charge Twitter users attempting to report on the violent conflict while it can't effectively investigate and halt the violence in its territory is seen by many as absurd.

US and Brazil launch Open Government Partnership

2011-09-21T08:00:00.001-04:00

Presidents Obama and Rousseff officially inaugurated the Open Government Partnership (OGP) yesterday in New York. Among the six other founding members is Mexico. Committed to signing on in the next year are Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay.

The OGP is encouraging countries to build transparent and accountable governments by providing citizens with the information and tools to effectively monitor their elected leaders.

Access to government information is a right every citizen should have. Giving journalists, citizens and bloggers the ability to access and monitor information about government programs should improve government at all levels. Corruption is a problem throughout this hemisphere and building transparent institutions is key for democracy, economic prosperity and security.

This is a smart program for US policy in the hemisphere and a great leadership role for Brazil to play. There is a working group meeting scheduled for December in Brazil and a conference scheduled for March next year.

Links: Country plans and commitments by the US, Brazil and Mexico. President Obama's remarks and White House fact sheet. Post from Brazilian presidency blog. Commentary on Brazil's role from Greg Michener.

Mexico increases penalties for oil robbers and military defectors

2011-09-21T06:54:00.002-04:00

The Mexican Congress approved two new laws increasing penalties for several specific crimes hitting the country (EFE, Cronica).

Those convicted of stealing oil can receive anywhere between 6 and 18 years in prison for the offense. As discussed previously on this blog, oil theft has increased dramatically over the past few years, now up to 20,000 barrels per day.

Separately, "treason against the Armed Forces" defined as any member of the military who joins an organized crime group will receive 30 to 60 years in prison. Troops who use military equipment to commit a crime can face between 15 and 60 years for that crime.

I'm not sure longer prison sentences for either of these crimes will necessarily deter criminals. Improved investigations, prosecutions and prisons seem to be necessary.

One more DAS scandal

2011-09-20T05:59:00.003-04:00

Semana Magazine published an investigative report this weekend that outlines one last major scandal for the DAS. Colombia's intelligence agency is in the process of being shut down due to previous scandals including one former director's collusion with paramilitary groups and their espionage operations targeting political opponents of President Uribe.

Several rogue employees of the agency leaked large databases of classified files and sold those files to the highest bidders. It appears the FARC, paramilitary groups and the government of a certain antagonistic neighbor (I wonder who that could be) all jumped in on the information black market, buying up documents containing Colombia's secrets.

Semana obtained some of the files and reports that they reveal new details about DAS spying on members of the Colombian Congress. The documents also contain a list of people on the DAS payroll including undercover agents. As there are thousands of documents, it's possible Semana will have additional revelations in the coming weeks.

The current director of the DAS, Felipe Muñoz, says most of the leaks occurred in 2009 after President Uribe announced the organization would be dismantled. However, other reporting related to criminal leader el Loco Barrera suggests much more recent leaks. Muñoz says the leaks will be investigated and anyone guilty of leaking information will be punished.

Other coverage: BBC, InSight Crime, Colombia Reports, Latin America News Dispatch, EFE.

Mexican Congressman killed

2011-09-19T06:35:00.000-04:00

Congressman Moises Villanueva of the PRI was found murdered in the state of Guerrero. The deputy and his driver went missing several weeks ago.

Local party officials claim there were recent threats made against the politician. Some believe an organized criminal group was involved in the assassination. Others believe this was a political vendetta related to local politics. The federal government is investigating.