1. The Pacific Alliance held a meeting in Colombia this week. Four members - Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile - met with three aspiring members - Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama - and a mob of observers and otherwise interested countries and businesses. What happened:
    • The four current members dropped tariffs on 90% of the goods traded among them (something that was mostly done due to bilateral free trade agreements) and committed to completing the final 10% within the next few years.
    • The countries have dropped visa requirements with each other.
    • The four countries will likely create a joint visa system - Visa Alianza del Pacífico - that will allow tourists to visit all four countries on just one visa.
    • Peru dropped business visa requirements for the other three members.
    • The four current members agreed to open joint embassies in Africa and Asia.
    • The countries will conduct a coordinated trade mission in Africa and tourism promotion globally.
    • The creation of a fund to support small and medium sized businesses.
    • A fiscal transparency agreement to prevent businesses from avoiding taxes.
    • Agreement on educational exchanges, including 400 annual scholarships.
    • Agreement to consolidate a scientific network on adapting to climate change challenges.
    • Mexico signed an agreement with Chile to export meat.
    • Mexico moved forward on integration into the Integrated Latin American stock Market (MILA).
    • Costa Rica signed a free trade agreement with Colombia.
    • Guatemala and Peru will have a free trade agreement within the next few months.
    • Guatemala dropped its tourist visa requirements for Colombia.
    The agreements being signed and implemented are creating real economic integration.
  2. A few months before El Salvador's gang truce began, President Funes named two recently retired generals, Munguía Payes and Salinas Rivera, to be Minister of Public Security and Director of the Police. The appointments appeared to violate the spirit of the peace accords and constitution which state that the positions should be civilian led.

    El Salvador's Supreme Court agreed with that position last week, declaring their appointments invalid and removing the ministers from their posts. The government of President Funes has said it will comply with the ruling, though they clearly are not happy about it.

    The gangs, on the other hand, held a press conference to denounce the ruling and claim that it places the truce at risk. To criticize a Supreme Court ruling about cabinet appointments emphasizes:
    1) The gangs have become political actors with a political agenda and
    2) The ongoing truce gives the gangs political leverage as they can threaten to restart the violence.

    This goes straight to the questions about the legitimacy and sustainability of the truce. While it is certainly good news that homicides have dropped so significantly in El Salvador, it can't be good for democracy to have gangs making threats of violence if they don't get their way.
  3. The Mexican government placed a military officer in charge of security in the state of Michoacan and is sending additional military forces to the state to battle the various criminal and militia groups there. (El Universal, LA Times, InSight Crime)

    Interior Minister Miguel Osorio Chong said the federal forces will be in the state until peace and security existed. That is a long way from the Peña Nieto campaign promise to remove military forces from the streets as soon as possible.

    The EPN government insists this deployment is very different from 2006, when President Calderon deployed troops to Michoacan. They say there is better intelligence and coordination among government forces (even though they are reducing coordination and intel sharing with the US) and promise to obtain better results than the previous administration.

    Unfortunately, this deployment appears to be very similar Calderon's strategy, or lack thereof, in the early years. With few other options available in the short term, the EPN government is sending military forces into the state and simply hoping that security improves. They don't appear to have a plan, a timeline, metrics for success or a clear explanation of the resources needed.
  4. To the extent the the OAS report published on Friday offers recommendations, it says:
    1) Countries should have flexibility to develop their own strategies but policies should be coordinated across the hemisphere,
    2) Better police, judicial and penitentiary institutions along with economic development and education are needed to improve security,
    3) Drug addiction should be treated as a health issue, and
    4) Marijuana should be decriminalized or legalized.

    "Gamechanging" writes the Guardian, reflecting much of the coverage in the media and NGOs that favor drug policy reform. For some in the report-writing industrial complex (of which I'm sometimes a member), it's apparently a gamechanging accomplishment to spend $2.2 million dollars to write a report providing nearly the exact same recommendations as similar reports published over the last few years.

    I don't want to dismiss all the hard work that went into writing this report. I agree with much of the analysis and the key recommendations. While I think the scenario methodology is incorrect, there are some decent policy ideas scattered throughout that section of the report. The problem is that the OAS and others portray this report as a giant step forward for the drug policy debate when it's really just a rehash of ideas from other reports. The bar has been set so low that any report recommending legalizing pot gets cheers from the crowd. For anyone who follows the drug policy debate regularly, there is nothing new, controversial or innovative in this document.

    "Gamechanging" will be when a country or a group of countries in this hemisphere implement policies that reduce violent crime or improve health by reducing drug addiction rates. Save the word for when the direction of the game is actually changed.
  5. CID/Gallup conducted a poll in Nicaragua in early May. END published articles on approval ratings, political parties and economic concerns. Key results:
    • 62% of Nicaraguans approve of Daniel Ortega; 31% disapprove.
    • 51% think Nicaragua is on the right track; 38% think it's on the wrong track. The right track number is down slightly from 2012 but still way up from 2008.
    • The major concerns of the public are economic. Lack of employment and high costs of living were cited. 10% of people also said they lacked access to potable water.
    • 24% said their family finances were better than a year ago; 33% said they were worse. On a question about the future, 36% expected things to improve, 38% stay the same, and 17% get worse.
    • 49% of Nicaraguans identify with the FSLN. Only 5% identify with Aleman's Liberal Party (PLC) and 4% with the PLI.
    • 44% of Nicaraguans feel insecure about discussing politics in public (that number is lower in Managua; higher outside the capital). Some people who answered that said they were concerned they could lose government benefits if they were publicly against the FSLN. Gallup notes that they have some concerns over their overall polling methodology in the country given those concerns. Of course, asking a question in a poll about whether people are nervous about giving political opinions creates its own methodology problems.
    For me, the point that stands out most is the low approval rating for the "opposition" political parties. Just two years ago, both the PLC and PLI had about 20% support each. It wasn't strong, but it was a political base from which to work. Today, they have less than 10% support combined. Even if you think there is a methodology problem with the poll that overstates Ortega's and the FSLN's approval ratings, the drop in opposition party support since the 2011 presidential election is still striking.

    From a public opinion standpoint, there is no significant opposition political party right now in Nicaragua. The anti-Ortega and anti-FSLN political space (not to mention the pro-anything else space) has a real leadership and organization problem.
  6. Here are the election poll numbers from CID/Gallup:
    28%: Xiomara Castro
    21% Salvador Nasralla
    18% Juan Orlando Hernandez
    14%: Mauricio Villeda
    19%: Don't know/Not responding

    The trends look similar to the previous polls from January and April. It's a three way race.

    Castro, the wife of former President Zelaya, has a narrow lead over the other candidates and the Libre Party organization is coming along. Hernandez, the head of the Congress, continues to run poorly, but he has government influence and National Party infrastructure that should help him turn out the vote above what he is polling. Nasralla's numbers look fantastic and I expect his support to continue rising, but he lacks the party infrastructure that the others have to turn out voters on election day.
  7. Costa Rica President Chinchilla has had some strange and embarrassing scandals in her administration, hurting her public opinion numbers and forcing government officials to resign, but the scandal breaking this week may be the strangest.

    Communications Minister Francisco Chacon resigned because he let the president fly on an aircraft of THX Energy. The flights were arranged by a man named Gabriel O'Falan. The president used the plane twice: once for the funeral of Hugo Chavez and again to attend a private wedding in Peru on 11 May. This would be a potential problem as there are laws against public officials accepting undisclosed gifts (like plane flights) from private individuals or companies.

    But there is a bigger problem. The person using the name O'Falan appears to be Gabriel Ricardo Morales Fallon, a businessman with ties to drug trafficking and money laundering. Here's a profile of him from the Colombian media in 2007. Morales, if it is him, used a fake business card to con the Costa Rican government into allowing him into their inner circle and getting on a private jet with the president. THX denies that Morales is linked to their company, but that issue is still being investigated.

    Coverage: Reuters, Bloomberg, Nacion.

    Details are still being clarified, but this is a huge embarrassment for the Chinchilla government.
  8. From today's Washington Post article on child soldiers in Colombia:
    Angel Vivas, who served in the FARC from age 13 to 16, recalled how one 10-year-old fighter was executed for having thrown away his rifle. “The commander shot him right then and there and told the others to throw him in the same hole where he slept,” Vivas said.
    Then the FARC wonder why most people don't like them. Go read the whole article.

    My estimates are that the number of children currently within FARC ranks is certainly over 2,000 and potentially as high as 4,000. As the article says, the government has records of at least 5,000 child soldiers who deserted or demobilized from all the armed groups.

    Here's what I wrote when the peace talks between the government and FARC were first announced:
    There are thousands of child combatants among the FARC ranks, some as young as 12-14 years old. While the images of peace negotiations will be old men sitting at a table talking politics, the people who need to disarm and demobilize are the minors who care little about politics and are unprepared for civilian life. The older members of the FARC leadership cannot be allowed to dodge or ignore this issue. The manner and conditions in which the FARC's child soldiers demobilize will be key points for lasting peace in Colombia.
    As far as I can tell, the issue has not even come up as the pace of the talks has appeared quite slow.
  9. The Venezuelan government is looking for ways to remove Henrique Capriles from his post as governor of the state of Miranda. Specifically, pro-Maduro officials have asked the Supreme Court to rule on whether Capriles should be declared "absent" from office because he is too busy operating as the national party leader and candidate for president.

    Capriles has called this a potential "Golpe de Estado" because the government is attempting to overthrow the will of the voters in his state. In many ways, this is similar to the Paraguayan "golpeachment" scenario in which President Lugo was impeached following the letter of the constitution, but certainly not the spirit of it. There is a process for a governor in Venezuela to have his mandate revoked and the Maduro government is going to claim it is following that process while in reality violating the spirit of the law to take down a political opponent

    For Venezuela, another very relevant precedent is that of President Chavez. Over his last two years in office, Chavez spent many months in Cuba, often completely out of public view, while receiving medical treatments. The country's court system refused to rule Chavez "absent" from the presidency even though his de facto absence from the leadership role was obvious to nearly everyone. For the Court to turn around and rule Capriles "absent" even as he is governing the state would be a ridiculous change in the legal definition of that term.

    Meanwhile, Capriles and the MUD continue the legal challenge of the election results with several court cases presented to the Supreme Court. While the Court certainly leans pro-Maduro and unlikely to rule against Chavez's former foreign minister, Capriles is attempting to exercise every institutional option available on this election challenge. The legal challenge and continued public criticism on government policieis is a clear annoyance to Maduro, which explains his targeting of Capriles's position as governor.

    In another detail worth watching, the government announced it would deploy the Armed Forces to the streets to combat violent crime. Citizen security is a top issue in Venezuela and many governments around the hemisphere are deploying their militaries in police roles. However, the fact that most of the first 3,000 troops deployed by Venezuela are being sent to the state of Miranda, where Capriles is governor, certainly threatens the politicization of this military security effort.
  10. "Four of Brazil's five bestselling cars failed their independent crash tests." The AP article on how cars in Brazil fail safety tests is probably the most important read out of Latin America this weekend.

    Car companies around the world appear to be cutting corners in models sold in Brazil and other Latin American countries. Lower government safety standards and poor monitoring mean that many of the most economical cars sold in Brazil fail tests that are required for US or European consumers.

    It's likely that these safety failures on the part of both car manufacturers and Brazilian government have contributed to thousands of avoidable deaths on the country's roads. The death statistics from car crashes do not receive the same attention as a brutal massacre or a factory collapse.

    To be clear, this is not just a story about Brazil's manufacturing industry. It's not just cars made in Brazil, but cars sold in Brazil, including many that are imported. From the article:
    The Mexico-produced Nissan March compact sold in Latin America received a two-star rating from Latin NCAP, while the version sold for about the same price in Europe, called the Micra, scored four stars. The crash tests found the Latin American model had a weak, unstable body structure that offered occupants little protection in even non-serious wrecks.
    Factories in Mexico are producing essentially the same car for both regions, but with lower safety standards for the Brazilian market.

    Automakers aren't going to change their practices until politicians and regulators in Brazil and elsewhere in the region force them to do so. Political systems aren't going to move until citizens pressure them.
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